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We are habituated to an hyperactive legislature and the proliferation of legislation.  
The legislature hurtles along, causing Anglo-American legal systems to degenerate 
into massive, and often meaningless, contradictory or trivial blocks of rules and 
norms, and ones which are beyond the ordinary citizen or corporation to know and 
fully to meet. 
Legislation’s demands are ever-increasing: it grows in volume, in ambition, and it 
seems to recognise no end to its capacity and entitlement to regulate the most 
detailed, most banal or most technical of affairs.  It has lost any means by which to 
prioritise those matters with which it ought concern itself. 
The situation has been brought about by conflating an authority which Parliament 




 Centuries with the legislation it produces.  I seek to 
separate the two and show that there is no justification for attributing to legislation 
such legitimacy and authority as Parliament as an institution acquired historically.  
But because legislation-making has been based upon this assumption, there is a loss 
when Parliament legislates hyperactively because there exist normative reasons why 
Parliament should perhaps not act in such an unrestrained manner, but ones which, 
partly owing to the underlying assumptions about the authority of legislation, remain 
unaddressed.   
For so long as those who would claim for Parliament an entitlement ambitiously to 
legislate and without restraint fail to confront these considerations, there remains a 
normative loss when Parliament legislates in the manner they would advocate.   
I seek to diagnose a presently less than fully justified conferral upon legislation of 
authority and an accompanying incompleteness in the arguments of those who would 
seek to justify an activist and ambitious role for Parliament via legislation.  This is 
not to say that there is no justification for Parliament’s current disposition, but that 
the foundation upon which Parliament’s hyperactivity in legislation has been built is 
attended with a failure of those who advance such a position to confront and to meet 




Much of the law now made is legislation.  Other sources of law – or rules by which 
we live – are Court decisions and even customary ways of doing things.   
The amount of law making through legislation is a fairly new occurrence.  
Historically, the making of rules was an activity that was shared by different bodies, 
and it occurred in a much more diverse way.  
The amount and type of legislation means that Parliament has become hyperactive 
and that there is too much legislation.  This can be problematic. There has come to 
be a massive body of rules.  Not all of those rules have real and practical meaning, 
and they can be contradictory or even try to deal with topics that are trivial, or that 
citizens think are no business of government.   
Ordinary people often have trouble knowing all the rules that govern their life, their 
business, and their dealings with others.   This is a problem if we are presumed to 
know what the law is and are to be held responsible as if we actually had that 
knowledge.   
One of the troubles with legislation in current times is that we lack any way of 
knowing when and when not to legislate.  I show that to be the case here, and also 
that we need to begin thinking about what limits exist or should be put in place to 
keep legislation limited to the kinds of activities that it must deal with and that it can 
handle well. 
I do this by looking to:     
1)  how, historically, we came to tolerate such reliance upon legislation;  
2)  the relatively few limits that we presently recognise as limiting legislation; 
3)  what practical limits exist on legislation and how the Parliament itself has 
limitations; 
4)  how other sources of law (particularly the Common Law and customary law) 
can also do (and do well) some of what legislation tries to do; 
5)  understanding why, given the way we have looked at these matters historically, 
we think that legislation is an appropriate way to handle so many topics. 
I suggest that the scholars who favour unrestrained legislative activity have not fully 
justified the approach that they advocate because they have not answered some of 
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Legislation is pervasive in modern law.  There is virtually no subject matter to which 
it will decline to extend, no audience to whom it will refuse to address itself, and few 
means it will not employ to achieve its objects.  It is a situation to which we have 
been habituated.  The Legislature regulates hyperactively,
1
 with detailed commands, 
across the whole spectrum of human activity and fully cognizant of its supremacy 
over other sources of law. 
The proliferation of legislation, and therefore its complexity and volume, are 
not the only features of this state of affairs which are worthy of interest.  Legislation 
seems content to change its commands with increasing regularity, to regard itself as 
needing less and less to be informed by history and by wider legal principle, to rival 
rather than to complement other sources of law and, in a general sense, to regard 
itself as wholly unconstrained by any force other than the need for those who 
dominate its making (governments) to retain the support of the majority of the 
electorate.  The attitude that everything can be ‘well fixt by a good law’
2
 has come to 
predominate, no matter what problem it is sought to remedy and no matter what 
disruption or imposition this might cause for those commanded to comply.  Almost 
inevitably now, every perceived community problem, some failure of the private 
sector or the market, or some miscarriage of public administration, is met with 
legislative action.  The legislative response is often defaulted to unthinkingly, as if it 
were an assured, and the only possible, cure.  
                                                             
1
  The term is Lord Bingham’s:  see T H Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 CLJ 67 at 70. 
2
  L A Harper, The English Navigation Acts (1939) 381. 
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Each legislative solution regularly entails an organisational apparatus: a 
regulatory or like body to enforce the statute or administer its implementation and 
operation; a register to record licences, permits and other rights which the scheme 
recognises or creates; public officials to process applications and peruse or produce 
reports, to receive imposts and distribute subsidies and incentives.  In turn, there are 
demands for better management and scrutiny of the activities of the burgeoning 
Executive, it having become too gargantuan for even the most diligent of Permanent 
Secretaries or Ministers to oversee.  And so yet more bodies are created: in England, 
for example, there is a Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, a Comptroller 
and Auditor-General, an Information Commissioner, an Electoral Commissioner, 
Civil Service Commissioners, a Committee on Standards in Public Life, a Public 
Appointments Commissioner, a Business Appointments Committee, a House of 
Lords Appointments Committee, the UK Statistics Authority, an Audit Commission, 
Standards for England, and a Parliamentary Standards Commissioner.
3
  In Scotland 
alone between 1999 and 2007, eleven completely new bodies were created to carry 
out scrutiny previously performed by other organisations.
4
  Almost invariably, 
legislation is the means by which even these regimes are created, adjusted and 
maintained.
5
   
It is not enough for legislation simply to establish new regimes.  Unless that 
regime is one which imposes obligations or confers rights upon private parties and 
unless those rights are ones which private citizens and entities have some real 
                                                             
3
   Established, in part, owing to a lack of a clear legal definition separating Officers of the House, 
as independent constitutional watchdogs, from employees of the House.  
4
  Report of the Independent Review of Regulation, Audit, Inspection and Complaints Handling of 
Public Services in Scotland (‘Crerar Review’) (2007) para 6.2. 
5
  See, for example, Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 (UK), ch 1. 
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personal motive to assert (including to expose themselves to the risk of litigation) it 
seems often to be considered necessary, lest the statute’s irrelevance be revealed by 
its disuse (or perceived under-use) that there be a state body with the function of 
deploying its provisions.  We see particularly clear examples of this in fair trading
6
 
and consumer protection bodies, which are characteristically vested with enforcing 
and administering vast numbers of statutes, including ones that define what 
constitute unfair contractual terms.   
Other – blunter – means for encouraging compliance with statutory commands 
include imposing criminal sanctions for contravention (prosecution being, of course, 
another state-centred activity) and having as a consequence of contravention, the 
forfeiture of permits, licences or other privileges often derived from statutory 
schemes.  That in turn justifies a state agency acting as the repository for registering 
and enforcing penalties, and, in some cases, yet more legislation to support those 
functions.
7
   
The manifestations of legislation’s assertiveness lie, for example, in its 
articulation of formulae for the price at which essential services and commodities can 
be sold to consumers, contriving scarcity to create markets in which legislatively-
created and defined rights and privileges might be traded,
8
 imposing standards for 
the construction of buildings, for food and fire safety, for workplace health and 
                                                             
6
  The UK Office of Fair Trading closed on 31 March 2014 and its responsibilities passed to 
organisations including the Competition and Markets Authority and the Financial Conduct 
Authority.     
7
  See, for example:  in Australia, the New South Wales Debt Recovery Office, in Queensland the 
State Penalties Enforcement Registry; in New Zealand, the Collections Unit; in the UK, HM 
Courts & Tribunals Service; in Canada, the Environmental Enforcement Act; in the United 
States, the Central Violations Bureau (a division of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts).   
8
  Examples include water rights, rights to install and operate electronic gaming machines and to 
conduct a taxi service.  A more recent example is carbon trading schemes.  
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safety and for taste in building appearance and streetscape.  In other fields, 
legislation enacts ethics and codes of conduct.
9
  Where legislation itself lacks the 
expertise to make these rules, it engages technical standards and codes of practice to 
do its detail work, and by making non-compliance with these often minutely-detailed 
regimes a breach also of the statute, or at least presumptive evidence of such.  
Legislation shows no reluctance in addressing specialised audiences on topics within 
their particular expertise.
10
  It experiences no embarrassment by requiring its citizens 
to comply with standards, prescriptive in the extreme, that are not freely available 
and have to be acquired, at some considerable expense, from non-government 
standards bodies, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).   
Legislative proliferation accompanies not only the continuous increase in state 
functions but also the constant (and rapid) refinement and consolidation of rules, and 
then the modification of them.
11
 
We acquiesce in this system, despite the impossibility, whether we are legally 
trained or not, to know more than a relatively small proportion of the legislated rules, 
and despite knowing that the body of rules will change – and grow – rapidly.  We are 
content to do so despite the knowledge that, regardless of the reasonableness of our 
ignorance of a particular rule, we can nevertheless be held to account for a failure to 
adhere to it (ignorance of the law being no excuse). 
Acquiescence is not necessarily, of course, an endorsement of legislation’s 
dominance or even its desirability.  People (including lawyers) frequently complain 
                                                             
9
  See, for example, the Civil Service Code (made under the Constitutional Reform and 
Governance Act 2010 (UK)). 
10
  D A Farber, ‘The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism and the Rule of Law’ 
(1992) 45 Vand L R 533 at 552-553. 
11
  O Höffe, Democracy in an Age of Globalisation (2007) 75. 
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about legislative rules, about their bluntness, about their proliferation and about their 
lack of common sense.  Sceptical scholarly views have also been expressed.  For 
instance, after A V Dicey published his Law and Public Opinion in 1905, 
Christopher Columbus Langdell in his review of it, commented that the work was not 
a law book at all, the term ‘law’ commonly being used by lawyers to mean ‘law as 
administered by the courts of justice in suits between litigating parties’ whereas 
Dicey had used the term to describe legislation.
12
  In more recent times, Guido 
Calabresi has suggested we are ‘choking on statutes’.
13
  Hayek differentiated 
between law (as something not invented and conceived of independently of human 
will) and the relatively recent newcomer, legislation.
14
 
There are also very stark practical consequences.  The disparity between the 
Western appetite for the regulation of wages, of workplace safety, of manufacturing 
and environmental standards and a reluctance to regulate in this manner in less-
developed nations is marked.  One consequence of it is the movement to those less 
regulated economies from Western economies, of manufacturing and other activities 
which Western nations seek so closely to control, but which in those other nations 
run freer.  Economists take a special interest in regulation – the forms it takes, the 
incentives it provides and its impact upon economic growth.  Regulation which 
assumes a legislative form (as so much of it does) is a common object of their 
attention, owing to its greater incidence, its more agile character and its greater 
tendency than the Common Law more comprehensively to govern stated affairs.    
                                                             
12
  C C Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth Century (1906) 151. 
13
  G Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982).  The title of his Chapter 1 is 
‘Choking on Statutes’. 
14
  F A Hayek, Law, Liberty and Legislation (1982) vol 1 72-73. 
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An outsider (a person not habituated as we are to legislative proliferation) 
would be justified in being curious as to how this all came about and why there exists 
such apparent acquiescence or acceptance.  There would be many explanations to 
offer.  Legislation has had, after all, considerable and undeniable successes: 
workplaces are safer; food is more hygienic, large structures are more secure and less 
prone to fire; cities, despite being large, are sanitary and relatively clean; the air we 
breathe and the water we drink is (generally speaking) conducive to good human 
health, despite the growing scale of industry and of all the infrastructure required to 
serve our insatiable appetite to consume: ‘getting and spending’.  Society is, in 
general, safe and prosperous.  We are comfortable, and we see the state playing such 
an active role in providing our comforts.   
Legislation can claim more than just having contributed to these practical 
successes.  Its author, Parliament, carries kudos.  It was the body (with the Common 
Law’s assistance) which wrested rule-making power from absolutist Stuart 
monarchs.  Its representative nature (especially in view of the events of the late 18
th
 
century and later expansion of the franchise) clothes Parliament with a real or 
perceived legitimacy.  It took Parliament, after only a relatively short time of 
acquiring its power, to come to enact law at least as willingly and intrusively as had 
the Crown as monarch.   
There is a strong tendency to attribute to Parliament (and therefore to 
legislation) a range of virtues well beyond what is warranted, because of the role that 
Parliament played in those Constitutional upheavals, when in those struggles 
legislation had played no great role and when the whole reason for its intervention 
was to prevent the very thing that Parliament has come to embody: the unrestrained 
13 
 
deployment of imposed or enacted law.  To attribute prestige for this historical 
reason is unjustified.   It is a problematic approach because it conflates the authority 
of Parliament with the desirability of legislation.  Not only is it wrong to conflate 
those two considerations in a conceptual sense, but the bases for their conflation (the 
historical role and achievements of Parliament) are no foundation at all to do so.    
Legislation dominates today despite an agenda of legislative reform (let alone 
an activist or ambitious one) being something which until recently was considered 
not to be a necessary part of a Government being a good and diligent one.
15
  This 
transition entailed legislation finding new and more confident rationales for its 
deployment, and displacing an historical disposition against routine or unthinking 
reliance upon it. 
 Another explanation for our having acquiesced in legislation’s rise and 
possible overreach is that many in common law countries (including legal scholars 
and teachers) have not woken up to the fact that legislation has assumed this 
dominant role in our systems.  Calls are often made, in order to remedy this 
ignorance, that law students be better trained to deal with enacted law.
16
  These calls 
may amount to the acceptance of legislative dominance, rather than an appeal to 
appraise the merits of that system.  The better starting point is not to strive to learn to 
live with enacted law, but to first come to grips with what it means for the system as 
a whole to be so dominated, and whether legislation’s claims to behave so 
monopolistically and jealously are ones which ought be supported.   
                                                             
15
  S Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, 2
nd
 edn (1889) ii, 96; S A Walkland, The Legislative 
Process in Great Britain (1968) 12. 
16
  See, for example, F Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation: Drafting and 
Interpretation (2001) 180; M A Glendon, ‘Comment’ in A Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: 
Federal Courts and the Law (1997) 95-114 (Ed. Amy Gutmann).    
14 
 
Jeremy Waldron in particular has attempted that task.  Much of his work, 
however, is an apologia for legislation and legislatures.  His disclosed object is to 
restore (or assert) legislation’s good name.  Waldron has lamented the attitude so 
deeply embedded in common law countries of distaste for legislation.  In his Dignity 
of Legislation (1999) and Law and Disagreement (1999), he sets out to rectify the 
‘bad name’ which he says legislatures have in legal and political philosophy and to 
recover and highlight ways of thinking about legislation that present it as a dignified 
mode of governance and a respectable source of law.
17
  His work stands not merely 
as the work of one author, but as representing a wider proposition: that the multitude 
has a wisdom all of its own and is more likely to reach the right result than, for 
example, the lone judge, or indeed a small group of people arranging their own 
affairs.  Much of the argument Waldron makes is heavily predicated upon the 
deliberative qualities of popular assemblies and the firmly conscious nature of those 
deliberations.  
Why was Waldron’s project necessary?  If legislation has achieved dominance, 
why does it still have, somewhere in common consciousness, such a bad name?  
Does Waldron’s work expose our ignorance, or is it an indication of deep, residual or 
intuitive scepticism about the desirability of legislation having assumed the position 
it does?   
Any appraisal of the dominance of legislation brings us to conundrums which 
are not merely practical: they are well recognised as going deep into national life,
18
 
                                                             
17
   J Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (1999) 1, 2. 
18
  C Ilbert, Legislative Methods and Forms (1901) 1, 3 and 124. 
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into common consciousness and historical (mostly British) ideas.
19
  It calls upon us 
to ask to what extent we are content for legislation as a source of law to displace 
custom; what trust we have that popular assemblies and their members will control 
responsibly that larger portion of the body of laws; whether the modern legislative 
process is one that is indeed democratic and reflective of popular will; whether 
modern legislatures are equipped to make ‘good’ law; and the extent to which we are 
willing to permit intrusions into our liberty for the benefits, real or perceived, which 
legislation promises; and to ask when legislation solves some problem, what 
problems it creates; and, in a more general sense, the extent to which we might be 
content with the more interventionist, reformist and in many ways unforgiving, role 
which Parliament has acquired.  Underlying these is an even deeper influence, being 
whether and to what extent we would regard the cosmic or underlying order as 
immanent and therefore how far we would justify our entitlement to adjust or 
interfere with it.   
This brings me to the second of my objectives.  Once history disentangles for 
us the kudos we attach to Parliament and the authority we confer on legislation, we 
might explore, once freed of the assumption of legislation’s authority that I have 
identified, what considerations operate against those to which Waldron gives 
expression.  To do so is to search for principles that might mark the boundaries 
beyond which legislation ought not be allowed to pass and also to show that the 
factors upon which Waldron would rely as lending support to legislation to do not 
obtain. 
                                                             
19
  J G A Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: English Historical Thought in 
the Seventeenth Century (1957) 55. 
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Doctrinally speaking, there are few limits on legislation.  Having been freed 
from most of the historical limitations on its making, legislation has now reached the 
point that, leaving aside any written constitutional limitations placed upon it, its 
validity may not be the subject of Court challenge, even if its enactment was affected 
by fraud or misrepresentation.
20
  Courts are precluded from going behind what has 
been initiated by the legislature and questioning whether the Act arose out of 
incorrect information or even actual deception.
21
  That absolutist view is the natural 




Any Act of Parliament, or any part of an Act of Parliament, which makes a new 
law, or repeals or modifies an existing law, will be obeyed by the Courts. 
 
Courts, although they retain the function of interpreting and applying the law, 
nevertheless seek to give effect to Parliamentary will as expressed in legislation.  
There have even been statutory inroads into that function, through the various Acts 
that prescribe the rules for the interpretation of statutes.  Nevertheless, within that 
interpretative function does lie some capacity to limit legislation.  Although the rules 
of statutory interpretation largely re-assert the Courts’ subjection to the legislature’s 
will, there nevertheless remains recourse to common law principle, which, on 
occasion, operates to restrain both legislatures and legislation.  Regrettably, however, 
the Courts from time-to-time sacrifice this rare slice of autonomy, lured by the kudos 
of popular assemblies and the legitimacy which statutory words are thought to 
                                                             
20
  British Railways Board v Pickin [1974] AC 765; Edinburgh and Dalkeith Railway Co v 
Wauchope (1842) 8 Cl & F 710; 8 ER 279. 
21
  Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [1941] AC 308 at 322-323; 
Labrador Co v R [1893] AC 104 at 123 per Lord Hannen. 
22
  A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8
th
 edn (1915) (Liberty 
Classics reprint, ed R E Michener, 1982) 4. 
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confer, by framing their decisions not as applications of common law reasoning, but 
as the mere giving effect to statutory language.    
It is one thing to acknowledge the relatively small degree to which doctrine 
might limit legislation.  It is another positively to assert that additional or different 
limits exist or ought be recognised.  My task here, having deployed history to 
disentangle Parliament and legislation in terms of the kudos might attach to the latter 
by reason of an historical view of the former, is not to say that legislation ought not 
be granted the kudos it presently attracts.  It is a more modest task, namely to 
identify the pervasive confusion which comes with conflating the prestige of 
parliament and looking at legislation by reference only to how it is formed (ie of the 
characteristics of its author) and showing that to do so is to overlook many of the 
problems in relying on legislation to the extent we do, problems which in many cases 
go unanswered by the prevailing theory justifying legislative proliferation. 
The loss then, in the end, from not disentangling Parliament’s prestige and 
legislation, is not just that potential problems (including normative ones) are 
overlooked or assumed away, but there is a normative loss in a substantive sense 
because those who would advocate an ambitious role for legislation have addressed 
neither possible alternatives to that state of affairs nor many of the problems with it.  
So my claim is not that legislation ought not have the authority which we presently 
attach to it, but that there is a normative loss when popular assemblies legislate as 
hyperactively as they do, because the premise of their doing so is seriously 
incomplete.  All this takes place in circumstances in which the burden lies upon 
those who advocate such an ambitious role for Parliament (Waldron included) first to 
18 
 
meet these gaps.  Waldron’s approach, therefore, is an incomplete normative 
justification for the result which it advocates. 
The loss which I identify can be traced, when one looks to the societal 





Centuries, to distastes, evident before legislation rose to the dominant position it later 
assumed, for despotism, for absolutism and for what were seen as unnecessary or 
undue intrusions by the imposition of new and changing norms.  
The normative tensions, therefore, which underlie the wider question of what 
authority ought legislation properly possess have gone largely unaddressed 
notwithstanding legislation having acquired dominance.  On the one hand there is 
Bentham’s (18
th
 century) notion of an ‘omnicompetent’ legislature and on the other is 
legislation’s proper province being the control and regulation of government.  
Government as a ‘deliberate contrivance’,
23
 beyond its simplest and most primitive 
forms, was something which required distinct rules to determine its structure, aims 
and functions.  Hayek saw these as being quite different from rules which establish 
or articulate rules of good conduct.  And those rules, Hayek points out, arose 
independently and before those having the quality of organisation.
24
  Maitland too 
pointed out that much of 19
th
 century statute law had been concerned with public 
law: remodelling the governing authority in the state; altering the constitution of the 
Courts and the forms of procedure.
25
  Legislation now of course seeks both to 
                                                             
23
  Hayek (n 14) 124. 
24
  Hayek (n 14) 124-126.   
25
  F W Maitland, A Sketch of English Legal History (1915) 161-163. 
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organise and to establish and modify rules of just conduct: ‘[s]ince it possesses the 
authority to arrange everything, it cannot refuse responsibility for anything’.
26
 
My project entails five principal inquiries: 
1) first (in Chapter 1) there is the historical aspect: how Parliament came to 
exercise law making power, the circumstances in which it did so, and the 
process by which legislative power came to be freed of the limits which 
had historically (but often implicitly) attended it.  An inquiry of this kind 
challenges our attitudes to Parliament and legislation and shows some of 
them to be unwarranted or historically inaccurate.  The Chapter seeks to 
wake us up to the reality and consequences of a system so dominated by 
legislation by contrasting it to the more restrained role that enacted law 
once had and also to disentangle the kudos properly attaching to 
Parliament from that we (implicitly) attach to legislation.  It is the point 
from which we ought to look at legislation afresh and as conceptually 
separate from the merits or otherwise of its author;  
2) secondly (in Chapter 2) I consider the way in which doctrinal law 
conceives of limits on legislation, the principal features being the rules by 
which statutes are interpreted and given effect, the division of labour 
between the various sources of law, constitutional rules, the operation of 
common law principle and some explicit statutory controls.  The purpose 
of my doing so is to expose the extent to which doctrine at least seems to 
reflect a conflation of the authority of Parliament and legislation; 
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3) thirdly (in Chapter 3) I deal with practical and institutional limits: the 
problem of legislation continuing to command obedience and the need for 
it to remain intelligible and within the grasp of those who are the subject 
of its commands and the very real and observable impediments to popular 
assemblies and the legislative process being the true expression of 
unadulterated public will.  It is here that I introduce Waldron’s advocacy 
of legislation’s dignity.  Exploring limitations of a practical and 
institutional kind reveals an incompleteness in the advocacy of an 
ambitious role for legislation.   It shows that Waldron’s thesis overlooks 
some practical and institutional weaknesses of popular assemblies and 
legislation, and that even if Waldron’s thesis be correct, it is no 
justification for legislation of the volume and of the intrusiveness that 
characterises our current experience of it;  
4) fourthly (in Chapter 4) I look to custom as a source of law.  I explain 
(following Lon Fuller) the impossibility of understanding made law 
without first obtaining an understanding of customary law, our neglect of 
custom and, as a consequence, having done damage to our thinking about 
law generally by being unable, it seems, to imagine social order as 
coming from a source other than ‘from above’ and only after having 
received the imprimatur of the state.  An examination of custom reveals 
further losses in the approach of those who favour a legislative 
omnicompetence: of them having overlooked alternatives to a world in 
which Parliament legislates so prolifically and intrusively; of means 
different from deliberative assemblies by which public will might be 
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formed and take expression as norms; and, ultimately, it helps uncover an 
undeclared preference in the Waldron thesis that the order in which we 
live is not something that is to be considered immanent, and instead is 
something which we ought to feel no restraint in changing and 
controlling;      
5) fifthly (in Chapter 5) I investigate some of the causes of the extent and 
degree of our reliance upon legislation and its proliferation: how our 
current approach came about.  Doing so contributes to an understanding 
of the influences upon our modern disposition to favour legislation and 
what that disposition overlooks or ignores and the alternatives it precludes 
us from imagining and expressing.  Doing so adds to my diagnosis of a 
problem, being the loss – an intellectual incompleteness – when 
Parliament legislates so regularly and intrusively because Waldron’s 
thesis does not seek to meet these factors as possible causes and say why, 
despite them, the reliance on popular assemblies and legislation ought 
obtain.     
Along the way, one of the quandaries I seek to explore is how, in Anglo-
American or common law systems (upon which my project focuses) legislation came 
to monopolise so much of rule-making activity.  A feature of those systems was, 
historically at least, the primacy afforded to judicial decisions, and in particular those 
of appellate judges, as sources of law.
27
  Those systems valued adherence to 
precedent: the ‘gradual accretion from case to case’
28
 and the movement from 
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specific instances to more general rules – a search for principle.
29
  Complex (and as 




The matters I have set out above are the principal ones which provoked my 
interest in this project.  They show there to be both a largely unscrutinised rise in the 
scope and incidence of legislation and an accompanying loss of any conception of 
where, beyond express constitutional limits and democracy itself, legislation’s limits 
lie.  Moreover, there is a need to reconsider where, within traditional conceptions of 
the Common Law system, legislative proliferation fits, and the extent to which it 
compromises fundamental values of British (in particular) legal culture.   
 It is necessary to state what are the parameters of my project, so that the 
extent and context of it may be understood at the outset.  My focus, as I have said, is 
legislation in Anglo-American legal systems, united by their common ancestor, the 
Westminster Parliament.  There are of course not insignificant differences between 
the nature and operation of the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and each of its 
former colonies.  Many (Canada, the United States and Australia) operate within a 
Federal structure, something which, until Scottish and Welsh devolution at least, was 
foreign to the British system.  Many are republics, substituting a President, and 
presidential-style system of election, for a monarch.  These differences, however, do 
not substantially affect my project or call for separate or special treatment.  The 
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trends which have attracted my interest are evident in each and, constitutional rules 
aside, the same basic approach to legislation obtains.   
 So too, legislation tends to possesses the same basic characteristics within 
each.  At its most basic, legislation is the product of law-making popular assemblies 
and the rules at which those bodies arrive.
31
  The term includes delegated legislation: 
statutory rules and regulations, being rule-making over which, under Constitutional 
orthodoxy, popular assemblies retain a form of supervision and control.  Many of the 
other features of legislation which distinguish it from other sources of law and from 
consensual arrangements are dealt with later, and especially in looking to those limits 
which, doctrinally speaking, emerge from the division of labour between them.   
By focussing upon the enactments of assemblies, I would exclude what is, on 
occasion,
32
 referred to as judicial legislation: law making by Judges.  The Common 
Law, as a source of law, has entirely different characteristics from enactments. 
My ultimate concern is to not seek to portray legislation as inferior for all 
purposes to the Common Law or to advance a merely libertarian thesis as part of 
which any legislative intrusion is opposed.  To do so would be to ignore legislation’s 
demonstrable successes.  But we have been better, I suggest, at identifying 
legislation’s strengths than we have been at confronting its weaknesses, and, worse 
still, at recalling the relative strengths of other sources of law: especially common 
law and custom.  We seem to have become convinced that there is an inherent 
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benefit in more laws, as if the righteousness of a country planted thick with laws 
were not a poetic flourish but a legal truism.   
My central claims are that: there has been a loss, in advancing or acquiescing 
in legislation assuming a dominant and virtually unlimited role, both in 
understanding the kudos we attach to Parliament and (wrongly) attaching it to 
legislation; that those who advocate such a role for legislation (predominantly 
Waldron) have failed to address many of the counter-arguments against legislation 
having such a role and have failed also to consider alternative possible roles for 
Parliament and legislation; and that there exists a conceptual error in equating any 
wisdom of the multitude (if it exists) with a positive case for legislative proliferation.  
My project, therefore, seeks to diagnose and prove this loss, and at the same time, 
present some of the problems – and the alternative possibilities – as a way of going 
some way to fill what would appear to be a void in the modern jurisprudential 
vocabulary so far as limiting the proliferation of legislation and our reliance upon it 
is concerned.   
Legislation has made its own, unsuccessful, attempts to control itself.   At 
present, attempts are made both ex ante and ex post to ascertain whether legislation 
should be, or should have been, enacted.  Ex ante approaches exist in the form of 
regulatory impact assessments.  They require legislators to turn their minds to the 
benefits of regulation versus the impact of placing an additional burden on, in 
particular, business.  Ex post approaches are very much in vogue, usually in the form 
of ‘red tape’ reduction programmes, or, in the case of regulation in environmental 
fields, ‘green tape’ reduction.  They target bureaucratic rules and practices as well as 
legislative provisions.  But for all that such programmes are promoted as the means 
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by which overly burdensome regulation might be pruned and made less interfering, 
the problem they seek to mitigate has proven pervasive and intractable.  One reason 
for this, I suggest, is a lack of any principled approach to the task.  Such programmes 
articulate aspirations of simplification, and for the better assessment and calculation 
of the costs of regulation, but they have been wholly uninformed by any conceptual 
guidance as what ought and ought not be the subject of state regulatory attention, and 
alternative forms of social ordering. 
I would hope that, along the way to making good the claims I have set for 
myself, perspectives emerge by which to reconsider legislative limits, ones that are 
realistic about popular assemblies and the legislative method, ones which weigh the 
benefits and drawbacks of legislation against other sources of law, and ones which 
are capable of taking into account the normative considerations that bear upon such 
questions.   At the heart of this debate are two strands of argument: the first is that 
deliberating multitudes are better at reaching the right result and are more efficient at 
getting there; the second is a more autonomous approach, that the will of the people 
ought prevail, not through an organised assembly consciously conducting thought-
experiments, but through an enlightened pursuit of self-interest achieved by less 




Parliament’s Rise and Reputation 
 
In this Chapter I seek to destabilise certain assumptions we tend to make about 
Parliament and legislation: that Parliament is and has always been the natural 
repository of law-making power; that the role of the Courts has always been 
limited to adjudication; that the Common Law and legislation have always been 
clear between themselves about that delineation (albeit, perhaps, as one of ‘oil 
and water’
1
) and that reposing in Parliament the power to make and change law 
need be limited by nothing more than politics and democracy itself and some 
limitations of a Constitutional kind, whether they be written or customary.    
Parliament commands an increasing hegemony, almost a monopoly, over 
the state’s law-making power.  Its English form evolved from an institution 
which in the 16
th
 century was largely subservient to its Tudor masters, to one 
which, in the 19
th 
and subsequent centuries, had the confidence and capacity to 
pursue far more autonomous and ambitious objectives. 
Parliament’s almost plenary law-making power is, therefore, relatively 
recently acquired, and acquired at the expense of the Monarch, and with popular 
backing in order to control what was tending to become absolutist power in those 
hands.  Parliament’s law-making power (once a small part only of its functions) 
has come to dominate most of its attention.  That power which, in the hands of 
the Monarch it was thought necessary to control, has been freed of all but what 
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are (I will suggest) the most basic of limits: there has developed a Parliamentary 
despotism of sorts. 
The exceptions to Parliament’s near monopoly on law-making power are 
small indeed:  the Common Law may change the law gradually and on a case-by-
case basis, as Courts are called upon to determine specific rules.  But they are 
changes which, if the Courts be bold enough to make them, Parliament may, in 
an instant, abrogate.  And the Executive’s ability to make subordinate legislation 
remains subject always to Parliament’s disallowance of it. 
Without some knowledge of the events by which Parliament acquired this 
power, and the role played by the other legal and political institutions in those 
events, we are prone to certain assumptions, ones that are wrong and no basis to 
regard legislation in the way we do.  Destabilising these assumptions informs a 
point I later wish to make: that the proliferation and intrusiveness of legislation 
grates with the societal and historical circumstances in which Parliament became 
clothed with power to act as it now does.  Doing so helps to disentangle the 
assumptions we have made about Parliament and the authority we tend 
unthinkingly to confer upon legislation.   
Historical context demonstrates the ways in which an unlimited law-
making power has the potential to provoke an adverse public reaction, how 
Parliament acquired kudos as an institution likely to maintain liberty and 
constitute a counterbalance to absolute law-making power, but also how 
Parliament, despite being virtually unlimited as it has come to be, may not meet 
the ideals now widely imputed to it.  
28 
 
The historical perspective, in the sense in which I employ it here, offers 
means to retrace our steps and see whether what we appear to have drawn from 
those developments stands up to analysis.  My use of history is to help identify 
and resolve a current entanglement that is also practically and conceptually 
problematic.  
The view which I offer here is that these historical events are better 
understood as demonstrating the answer to the then-immediate need of quelling 
public distaste for the Monarch’s absolute capacity to make law and in order to 
place, in the hands of those who complained of the abuses, some of the power 
that the Monarch possessed.  As matters have evolved, however, that power has 
been freed of many of the controls which attended it when it was in the 
Monarch’s hands.  
 Unless these matters are properly understood, we wrongly impute to 
Parliament an unswerving democratic motivation and regard as illegitimate any 
attempt to inquire whether its activities are motivated by such a force, or the 
legitimacy of particular legislation.  We have come to fuse, as Luc Wintgens has 
shown,
2
 questions of the validity and legitimacy of legislation and to subsume 
entirely the latter within the former.    
I approach my topic in this Chapter in two parts:  
1)   the events and circumstances in the 17
th
 century which saw 
Parliament come to hold the power it does;  
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2)   how, in the 18
th
 century, there was recognition of the problems which 
uncontrolled power might provoke.  That new-found power was first 
sought to be controlled by a legislative science, but was ultimately 
freed of almost all its external restraining influences;  
Later (in Chapter 5) I take up again the theme of how restraints on the 
legislature have, over time been relaxed or removed, not only those that bear 
directly upon it, but also some of more general application to human activity.  
What Brian Tamanaha describes in this sense as the loss of ‘higher laws’ is 
important in understanding some of the causes of legislation’s rise to dominance.   





 century Parliament, although not wholly subservient to the 
Monarch, rarely sought to assert itself beyond the role of an experienced 
advisory Council.  It was the forces and events of the 17
th
 century which caused 
it to become more assertive and to acquire an independent identity and function.  
Gaining some understanding of this historical backdrop, and of the forces and 
events which took place, provides a starting point from which to assess some 
assumptions which now seem to underpin our current attitude and approach to 
popular assemblies and to legislation, namely: that Parliament is the natural 
repository of law making power; that Parliament, by its institutional 
characteristics, provides most of the restraints on law-making power as might 
reasonably be required; and, that there is an historically-settled position as to the 
respective roles of the Common Law and legislation.  The assumptions appear to 
be both sociological – a widespread tacit acceptance of Parliament conducting 
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itself in the way it does – and also to have imbued the scholarly treatment of the 
topic, which, for the most part as I show later, largely takes the status quo for 
granted.   
Parliament’s role in 16
th
 century England was influenced heavily by the 
dominating Tudor monarchy and by the Reformation and the upheavals it 
produced.  Tudor influence was a popular despotism, one which stood in contrast 
to Louis XIV’s continental aristocracy but which co-existed with the English 
medieval distaste for temporal absolutism.
3
  Even Tudor royal power had its 
serious competitors: in feudal structures; the formidable and centralised 
(particularly pre-reformation) Church juggernaut; and myriad other specialist 
institutions: for example abbeys, universities, colleges, schools, town 
corporations, craft guilds, and the Inns of Court.  What has been referred to as 
‘legalised and regulated anarchy’
4
 helps place the Tudor monarchy, as 
dominating as it may have been, in the wider (and more complicated) context of 
competing spheres of power.  
The Tudor period saw Parliament become better equipped and qualified to 
be a critic of the Crown and even to rival it.
5
  Country gentry and the commercial 
classes were elevated to political importance and had steadily improved their 
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  Those classes had benefitted from the spoils of the disbanded 
monasteries and profited from the improved trade with the New World at Spain’s 
expense.
7
  Parliament’s power had been employed in the meantime to effect the 
sweeping changes for which the Reformation had called, reforms which might, 
theoretically at least, have been effected by Royal injunction
8
 but which Henry 
VIII chose to effect through his willing Parliament.  
The use of Parliament to effect much of the Reformation agenda helped to 
secure recognition of its capacity to marshal and crystallise public sentiment, an 
attribute recognised by Henry VIII’s choice of it as the vehicle for those 
sweeping changes.  Those reforms also had the consequence that the composition 
of Parliament itself changed:  Abbots and Priors no longer attended the House of 
Lords, and although Bishops remained, the Lords Temporal now, and for the first 
time, held the majority there. 
These factors helped set the scene for the century which was to follow, 
first by equipping Parliament to act more competently, second by persons having 
been enlisted and resourced who were more likely than previously to have views 
which were to some extent independent of the Crown and, finally, by giving 
Parliament a practical demonstration of the power that it could itself wield, and 
partly by reason of its greater capacity to be the repository of, and give 
expression to, popular will.   
It was the next monarchical dynasty which was to confront the difficulties 
to which these factors gave rise.  They did not manifest themselves so long as the 
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Tudors’ popularity and political genius subsisted and before serious divisions 
were to emerge within the Church.  
The Scottish parliament was in a rather different position from the English, 
albeit that it, by other means, acquired in the 17
th
 century greater means for the 
exercise of an independent voice.  For a little over half of the 16
th
 century, the 
Scottish Crown was held by a minor,
9
 with the consequence that, as MacIntosh 
and Tanner have remarked:
10
 
The absence of strong personal kingship and the resultant factionalism, 
recurrent features of government during minorities, saw parliaments 
summoned frequently to provide political direction.  Parliamentary 
authority, therefore, was enhanced, strengthening the estates’ role in 
legitimising action taken for or against the crown. 
… 
For much of the first half of the sixteenth century, parliament was either a 
tool in the hands of whatever regent or faction happened to have control of 
government, or it was sidelined when the monarch assumed personal 
authority.       
 
As with the English Reformation agenda, the equivalent agenda’s 
implementation in Scotland also served to underline the political importance of 
that Parliament.
11
  And, like the English Parliament, the fact that it was the 




At the outset of the 17
th
 century, the Stuarts were met with an institution 
capable of self-assertion and initiative, but which, under Tudor management, had 
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  It is from the turn of that century, coinciding with the 
accession of James VI to the English throne, that a marked change can be 
observed in the relationship between the Monarch and Parliament.  By the end of 
that century, the English Parliament had come to act as a major restriction upon 
absolute and despotic royal power.  It is difficult to know the extent to which this 
was the result of a change in public sentiment or a response to new or more 
striking abuses of that power.  It may have been both.
14
  Stuart absolutism was 
certainly a contributing factor.
15
  It is nonetheless interesting that it took longer 
in other parts of Europe for despotism to face any serious threat.  Foreign as it is 
to modern attitudes, despotism was, Trevelyan once ventured, not something 
which has always been uniformly challenged or condemned:
16
  
Despotism … was the secret of efficiency; freedom was a luxury to be 
enjoyed by small communities like the Cantons of Switzerland and the 
seven provinces of Holland. 
 
In 1603, with accession of Scottish King James VI to the English throne and the 
Union of the Crowns, came, inevitably, enhanced royal power.
17
  James gained 
in the Westminster Parliament an alternative and additional source of funds.  He 
was absent often.  Parliament met less frequently.  The Stuart dynasty (1603-
1688) (which commenced in England with James VI/I) saw relative harmony 
between England and Scotland.  That followed naturally from James holding 
both Crowns, having succeeded to his mother’s Scottish throne in 1567.  Unity 
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of the Crowns did not mean unity in the religious outlook of his people, being 
beliefs which had nationalist identities.  The English reformation had been 
influenced principally by Luther.  The (slightly later) Scottish reformation was 
one in which the views of the more fundamentalist John Calvin dominated.  
There were divisions then, not just between the Roman Catholic Church and 
those who sought an alternative communion, but among branches of that 
protesting group.  This problem of fragmentation within Protestantism in the 17
th
 
century presented new and difficult problems for the Stuart Monarchy, problems 
which the Tudors had to some extent escaped or avoided.     
The principal demonstrations of absolute Stuart power were attempted 
incursions into the Protestant faith, the governmental models for which it called, 
the greater Stuart need for funds and the Stuart mode of governing in general.  
An understanding of these, and the response of the Parliament and the Common 
Law to them, is a basis upon which to understand the prestige which Parliament 
came to attract and what it was that provoked such a sustained and successful 
reaction.   
From the outset of his British reign, James I/VI refused to permit within 
the ecclesiastical establishment, any aspect of the puritan movement.  His 
decision to do so was not the product of his own religious convictions: he was a 
Calvinist.  His desire was to avoid the political consequences which such a 
relaxation might provoke,
18
 knowing from his experience of Scotland (in which 
he was raised and over which he had already reigned for some 36 years) the risk 
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this might pose to him.  The Scottish Presbytery was, ultimately, at odds with a 
monarch of the Stuart kind.   
Each of James’s Parliaments was dominated by a Puritan majority.  His 
1604 decision, in response to the so-called ‘Millenary Petition’
19
 to reject 
entirely what was sought, set him immediately at odds with Parliament.
20
  That 
petition sought, among other things, the discontinuance of the making of the sign 
of the cross in baptism and adjustment of the service to make more room for 
sermons.   
James’s difficulties with Parliament did not stop at religious ones.  He had 
a need for funds, due in part to his lesser capacity (shared by all the Stuarts) to 
control his spending.
21
  This gave rise to a vicious circle:
22
 the need to summon 
Parliament frequently to seek subsidies (and therefore to break with the 
convention that Parliament meet rarely and on great occasions only); frequent 
Parliaments meant greater opportunities for Parliamentary criticism and the 
airing of ecclesiastical grievances; redress of these matters could be used as 
leverage to refuse supply; the Crown thus came under pressure to maximise 
sources of revenue which did not depend upon Parliament (even though doing so 
involved the imposition upon subjects through forced billets and loans); in turn 
giving rise to fresh grievances for Parliament to redress.   
Many of these conflicts arose from James VI/I having had familiarity 
with the Scottish Parliament only, and his successor, Charles I, the English 
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Parliament only, reflecting the countries in which they, respectively, had spent 
their early lives
23
 and the important differences between them.  James is said to 
have tended to treat the English Parliament as obedient to the Privy Council, just 
as Charles treated the Scottish Church as subservient to royal command.
24
  
 James, in 1610, was faced with an opinion of Sir Edward Coke as the 
Chief Justice of Common Pleas (Judges then acted also as the Crown’s advisors) 
which defined the limits of the effectiveness of Royal Proclamations.  The 
Commons complained that Proclamations had sought to establish offences not 
known to the law, and sought to bring them before tribunals who lacked the 
lawful authority to try them.  James answered the petition by referring the 
question to his judges.  Their reply (which is that of Coke) is part of the radical 




… the King hath no prerogative but that which the law of the land allows 
him.  … 
   
Perhaps there is no clearer illustration of James’s absolutist view of his 
monarchy and of the subordinate role of the Parliament than his True Laws of 
Free Monarchies (1598), published under a pseudonym, in which he referred to 
Parliament as ‘nothing else but the head courte of the king, and his vassals’, and 
as an institution without independent legislative authority because it could pass 
no statute unless the King, by touching the Act with his sceptre, indicated his 
consent to it.  This statement, although perhaps more an assertion of James’s 
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 nevertheless shows how opposed were the contrary positions 
of the Crown and Parliament.  It shows too how the notion of a legislature was, 
perhaps until at least the mid-17
th
 century, simply a name for representative 
assemblies directing or controlling government rather than giving expression to 
any real separation of powers.
27
     
In 1625, when James VI/I died and his son Charles I succeeded, the 
failures of the King’s prohibitively expensive wars against France and Spain 
became even clearer.  Those failures tarnished monarchical prestige.  The vicious 
circle was thus perpetuated: these ambitious yet unsuccessful ventures 
necessitated seeking from Parliament the means of funding them.  The 
consequence was the need for Charles I to submit himself to Parliament in the 
form of the Petition of Right of 1628, and, along with it, to cement his need to 
have Parliamentary approval for the raising of any funds:
28
  
… no man hereafter be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, 
benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by Act of 
Parliament. 
  
The Commons became the King’s opposition.  Charles governed without the 
English Parliament for the eleven years between 1629 and 1640.  In so doing, 
and by dismissing those judges who would not interpret laws in his favour,
29
 
Charles sought to exclude Constitutional checks upon his actions.   
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 With Parliament under threat, the Common Law again mobilised.  Coke 
again features.  He served first as Chief Justice of Common Pleas (1606-1613).  
Despite attempts to render him less influential (and against which he protested)
30
 
he was later Chief Justice of King’s Bench (1613-1616).  His was one of the 
main roles in deploying the Common Law both to protect Parliament and at the 
same time secure the loss to the Crown of the law-making function which had 
been reposed historically in the Monarch (along with other powers we now 
recognise as distinct) but which collectively have been known as the royal 
prerogative.   
That the Common Law could be so mobilised, that there was a perceived 
need for it to be mobilised and that the purpose of doing so was to further 
Parliament’s interests, reveals much about underlying social use of law making 
power at the time.  First, it suggests that it was considered desirable to wrest law 
making power from the Crown, and that the transition of that power from the 
Crown to the Parliament was by then, if not incomplete, not secure.  Secondly, it 
shows the struggle to have been one motivated by more than merely 
Parliamentary forces.  Thirdly, and in a related sense, it demonstrates the 
widespread support for limiting otherwise absolute power.  Fourthly, it shows the 
relationship between Parliament and the Common Law to have been one in 
which there was not an entirely clear delineation of roles, but a relationship in 
which there is no evident rivalry or deep-seated antagonism.  
What can be drawn from this is that the control of monarchical law making 
power was a response to abuses of it, more than the product of a desire to have a 
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representative assembly vested with such power.  And no part of that move in 
any way suggested that Parliament ought exercise its power any more regularly 
or confidently than had the Monarch.  
The skilful mobilisation of the Common Law took several forms.  Coke 
wrote the Petition of Right 1628, the Parliamentary petition which reinforced 
what Coke himself had said in his 1610 Case of Proclamations: that the King’s 
proclamations were ineffective to change any part of the Common Law or create 
any offence without Parliament.
31
  The Petition protested against the imposition 
of tax without Parliamentary approval (apparently still then controversial); 
detention of individuals in prison without cause shown; and against forced 
billets.   
That the King in 1610 had considered it necessary (or had no choice but) to 
refer to his judges the question of the lawfulness of proclamations, shows what 
room there must have been for debate about whether Stuart Kings were so 
constrained.  Coke too recognised it as a question of great importance: one which 
concerned ‘the answer of the being to the body, viz, to the Commons of the House 
of Parliament’.   
 Returning for a moment to the 1610 opinion, it offers an insight into the 
way in which the Common Law was employed to support Parliament as the 
proper repository of law making power.  The questions Coke was asked are not 
ones whose Constitutional significance is immediately apparent: can the King by 
proclamation prohibit new buildings in and about London?  Can he prohibit the 
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making of starch from wheat?  Coke however, sees the consequence of these 
matters for the extent of the King’s law making power, and in doing so addresses 
the crucial Constitutional question of the day. 
 The tension between the competing sides is discernible: the Lord 
Chancellor urges the Judges ‘to maintain the power and prerogative of the King’; 
but, in any event, because there is no authority and precedent, to ‘leave it to the 
King to order in it, according to his wisdom, and for the good of his subjects’.  
There probably was, in fact, no precedent.  Tudor Judges had been subservient to 
the Crown, and their decisions were adverse to Constitutional freedoms.
32
  Coke 
turns the absence of precedent to his advantage: ‘every precedent ought to have a 
commencement’, he says, and before establishing ‘any’ thing of novelty, great 
consideration is required.  This, then, Coke uses to justify the making of the rule: 
… the King by his proclamation or other ways cannot change any part of 
the common law, or statute law, or the customs of the realm…; infra: also 
the King cannot create any offence by his prohibition or proclamation, 
which was not an offence before, for that was to change the law, and to 
make an offence which was not… 
 
The decision itself identifies proclamations which are ‘utterly against law and 
reason’, suggesting of course, this decision did set a precedent and that Coke’s 
decision was more one of ‘reason’ (and perhaps political reason) than the 
application of settled legal principle.  Dicey referred to Coke’s reasoning in other 
(related) decisions of the time as ‘artificial’ and ‘unhistorical’, but as surpassing 
any stroke of enlightened statesmanship in enforcing a rule (in that instance, that 
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the King could not withdraw cases from the Courts for his personal 
determination) so essential to the existence of the Constitution.
33
     
In these events, we see not only the Common Law’s co-operation with 
Parliament’s desire to overcome or limit arbitrary and excessive power, but also 
its mobilisation to protect Parliament at a time when that body was most 
threatened.  The joining of these forces occurred amidst countervailing attempts 
to displace all forms of control on royal power.  It shows how there had by then 
developed the firm conviction of a monarch with limited powers: a view that 
certain powers, once within the Monarch’s traditional reach, were now held by 
organs which, although they might be formal emanations of his office, were now 
beyond his direction.   
Knowledge of this helps us to comprehend the place which the Common 
Law occupies in English legal culture, as a stabilising force and as a protection 
against absolutism, and all the more so because these important events took place 
in the periods in which both stability and balance were so seriously under threat.  
It is also part of the English preference for common law over legislation, which 
is something that Jeremy Waldron
34
 and R C van Caenegem
35
 have both 
observed, albeit from different perspectives.   
There is something confusing on first analysis between the deep-seated 
English preference for the Common Law and what I advance as an explanation 
for our contemporary willingness to tolerate a parliament virtually unlimited in 
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its law making power.  How can the consequence of historical events I have set 
out above found a preference – deep in the national consciousness – for common 
law, and at the same time a modern tendency to ascribe to Parliament great kudos 
for it having acquired and thereby limited, royal law-making power?  And how 
can a preference for common law and a view of legislation as inferior to this rival 
source be reconciled with a respect for Parliament having succeeded in its great 
struggle?   
I would explain these apparent tensions in this way: 1) the Common Law 
had demonstrated its capacity to establish and enforce Constitutional 
Government; 2) Parliament had stood firm in its opposition to the King; 3) there 
was a popular desire that the King not have law making power (having abused it, 
and especially in financial matters); 4) nowhere, however, had legislation played 
any particular role in these events; and, 5) these historical events show that the 
completion of the transfer of law making to Parliament was not the product of 
any desire for some Parliamentary agenda, but that a royal legislative agenda 
was to be avoided.  The whole push had been for freedom from intrusion by royal 
power, and that power being vested in or remaining with Parliament, not for the 
creation of some new order, which would have required the support of 
legislation, but because of the relief from absolutism which that afforded.
36
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Stuart absolutism was not directed towards Parliament only: the Common 
Law too faced threats from the Stuart establishment and it mobilised its 
protectors.  Coke was one of the protectors, but for that reason also a target of the 
Monarch, and hence his ‘demotion’ from Common Pleas to Kings Bench.  The 
prerogative courts (Star Chamber and the Court of High Commission in 
particular) adopted canon law rather than common law procedures.  The 
continued use of the former in Stuart times reaffirmed a widely-held view that 
the Stuart establishment was one more fitting of Rome than something home-
grown.  It was Parliament (Charles I’s Long Parliament) which abolished the Star 
Chamber.
37
  And it did so in the name of the Common Law.
38
  
Revolt came.  And it came from the North.  The Scottish revolt against 
Charles I expressed itself as the National Covenant; in part religious, but also 
political by its exclusion of any necessary involvement of the King in church and 
religious affairs: ‘God and His Kirk’.
39
  Covenant ideology, expressed perhaps 
most prominently by Samuel Rutherford in his Lex, Rex, sought to turn Stuart 
absolutism on its head, for example:
40
 
If the estates create the king, and make this man king, not that man, (as is 
clear from Deut. xvii. 18, and 2 Chron. v. 1-4,) they give to him the power 
of the sword, and the power of war, and the militia; and I shall judge it 
strange and reasonless, that the power given to the king, by the parliament 
or estates of a free kingdom, (such as Scotland is acknowledged by all to 
be,) should create, regulate, limit, abridge, yea, and annul that power that 
created itself.  Hath God ordained a parliamentary power to create a royal 
power of the sword and war, to be placed in the king, the parliament's 
creature, for the safety of parliament and kingdom, which yet is destructive 
of itself? Dr Ferne saith that "the king summoneth a parliament, and giveth 
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them power to be a parliament, and to advise and counsel him;" and, in the 
meantime, Scripture saith (Deut. xvii. 18-20; 1 Sam. x. 20-25; 2 Sam. v. 1-
4) that the parliament createth the king.  Here is admirable reciprocation 
of creation in policy!  Shall God make the mother to destroy the daughter?  
The parliamentary power that giveth crown, militia, sword, and all to the 
king, must give power to the king to use sword and war for the destruction 
of the kingdom, and to annul all the power of parliaments, to make, 
unmake parliaments, and all parliamentary power, what more absurd? 
  
While in England it was the Crown and Parliament who were at odds, in 
Scotland the quarrel was between the King and the Kirk.  But in many ways the 
centre of both disputes was a common core.  
Charles I’s failure to obtain money from the Short Parliament to fight the 
Scots and their Covenant, along with the success which the Long Parliament had 
achieved in assuming the government of the country
41
 are critical to an 
understanding of Parliament’s rise and reputation.  The Long Parliament found 
its strength, in part, in the deep experience of many of its members, their 
associations in committee with Sir John Eliot (1592-1632) (a key Parliamentary 
figure of his time and gifted rhetorician) and Sir Edward Coke
42
 and the absence 
of reticence in employing physical force to attain power: a willingness to grasp 
the power of the sword.
43
 
 Cromwell believed in the necessity of Parliamentary rule
44
 and was an 
ardent Parliamentarian,
45
 so Parliament had no real quarrel with the 
Commonwealth, itself a state of affairs which the English Parliament had helped 
bring about.   
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 It is in the Restoration of the Monarchy (with Charles II’s accession to 
throne)
46
 that important pro-Parliamentary themes merged.  Britain had been 
without a monarchy and had experimented with truly Parliamentary government.  
Yet in that form too, absolute power had proved intolerable.         
Parliament (particularly the Scottish Parliament) had a role in facilitating 
the Restoration.  Charles II, in the Declaration of Breda, which issued on 4 April 
1660, proclaimed his pardon for crimes committed during the Civil War and the 
Interregnum for all who recognised him as the right and lawful King, and 
promised also, religious toleration.  The Declaration comprises several letters 
addressed to, among others, Parliament.  That Declaration, however, was no 
spontaneous act.  Viscount Stair (among others), who had refused to take the 
oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth, had been involved in its negotiation 
and had travelled to Breda for that purpose as one of the Scottish Parliament’s 
Breda Commissioners.
47
  The Scottish Parliament had proclaimed Charles II the 
successor of Charles I upon his execution.  The Scots, with a Covenant 
mentality, sought from Charles II a commitment about the fundamentals of the 
way in which he would exercise his royal power.  Initial negotiations took place 
at the Hague in 1649, but were not successful. Further negotiations took place 
between Charles II and a delegation of Scottish Commissioners (Stair included) 
commencing on 25 March 1650.  They communicated the demands of the 
Scottish Parliament, including that Charles would sign the Covenant and promise 
to impose it on all in his three Kingdoms, that he and his household would adopt 
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the Presbyterian faith, that Catholicism would not be tolerated and the King 
would recognise the Scottish Parliament and confirm all Acts it had passed since 
1641.   
Charles agreed to take the oath of the Covenant and signed the Breda 
Treaty (the precursor to the Declaration) on 1 May 1650.  
Much later, a secret message was sent by George Monck (then, in effect, in 
control of England) prompting the Declaration’s making.  Parliament passed a 
resolution declaring that Government ought to be by the King and Parliament, 
inviting Charles to take the throne.       
The Parliament which effected the Restoration was not summoned by the 
King as had been previous ones.  It was therefore no Parliament at all, but a 
Convention.  This Parliament, having constituted itself as it did, virtually 
anointed a King, and on terms.  It enjoyed not only an a priori superiority over 
the Monarch; it had effectively swapped places with Royalty which, until now, 
had possessed that metaphysical quality of having subsisted – uninterrupted – 
since time immemorial. 
It was Parliament that resolved to restore Charles II to the throne,
48
 such 




 It is clear that Parliament has attained a position in the state which it 
never possessed under the Tudors or the first two Stuart kings.  It was no 
longer a body to be called in occasionally to assist the king’s government 
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by sanctioning the new legislation, or by voting the supplies which that 
government considered to be necessary.  
  
Restored as Charles II might have been, he did not enjoy the position of either 
his father or grandfather.  
 The succession of Charles II’s brother James VII/II in 1685 coincided 
with Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, visiting cruelty on 
Protestants in France and renewing in England a hatred of Popery and a fear of 
the new King, whose disposition was always Catholic.
50
  Fears of this kind 
united groups within Protestantism who had in many ways been rivals. 
 James VII’s suspension of the laws against Roman Catholics and 
dissenters, and the admission of Catholics to civil and military posts in 1688, 
confirmed the worst fears of English Protestants.  The Glorious Revolution 
followed, as did another Convention Parliament.  
Here, on the eve of the 18
th
 century, occurred two connected events by 
which Parliament confirmed the position to which it had risen:  James VII/II fled 
his realms; and Parliament filled the throne. The new (joint) Monarchs were 
William and Mary, both of whom had some birthright, but not such as would, 
without Parliament’s intervention, have trumped that of the departing James. 
The way in which the Revolutionary Settlement was effected says much 
about how far Parliament had travelled.  Rather than establish a regency in 
James’s name (something Tories advocated) or appointing Mary only (as having 
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the closer right), Parliamentary will prevailed.  J G A Pocock spoke of the fall of 
James from the English throne and the consequence that the manner in which 
that had been effected had for the concept of the ‘ancient constitution’.
51
   The 
view he expresses is as follows:
52
 
To this, then, the ancient constitution had come: a conservative and 
legalist version of the contract, a sanction … by which the doctrines of 
election and deposition might be justified. 
The ancient constitution was not of itself necessarily anti-monarchical.  Once 
James VII/II claimed too absolute a power, and at least tacitly, that all customs 
and privileges derived from his will, the ancient constitution could be employed 
to disprove that assertion, as divorcing, as it would, the role of custom.
53
  By this 
means, the ancient constitution became incompatible with the sovereignty of the 
King, at least in the form in which James had asserted it.  But the ancient 
constitution also had revolutionary possibilities:
54
   
The idea that it belonged to parliament to define the content of the ancient 
constitution, and that all actions undertaken in its defence were legitimate, 
obviously led to the revolutionary sovereignty of that body; yet it is 
paradoxically significant that parliament should have clung as long as it 
could to the doctrine that its acts were justified by fundamental law – by a 
body of ancient custom which it repudiated all claim to have made. 
     
There are, of course, many nuances associated with the events I have surveyed 
above.  Pocock’s observations, however, coming as they do with the benefit of 
the wider lens which his historiographical perspective affords, shows how these 
events merged in the 18
th
 century notion of the ancient constitution.  That notion, 
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understood as Pocock authoritatively suggests it must be, shows the dominating 
idea to have been that of immemoriality or ancient custom, something which 
entailed a clear preference for what was immanent and a rejection of that which 
was willed.  This had significance of course for the Crown, because the ancient 
constitution subjected its sovereignty to the need to respect those ancient customs 
and to deny to the Monarch the ability to exercise his or her prerogative to will 
law into existence.  The significance for Parliament was to be recognised as 
better able to respect the ancient constitution, and be more restrained in the 
extent to which it would exercise its will (albeit a collective will).  This restraint, 
which came as a necessary part of its newly-acquired power over the Crown (as 
the very basis upon which the Parliament came to be seen as the preferable 
repository of law-making power) was something which, over the next century or 
so, it was to shed. 
The Settlement, the Bill of Rights which accompanied it, and William and 
Mary’s willingness to submit themselves to it, almost complete my overview of 
Parliament’s rise:  it had secured law-making power from the Crown, and in 
doing so saved the populace from the absolutist exercise of that power by the 
Monarch.  Parliament was once again to assert its king-maker role when, only 
shortly afterwards, statute, the Act of Settlement 1701, took effect in 1714 upon 
the death of Queen Anne to anoint the (Protestant) House of Hanover as the 
English royal line. 
50 
 
These arrangements, so fundamental as to be Constitutional in nature, came 
to imbue English law and Government, such that there emerged a ‘supreme law’, 
of which Holdsworth speaks in these terms:
55
 
 In England alone the monarch’s powers had been limited and subjected 
to the rule of law.  The result was that England had acquired a form of 
government and a system of law which were unique, because both in the 
government and the law of England medieval and modern elements had 
met and blended.  From this blend there had emerged a constitution in 
which the two Houses of Parliament had the predominating influence, 
and in which all the members of the state, except the King, and all the 
institutions of government, including the Prerogative itself, were subject 
to a supreme law. 
 
Of these events, Parliamentary supremacy is said to have been the greatest 
political outcome of this period, and to have been a ‘conspicuous change’ in the 




This account of some of the more important stepping stones to 
Parliament’s rise in the 17
th
 century offers an insight into its role and status at the 
commencement of the 18
th
.  Parliament had played its role not only in 
maintaining relative stability in government through the Commonwealth, the 
Restoration, the Glorious Revolution and the Hanoverian genesis, but also in 
providing some check on otherwise absolute and often despotic royal power.  But 
that role was, for the most part, not one exercised via legislation.  Whereas the 
                                                             
55
  Holdsworth (n 31) vol XI 274; see also J I Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, 
Modernity and the Emancipation of Man 1670-1752 (2006) 8-9.  Israel distinguishes the 
Glorious Revolution from earlier like events for its creation of a ‘fundamentally new type 
of parliamentary monarchy’, 8.  
56
   J-L Halperin, Five Legal Revolutions Since the 17
th
 Century (2014) 12.  The ‘Bloody 




exercise of the Common Law (already by then a long-standing institution) had 
played a part in confirming the loss to the King of his absolute power, in no 
sense could Parliament’s role be said to be one which had been expressed in its 
legislative agenda.  It was, instead, the insistence by Parliament of its capacity to 
legislate (ie its monopoly on law-making) rather than its actually doing so, by 
which it asserted itself in the 17
th
 century.  This power, however, was attended 
with restraints, and ones derived from an expectation of it being more likely that 
Parliament would respect custom (and thereby being restrained in the exercise of 
legislative power) than would the Monarch. 
The account offers also a point from which to understand the depth and 
strength of the place in English legal culture of the Common Law, and the role it 
played as an ally of Parliament in maintaining an insistence upon freedom from 
the exercise of power in which subjects had no say.  If, as van Caenegem 
suggests, legal history is part of political history and that the different political 
development of the various European nations was largely responsible for the 
respective importance of the judiciary, the legislature and the law faculties in 
shaping the law,
57
 we have a basis better to understand from that comparative 
history the Common Law’s force, if not its imaginative power.  It also offers us 
an explanation why, in the English system in recent centuries, questions about 
what limits there ought to be on legislative reach seem to have been held more as 
unstated assumptions than fleshed out through considered and systematic 
philosophical analyses.   
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One way by which limits of legislation might be identified is to look back 
to a time when legislation operated within narrower boundaries than now and 
investigate the causes of the different attitudes to it.  It is a potential source of 
understanding, even if not of the nature of the limits themselves, of the culture of 
the Common Law.  It is therefore one means by which better to understand the 
peculiarly British attitude to legislation and the legislature.   
At a more abstract level, having some understanding of the prestige which 
had accrued to Parliament by the commencement of the 18
th
 century and the 
basis upon which it acquired its late 17
th
 century ascendancy takes us also to a 
period in which Parliament found a group of powerful, practical philosophers 
who, although often critical of the way in which its legislative power was being 
deployed, gave expression to the systematic (‘scientific’, as that era saw it) and 
confident exercise of that newly-acquired power.  The events of the 17
th
 century, 
and the emergence of Parliament as a force in its own right, set the stage for the 
18
th
 century’s search for the science of a power which, now unlocked from royal 
control, offered new possibilities, both dangerous and promising. 
II 18th Century Legislative Science 
 
By the turn of the 18
th
century, Parliament was a fully functioning body, with 
autonomous objects and functions clearly differentiated from those of the 
Monarch.  That century saw also an explosion in public thought about 
approaches to law and legislation, one which accompanied the Enlightenment’s 
self-conscious study of humankind, man’s sentiments and perceptions, and the 
conditions under which we might prosper and be happy.  In that period, and in 
53 
 
this sequence, Lord Kames (Adam Smith’s mentor) advocated the ‘judicial 
route’ to legal improvement,
58
 Smith himself developed his sophisticated natural 
jurisprudence, and Bentham devised and advanced his theory of utility as the 
basis for a confident, omnicompetent legislature.   
Attempts to understand the origins and development of the intellectual 
endeavours of the 18
th
 century and its lasting effects are numerous and the 
project
59
 as a whole is incomplete.
60
  But such attempts do explain much about 
the Common Law’s place in British legal culture, a place made even more 
important if, as many have claimed, it is by reason of those events that Britain 





It is the period in which influential theorists began both to articulate a discipline 
for legislative action and also to lay the foundations for the relatively recently-
empowered Parliament to be justified in the confident deployment of its 
legislation.   
The immediate historical context of the 18
th
 century developments was the 
Enlightenment.  But there were as well, as we have seen, events which touched 
Parliament specifically and directly: ones which prepared the ground for a more 
confident and active role for Parliament.  The principal practical catalyst was the 
need to control the Stuart monarchy, but it was the era too of a new-found 
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confidence in human reason, which brought with it the susceptibility of long-
standing institutions being exposed to new forms of scrutiny and analysis. 
The 18
th
 century science of legislation was a systematic inquiry into how 
legislative power might better be employed.  To some, the aim of the exercise 
was to cleanse the statute book, to others it was employing legislative power to 
fulfil the function of ‘cognoscibility’
62
 of law by, among other things, its 
codification.  Such approaches, even of the latter kind, were still less than 
absolutely formulated.  Bentham, while by no means reluctant when it came to 
employing legislative power, nevertheless operated with clear (but implicit) 
limitations on the exercise of that power in mind.  Even that most vigorous and 
persistent advocate of the potential of legislative power would not release it from 
all its restraints.  A development of that kind would take those who came later to 
advocate.   
The Christian philanthropists of the 19
th
 century mobilised legislative 
power and showed that the limits within which legislative power had until that 
time operated were ones from which it could – and ought – free itself. 
My focus here is on three legislative scientists of the 18
th
 century who, 
together, offer an understanding of boundaries (both express and implied) within 
which legislative power at that time operated.  They are part also of the transition 
which can be seen in this century from a cautious disposition towards legislation 
to a much more confident one. 
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Henry Home (1696-1782) was to Adam Smith a mentor
63
 (as he was to 
many)
64
 and an intellectual precursor to Jeremy Bentham.  Home became a 
Scottish Judge, and upon that appointment became known as Lord Kames.  He 
was a tireless worker,
65
 lived to the age of 86 and epitomised the Scottish 
intellectualism of his day.   
In his Principles of Equity, Kames advocated change to the Common Law 
of Scotland, informed by what Lieberman describes as ‘equitable correction’:
66
 
… law, in this simple form, cannot long continue stationery: for in the 
social state … law ripens gradually with the human faculties … [and] 
many duties formerly neglected are found binding in conscience.  Such 
duties can no longer be neglected by courts of justice; and as they made no 
part of the common law, they naturally come under the jurisdiction of a 
court of equity. 
 
One of the principles upon which those reforms were to be based was utility:
67
 
All the variety of matter hitherto mentioned is regulated by the principle of 
justice solely … But, upon more narrow inspection, we find a number of 
law cases into which justice enters not, but only the principle of utility.  
Expediency requires that these be brought under the cognizance of a court; 
and the court of equity gaining daily more weight and authority, takes 
naturally such matter under its jurisdiction. 
 
Kames’s approach, although his desire for change was directed to the equity 
court and never explicitly stated to apply to Parliament,
68
 is a philosophy which 
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Lieberman says can be more than superficially compared to legislation.
69
  
Lieberman places Kames in historical context to illustrate how his reforms might 
have a source other than statute:
70
 
 … to encounter in eighteenth-century legal theory the articulation of a 
distinctly utilitarian jurisprudence deployed on behalf of a program of 
law reform may, in one sense, occasion little surprise.  However, we have 
become so accustomed to identifying this intellectual development with 
the utilitarianism and legal positivism of Jeremy Bentham that Kames’s 
Principles of Equity provides a crucial historical corrective.  For Kames, 
no less than for Bentham, utility featured as a critical principle of legal 
modernization.  ….  Kames reminds us how in this period a commitment 
to the methods and institutions of customary law need not be taken to 
indicate any lack of commitment to law reform.  Indeed, for Kames as for 
so many of his English contemporaries, the most important and recently 
confirmed lessons of English law was the clear superiority of the courts 
over the legislature in orchestrating legal development. 
 
Kames’s approach was no doubt a function in large part of the shifts which took 
place in the period in which he lived and which had taken place in what to him 
was recent history, even living memory.  Parliament may have risen to check the 
absolutism which public sensibility of the time so despised, but it had not yet 
utilised its legislative powers to demonstrate its competence to discharge its law-
changing power.  The Common Law, on the other hand, had shown its strength 
and its competence, and also that it could be trusted to maintain a steady hand in 
troublous times, and to deploy itself responsively to achieve popular change.     
Kames’s approach, although it took a somewhat traditional view that 
judge-made law was preferable in method to legislation, nevertheless formulated 
a jurisprudence which justified change.  
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The law thus became not an unchanging line of precedent, but a means by 
which order and justice could be attained in a changing society and to meet such 




David Lieberman devotes his Province of Legislation Determined to 
establishing a link between Blackstone and Bentham, who, although within the 
same century, represent opposite ends of the spectrum in their thinking about 
legislative and common law methods.  There are, however, between them, some 
common intellectual themes.  That link, for Lieberman, is the Scottish 




Kames employed utility to justify judicial activity, whereas Bentham 
advocated its use by the legislature.  Kames advocated the introduction of the 
principle of utility into (Scottish) equity jurisprudence, and addressed his 
principle to ‘enlightened Judges and not scientific legislators’.
73
  The claim, 
then, that Kames anticipated Bentham might be true so far as promoting utility 
and as a basis for change to the law, but it says less of the mobilisation of 
legislation to achieve this, which is such a key feature of Benthamism.  
Kames, nevertheless, provides a link between the structure of Blackstone 
and Lord Mansfield (never allied with the reformist school of thought),
74
 and ‘the 
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radically different views advanced by Bentham’.
75
  Kames, unlike Blackstone, 
judged the Common Law to require major improvement.
76
  The mechanism by 
which that was to be achieved was judge-made law:
77
 
 Matters of law are ripened in the best manner by warmth of debate at the 
bar and coolness of judgment on the bench. 
  
Adam Smith (1723-1790) too participated in the concerted intellectual enterprise 
of the age to uncover and articulate a science of legislation namely:
78
 
 [t]he principles by which those with the power to do so ought to cause 
changes to law, to enlighten the policy of actual legislators and 
encourage them to see what sort of legislative improvements the general 
interests of the community recommend. 
 
Smith’s science remains less than completely known to us.  He completed his 
Wealth of Nations before his General Jurisprudence (promised by him for 
decades to be imminent).  Political economy (the more famous of his pursuits), 
Smith himself said, was one important ‘branch’ of the science of the statesman 
or legislator.
79
  His General Jurisprudence, which we might expect to have more 
fully exposed his legislative science, was destroyed on his death at his 
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  There remain, however, student notes of his lectures
81
 and from 
them we gain some insight into his wider thinking. 
Smith’s work is of interest also because he identifies principles of human 
motion (independent of what the state might seek to impose), and shows how 
they are capable of producing their own order and of being afforded respect by 
law-makers.  These forces, depending upon the weight one gives to them, are 
reasons to limit legislative intervention.  If, as did Smith, one sees those forces as 
a natural state and values that ought not be stifled, then they are limits on legal 
innovation.  His approach to law was part of his more general disposition to view 
the historical world of human experience as something waiting to be studied 
scientifically (ie without a priori assumption dictated by reason).
82
 
 Smith’s approach started from the premise of principles in man’s nature 
being inherent and unavoidable.
83
  In sympathy (our fellow-feeling with passion 
of others),
84
 we find pleasure in mutuality
85
 (its coincidence with the feelings of 
others).  The spectator is capable of gaining a correspondence of sentiments 
(never, of course, perfectly or as intensely) with the sufferer, and this concord 
affects the way the spectator acts, refraining from or selfishly indulging our 
                                                             
80
  D Winch, ‘Smith, Adam (bap. 1723, d. 1790)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(2004) online edn, Oct 2007. 
81
  Discovered only in the 1890s and 1950s, and published as R L Meek, DD Raphael & P G 
Stein Lectures on Jurisprudence, Glasgow Edition of the Works of Adam Smith, vol 5 
(1978). 
82
  Stein (n 63) 160. 
83
  A Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790) (D D Raphael & A L Macfie (eds) (1982) 
being the first Volume of the Glasgow Edition of Smith’s works, Liberty Fund Edition) 
I.i.i.1 (‘Theory of Moral Sentiments’). 
84
  Theory of Moral Sentiments I.i.i.5. 
85









As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the great law of 
Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as 
we love our neighbour, or what comes to the same thing, as our neighbour 
is capable of loving us. 
  
These principles govern also the spectator’s behaviour.  We view our own 
conduct ‘with the eyes of other people’, or as others are likely to view it.
88
  The 
judgments we form about our intended conduct are always to some degree 
influenced by how others are likely to view that behaviour.  The division we are 
able to achieve between the judge and the person ‘judged of’
89
 is the key to 
understanding the way in which these strong natural forces govern the way in 
which we act, our desire to be loved, ‘be lovely’ and be the natural and proper 
object of love, and at the same time, to dread being blamed and being blame-
worthy.
90
  It is by judging our conduct by these measures that we emulate the 
perception of the ‘impartial spectator’ of our own character and conduct.
91
 
Smith thus constructs from desires endowed by nature ‘when she formed 
man for society’,
92
 a theory of jurisprudence (and therefore natural jurisprudence) 
by which natural forces gain an entitlement to direct the course of legal 
developments.  Smith takes the influence of the natural sentiments a step further: 
we desire approval, but only for what ought to be approved of, informed by what 
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we would approve of in others.
93
  It is by this means we have a real love of virtue 
and a real abhorrence of vice. 
In doing so, we have a basis not only for confident human-centred action, 
but a means by which we might know what is right and wrong:
94
 
The all-wise Author of Nature has, in this manner, taught man to respect 
the sentiments and judgments of his brethren; to be more or less pleased 
when they approve of his conduct, and to be more or less hurt when they 
disapprove of it.  He has made man, if I may say so, the immediate judge of 
mankind; and has, in this respect, as in many others, created him after his 
own image, and appointed him his viceregent upon earth, to superintend 
and the behaviour of his brethren.  They are taught by nature, to 
acknowledge that power and jurisdiction which has thus been conferred 
upon him, to be more or less humbled and mortified when they have 
incurred his censure, and to be more or less elated when they have 
obtained his applause. 
  
From these influences are derived laws, just as the general rules which bodies 
observe in their communication of motion (then so recently articulated by Sir 
Isaac Newton) were designated laws of motion.
95
  They show, Smith might have 
said, a natural source, and one which there is no occasion to upset or avoid, for 
doing so contradicts the whole edifice of the natural order.   
I have diverged from a purely historical account of Smith’s legislative 
science because these concepts so thoroughly imbue his approach that they must 
be understood.  They are concepts which inevitably favour judicial over 
legislative rule-making: the judge more clearly resembles the impartial spectator; 
the judge (like Smith) is a lone-thinker; the task of giving effect to these forces 
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was a work-in-progress, so much more suited to incremental decision-making 
than wider scale [ie, legislative] reform; and the judicial method was better 
equipped, especially before legislatures acquired the professionalism and the 
professional assistance they developed only later, to ascertain and to take account 
of the kinds of considerations which occupied Smith and governed his natural 
jurisprudence.  Moreover, Smith had, not only in Kames, but also in Lord 
Mansfield (of Scottish birth too and a contemporary of Smith)
96
 living, breathing, 
examples of very similar sentiments being given expression in judicial decisions. 
Smith, despite his method favouring judicial decision-making (or perhaps 
because it did), directed much of his jurisprudence to those with the power to 
enact ‘law’.  The strength of that theme is reflected in Knud Haakonssen’s title to 
his 1981 book on David Hume and Adam Smith, The Science of the Legislator.  
The terminology derives in part from a passage in Smith’s Wealth of Nations in 
which he distinguishes the hypothetical ‘legislator’ from a mere politician, the 
first being principled and considered, and the politician being susceptible to 




 … a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be governed by general 
principles which are always the same … 
and 
 … that insidious and crafty animal, vulgarly called a statesman or 
politician. 
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Parliament had by this time become, although neither omnipotent nor 
omnicompetent, a law-making organ without clear or formal external restraints 
(with some limited exceptions).  It depended almost entirely on unarticulated 
boundaries and the political process to guide its activities.  That latent power, in 
the hands of the vulgar politician, is one which had led not only to complexity 
and a lack of clarity in the statute book, but also a whole range of unnecessary 
and unscientific attempts to alter the natural motion of society and individuals, 
such as the grant of exclusive privileges to those who stood to gain and had the 
means to procure the exercise of authority in their favour.    
The science which Smith saw in the legislator’s task involved more than 
simply acting in accordance with principles.  It involved cultivating a natural 
jurisprudence.  From natural jurisprudence emerges those all-important 
principles which are the subject of the science and the legislator’s beacon:
98
 
[These principles] are the subject of a particular science, of all sciences by 
far the most important, but hitherto, perhaps, the least cultivated, that of 
natural jurisprudence …  
  
Natural jurisprudence, as I have explained, entails respect for inherent qualities, 
circumstances or relationships; respect which demands that positive law not 
unduly disturb that natural state is something upon which no imposed order 
could improve.  Smith was not alone in that sentiment.  Many Scottish theorists 
at the time derived their natural jurisprudence from an understanding of the 
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These influential tenets of Smith’s approach are bases to limit legislative 
intervention by requiring the legislator to know and respect these principles of 
motion, being ones to which Smith’s philosophy attached significant value.  The 
notions of sympathy and self-interest, as powerful innate forces, are ones which 
Smith utilised both for his justification of leaving them to function without 
interference and as the basis for some assurance that doing so could nonetheless 
produce an agreeable and functioning society.   
Natural jurisprudence provided another kind of limitation on the rulers’ 
capacity to make rules.  While ethics (which Smith distinguished from justice) 
concerned delineation of the virtues, justice concerned the elaboration of rules 
for the direction of conduct consistent with those virtues in a way that was 
precise.
100
  This brings, once again, its own limits.  Rules must be directed to 
achievement of the virtues.  Those virtues, if they be accepted to be the result of 
some human sentiments (ie forces naturally within us), then the resulting rules 
are ones which, to a large extent, seek to assist a natural propensity rather than to 
achieve aims independent of this natural course of human motion.  
Within the idea of Smith’s Wealth of Nations and his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments exposing part of the science of the legislator are several component 
concepts.  First, the whole notion of there being a ‘science’ (ie a discipline and 
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natural forces to be discovered and understood) to the legislator’s proper role; 
secondly, circumstances which necessitated the education of the legislature 
(including the prevalence of privileges secured by special pleading); thirdly, that 
the legislator was to facilitate a state of being which existed by force of man’s 
inherent qualities, and not something purely constructed or imposed; and, 
fourthly, the connection Smith saw between political economy and law, ie law as 
protecting the objects of political economy. 
The facts both of the monumental success of the Wealth of Nations, and 
that Smith’s General Jurisprudence never survived to publication (and perhaps 
completion) have left the unfortunate lasting impression that Smith was 
concerned only with economic prosperity.  It was no doubt one aspect of his 
approach that the legislator ought to seek to achieve a prosperous society.  In 
Book IV of the Wealth of Nations he says:
101
 
 Political economy, constructed as a branch of the science of a statesman 
or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful 
revenue or subsistence for the people, or more properly to enable them to 
provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and secondly, to 
supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the 
publick services.  It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign. 
    
We ought not then demote Smith in importance in the current exercise because of 
the prominence he achieved in the field of political economy.  That was only one 
field of his endeavour, and his general jurisprudence ought to be regarded as 
going well beyond the topic with which Wealth of Nations deals.    
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So why, it might be asked, was Smith’s work addressed to the legislator?  
And what prompted him to do so when the era was one in which it was novel to 
conceive of legislation being mobilised to achieve particular ends, other than the 
most immediate?   
The answer to these questions lies as much in what law then did as what it 
was capable of doing, and Smith saw many of the existing statutes as positively 
detracting from a successful and prosperous society.  Moreover, he saw the 
politician as lost and as susceptible to self-interested lobbying to impose 
protectionist and monopolistic laws, but the legislator as less so.  Smith also saw 
the legislator as the proper audience for his work not only because that was the 
source of many of the abuses he identified but also in recognition of a capacity 
(then incompletely expressed and only beginning to be realised) for a legislator 
to do better than the politician in making rules which constituted a general 
improvement.  The 18
th
 century legislator simply had neither precedent nor 
principle to focus and guide his law making function.  The 18
th
 century Judge, 
however, did.  We can see in the distinction that Smith recognises, a 
differentiation effected by one primary state of affairs: the legislator being 
interested in and imbued with the science of legislation and the discipline that 
affords versus the politician being wholly so unconcerned.  It is a theme to which 
I return much later, but we can see in this approach a basis for legislation, if not 
to be divorced from the political, to be informed by principles in no way arising 
from political considerations.           
67 
 
It was no small step from Smith’s science to Jeremy Bentham’s advocacy 
of an unlimited role for the legislature at the expense of the Courts.  Bentham is 
credited with being the first to assert the omnicompetence of the legislature.
102
  
His legislative science identified ‘imperfections’ in legislation, but ones which, 
through Bentham’s neglect of history, Holdsworth says, caused his diagnosis of 
the causes of them to be superficial, overlooking the real cause being the 
excessive individuality of statutes passed by the legislature,
103
 being what really 
prevented coordination between statutes, either in form or substance. 
Bentham too proclaimed legislation to be a science.  His science, however, 
was not merely a criticism of the existing body of statute law, but a basis for 
confident legislator-driven reform, guided by the principle of utility.  Nor was his 
science one which possessed any of the preferences that his near contemporaries 
Kames and Smith had found in the Common Law’s antiquity, its relative 
freedom from distraction from political and religious objectives and the 
vulnerability of legislation to ‘special pleading’ from self-interested parties. 
 Bentham’s approach, although offering utility as a justification to legislate, 
in many ways ignored the limitations which others had identified in legislative 
conduct.  His apparent disregard for general principles and his imperviousness to 
authority, led Jolowicz to observe that, over time, Bentham became other than a 
lawyer.
104
  Lawyers, Jolowicz explained, have an interest in legal technique and 
recognise some form of legal authority.  To Bentham there were only laws, made 
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by legislators; an approach which left no room for general principles.
105
  In these 
criticisms of Bentham we see yet again the desire to identify a legislative science 
quite autonomous from politics.  
The principle which Bentham championed – utility
106
 – was not one which 
had about it the recognition of any form of legal authority.  It carried with it the 
idea that law reform should seek to secure the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number.  It is based upon a conviction that the end of human existence is 
happiness and also that legislation’s science is the achievement of laws 
promoting (aggregate) human happiness.
107
  These combined convictions, which 
Dicey articulated as being essential to Benthamism, are justifications for 
legislative intervention, and perhaps heavy and frequent intervention.  But they 
overlook, without a deeper understanding of what Bentham’s happiness entails, 
important aspects of his approach which helped map the limits of such 
intervention, or which at least guided thinking about bases upon which 
legislative restraint ought be exercised. 
 Dicey considered ‘practically the most vital part’
108
 of Bentham’s 
legislative science to have been laissez faire.  This, he thought, could be seen 
both in his desire to see removed the unnecessary restraints placed upon 
individuals by ancient laws (as altered by haphazard legislation) and also those 
restraints imposed by positive laws which encroached upon happiness by 
restricting individual activity.  Embedded within Benthamism was a notion of 
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legislative restraint.  That notion was not articulated but implicit only.  It took 
others, such as Dicey, to expose that part of Bentham’s approach.  It was one 
based upon each individual being the best judge of his or her own interest, of 
contractual freedom and all within an historical context (then perhaps not 
appreciated as fully as we now can with the distance of time) of legislative power 
less than fully and confidently exercised.   
The correctness of these views might be tested by looking to legislation 
enacted in pursuance of Bentham’s legislative philosophy.  Benthamism came to 
be embraced by law reformers both in and outside of the legislature.  Dicey saw 
Benthamism as answering exactly the immediate want of the 19
th
 century, at 
which time there existed a feeling that the country’s institutions required 
thorough-going amendment.
109
  Bentham’s approach avoided reliance upon any 
notion of natural rights (he famously decried them) and also avoided social 
contract theory, which had been a thrust of the (then recently thwarted) Jacobites. 
Yet a paradox has been noted between Bentham’s reformist activities 
strengthening legislative machinery in order to achieve equality of status and 
opportunity (but which the state then failed to provide) and this leading to the 
positive state controlling and regulating the social life of the community.
110
  
There are other problems with characterising Benthamism as advocating 
legislative and regulatory restraint.  Those problems warrant close attention at 
this point, exposing, as they do, one point at which the much more confident and 
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unrestrained deployment of legislative power was advanced, and also some of 
the principal reasons for that occurring. 
Dicey has been criticised for having, in his Law and Opinion in England, 
essentially advanced a view which suited his own political disposition, to oppose 
collectivism in favour of individualism.
111
  He did so, it has been suggested, by 
summarising less than accurately, legislation in the middle decades of the 19
th
 
century and his division of that century into periods.
112
     
Dicey, as others, struggled to identify the transition from a Parliament 
which was legislatively ‘quiescent’ to one that became more and more willing to 
legislate in favour of general public welfare.
113
   
Different perspectives exist.  Each points, I suggest, to Benthamism being 
an important catalyst for legislative intervention in every area of life, and to the 
growth and disposition of the public service being an important factor, and one 
left largely out of account in Dicey’s treatment, and, for that matter, many others. 
An alternative account of Benthanism and its influence is offered by Elie 
Halevy in his Growth of Philosophic Radicalism.
114
  He saw a contradiction in 
Bentham’s treatment of economic and trade affairs versus other human affairs.  
In the former, it was assumed that state intervention would be harmful and that 
the players in the market, producers, distributors and consumers alike, ought to 
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be left to pursue their interests, from which an harmonious pattern would result.  
But in social affairs, Halevy detected Benthamism’s displeasure of the result of 
unrestricted pursuit of individual ends as likely to result in something less than 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number.   
The explanation Halevy offers for this apparent difference is a distinction 
between the natural and the artificial identity of interests.  The first urged against 
legislation: the second favoured it.  Ultimately, Halevy says, the former 
triumphed, but his is an analysis which ceases in 1852.  He might have revised 
that view had he been able to know how much legislative intervention was to 
come in the 1850s and 1860s.   
Another perspective is that of MacDonagh.  His focus is upon 
administrative matters as having played an important role in the growth of state 
intervention.  He considered that administrative changes in the mid-19
th
 century 
amounted to a revolution in government comparable in importance to the 
Industrial Revolution: one in which the momentum of government itself was 
decisive.  This factor, he thought, to have been both vital and neglected.
115
  
MacDonagh’s approach, although not expressly critical of Dicey’s view, is 
opposed to it.  MacDonagh’s focus was on administrative matters, upon which 
opinion had no influence.  He showed how the overwhelming majority of civil 
servants had been unaffected by Benthamism and by opinion.
116
   There would 
seem to be some force in this view.  Much mid-to-late 19
th
 century legislation 
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was concerned with the protection of those less able to protect themselves, rather 
than with measures designed to promote general happiness.  But if the motivator 
was not Benthamism, it remains to understand what moved the civil servants: 
what prompted the ‘administrative matters’? 
Others have given consideration to the time at which the transition from a 
laissez-faire mentality to one of state intervention took place and the forces 
which caused it.  Some, such as Carr, have been puzzled by the natural addiction 
of Benthamists to laissez-faire and its apparent inconsistency with the 
Benthamite theory of law.
117
  Others have noted the distinctions between 
Benthamite theory and the actual course of events which followed: ‘State 




It can be seen that Benthamism was taken strongly to legitimise legislative 
activity.  It offered a simpler and more resilient guiding principle than had Adam 
Smith.  Smith’s influential advocacy of laissez-faire had seemingly been 
restricted, in his Wealth of Nations, to primarily commercial affairs.  And with 
the religious verve of the Christian philanthropists, conditions were ripe for a 
whole range of interventions in the social sphere.  MacDonagh’s point is that 
what has been left out of account is the influence of administration and the 
momentum of government itself.  Theorists have looked for some external source 
of influence on legislative intervention, but overlooked that the push might have 
come from those who would acquire the task of regulating, and who therefore 
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stood to gain influence from such a development.  The interests of the non-
political Executive in doing so is something to which I will return in later 
Chapters as one of the important forces that such propelled legislative 
proliferation and intrusion.  It served not only to expand the bureaucracy, and 
therefore to build that empire, but it also gave bureaucrats control over whole 
new fields of activity 
In considering, however, the effect of Benthamism on the willingness of 
the legislature to intervene in favour of the general public welfare, regard must 
also be had to some particular developments in Victorian legislation.  It was the 
religious humanitarians that prompted, for example, the factory movement and 
prison reform.  It was they, and, most prominently, Lord Shaftesbury, who 
articulated the need for state intervention for the protection of the class of 
persons unable to protect themselves.
119
  It was only under the principles which 
the Christian philanthropists advanced that the 10 hour Bill could have been 
introduced in 1850.  Was this, as Dicey thought, Bethamism’s ‘earliest and 
severest defeat’
120
 or was it, in fact, something perfectly consistent with the 
Benthamite disposition?  
Precision seems elusive in the search for the time at which the transition 
occurred, or the factors which caused it.  It is difficult to exclude Benthamism as 
a major contributor: it immediately preceded the change; it was such an 
influential philosophy; one of its main focuses was legislation; and it did not 
explicitly advocate any laissez-faire restraint.  But nor either can the influence of 
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the Christian humanitarians be excluded.  Many of them, we know especially in 
their opposition to the slave trade and slavery itself, placed their own positions 
and (in some cases fortunes) in jeopardy,
121
 and spent their personal and 
professional lives dedicated to the difficult task of persuading others and the 
legislature of the force of their arguments.  
The cause of this move from Benthamism (with its embedded laissez-faire 
restraint) was not limited to the impetus from the Christian humanitarians.  
Modern commerce too, paradoxically, had an important influence.  Railways, for 
example, necessitated legislative privileges.
122
 
By the late 19
th
 century, laissez-faire had declined as even a tacit influence 
upon legislative decision making, such that it eventually disappeared as one of 
the principles by which legislative (in)action ought to be guided.
123
  In its place 
stood a belief of a different kind, and one opposed to that which it had replaced: 
a belief that governmental action ought to occur, and to secure the rights and 
entitlements of those less well-placed to protect themselves from harm and 
exploitation, and even if to do so impinged not only upon contractual freedoms, 
but upon those who, under a Benthamist regime, would have remained free to 
benefit from such exploitation. 
Protectionism is the form in which post-Benthamist philosophy first 
presents itself.  It directs itself to sections of society less well-placed than others 
to protect their own affairs.  It later assumes a broader role by safeguarding all 
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citizens against mistakes to which all are susceptible, but which require constant 
vigilance and often great cost to avoid or guard against.  Later still, protectionism 
led to compulsory standards, of which perhaps the clearest example is a move 
from the terms to be implied by the Sale of Goods Acts, capable as they were of 
being contracted out of, to those entrenched consumer protection provisions, 
which impose an inescapable overlay on every such dealing. 
Numerous factors underpin the connected events of abandoning laissez-
faire and embracing compulsory state intervention.  I touch here on a few only of 
the major ones. 
First, there is the principle of utility articulated as part of Bentham’s 




… a principle big with revolution; it involved the abolition of every office 
or institution which could not be defended on the ground of incalculable 
benefit to the public. 
 
It became, without some restraint, or without the rationale of its unstated 
restraints being made known, the force not of individual freedom, but of state 
intervention. 
Secondly, there was the realisation that between utility and laissez-faire 
there was no necessary connection.  If utility was the force which impelled or 
justified reform, then laissez-faire was the force which urged restraint.    
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Thirdly, Parliament in the meantime had become more representative 
(ultimately, of all householders).  With that, those for whose benefit Parliament’s 
power was mobilised was not restricted to a particular class, conferring upon it 
far greater representative capacity and, from that, legitimacy as the common 
caucus within which to debate and then to choose between ambitious legislative 
options.   
This last feature, of a much increased franchise, was opposed by Dicey.  
The [‘Great’] Reform Act of 1832 had the effect, by broadening the property 
qualification for voting and creating a uniform franchise in the boroughs, of 
increasing the English electorate (male only) by some 50 per cent: from some 
440,000 to about 650,000 in England and Wales.
125
  In addition to this expansion 
(which was no small step if the test required for legislative intervention were to 
be utility) the reforms went some way to quashing what we would now recognise 
to be improper influences by large landholders over county constituencies and 
the disparity between the voting influence of small boroughs.  The Act, in short, 
made Parliament more representative in more than one respect.  Its passage is of 
great significance: many historians identify it as marking the commencement of 
modern democracy in Britain.  It also marks the point, Sir Erksine May observed, 
after which Parliament became more liberal and progressive and ‘more vigorous 
and active; more susceptible to the influence of public opinion; and more secure 




 said that it was this Act which:  
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… showed that the fortress could be stormed, and which marked out the 
line of assault.  … it established a precedent of permanent force for 
enfranchising all classes when they should reach the stage of political 
consciousness and social power.  It determined that those who have power 
outside Parliament should have power inside it, and sanctioned a 
readjustment of the constitution for this purpose, even at the price of 
ancient forms and individual interests. 
 
There is no doubt, however, that the Reform Act set the path for the state of 
gradual non-violent change, quite different from the events which had been 
witnessed in the living memory of those voting on its passage in France and in 
America.
128
  It witnessed, if not the end of aristocratic government, the beginning 
of its end.   
The reform of the electoral system which the 1832 Act initiated in a formal 
sense further subjected Parliament to popular control.  It did so with knowledge 
of the pressure for change which had been witnessed on the Continent and 
provided the means by which that desire could be channelled.    
Courtenay Ilbert regarded the Reform Act as a catalyst for one of the three 
‘great constructive periods’ of English legislation, so great an influence, he said, 
that it was almost impossible to emphasise too strongly the enormous change 
which that Act introduced into the character of legislation, or the complete 
contrast between the legislation which preceded it and the legislation that 
followed it.
129
  He contrasts the legislation of the 18
th
 century and the 19
th
: the 
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former as largely ephemeral and creating no new institutions;
130
 and the latter as 





… building up piecemeal of an administrative machine of great 
complexity, which stands in constant need of repair, renewal, 
reconstruction and adaptation to new requirements as the plant of a 
modern factory.   
 
The new enactments, he says, belonged to the sphere of administrative law:  
‘[f]or lawyers’ law’, Ilbert said, ‘Parliament has neither time nor taste’.
133
  And 
so the theme returns of a legislative method and principles to be distinguished 
from political actions.  
Since Ilbert wrote at the commencement of the 20
th
 century, legislation has 
entered yet further periods.  Some features of modern legislation are considered 
in more detail in later Chapters.  But no longer is its only focus the 
administrative machinery of the state: it has regulatory objectives also.  But to 
administrative historians, the Reform Act marks a change deep in the psyche of 
public administration.  Parliament ceased attempting to govern by legislation 
(through detailed prescriptions about road widening and the enclosure of 
commons and the like) and turned instead to general matters, entrusting their 
working and implementation to officials.
134
  But there was a larger shift also.  
Before 1830, legislation was, for the most part, initiated by individual peers or 
members of the House of Commons.
135
  The Government did not regard itself as 
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the natural initiator of legislation.
136
  It is the reason why so many statutes 
preceding the Reform Act are known by the names of their proposers.  A 
transition is evident from the mid-19
th
 century: from Parliament as administrator 
to Parliament as carrying out the reform mandate of the electorate.  Lord John 
Russell, in 1848, summed up the former:
137
 
There have been in the course of the last thirty years very great changes in 
the mode of conducting the business of the House … When I first entered 
parliament it was not usual for government to undertake generally all 
subjects of legislation … [However] since the passing of the Reform Act it 
has been thought convenient, on every subject on which an alteration of the 
law is required, that the government should undertake the responsibility of 
proposing it to parliament. 
 
Later in the same session, Lord Russell revisited the question in these terms:
138
 
I must remind the … House that the supposed duty of the members of a 
government to introduce a great number of measures to parliament and to 
carry those measures through parliament in a session, is a duty which is 
new to the government of this country.  Let me call the attention of the 
House to the fact that the Ministers of the Crown are chiefly appointed to 
administer the affairs of the Empire.  
 
By the time of the third Earl Grey (1858), a different attitude had taken hold:
139
 
Those to whom the executive authority is entrusted, have also the duty of 
recommending to the legislature the measures it should adopt, and must 
retire if their advice is not generally followed.  … This is a duty which has 
been imposed upon the advisers of the Crown only be degrees, and chiefly 
since the passage of the Reform Acts of 1932.  Formerly ministers took 
little charge of the proceedings of parliament on all matters not 
immediately connected with their executive duties.  … A different system 
has of late grown up, and the ministers of the Crown are now justly 
regarded as responsible for bringing forward such measures as are 
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required, and for opposing any objectionable proposals from other 
quarters. 
 
And so we see the Reform Act, or the sentiment which motivated it, as having a 
marked effect on relationship between law (particularly legislation) and 
administration.  The effect was both to motivate Executive government as a 
proposer of reform and to employ legislation to do so.  All of a sudden, 
reforming influences (forces for change) and legislation had attached themselves 
to those persons with the power to give them life. 
Parliament had by this time secured its supremacy.  The emergence of 
reforming legislation as a function of government was not accompanied by any 
reassessment of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.  Nor did that occur 
later, when the party system took hold and became stronger.  Parliament, it 
continued to be insisted, despite these profound changes to the forces that 
operated upon it, could legislate about anything it wished.   
Perhaps these points were ones at which the absolutist notion of 
Parliamentary sovereignty ought to have been reconsidered.  Its continuation 
meant that Parliamentary sovereignty, acquired in one set of circumstances, and 










I explained in the previous Chapter many of the historical steps to our regarding 
popular assemblies as carrying considerable prestige, to legislation (wrongly) 
being likewise regarded, and some of the forces which propelled an activist role 
for legislation at the expense of those which urged a more restrained or scientific 
approach.  I suggested in the preceding Chapter that we ought to disentangle the 
prestige we might properly attach to popular assemblies from that which we have 
(unthinkingly) attached to legislation.    
In this Chapter I take that theme a little further, by arguing that the limits 
that we would recognise as attending legislation from a doctrinal point of view 
are relatively few.  This is something which, I suggest, shows how, in current 
times, the view has prevailed that popular assemblies ought be free to pursue 
unbounded legislative activities and almost free from limitations on the 
frequency with which they do so and the subject matter with which they might 
concern themselves.   
The Chapter provides a basis from which to consider the claim (of which 
Jeremy Waldron stands as the principal contemporary proponent) that legislation 
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and its author (popular assemblies) possess the authority and legitimacy to justify 
the omnicompetent and energetic deployment of legislation.  
I am concerned in this Chapter with limits on legislation which Anglo-
American systems recognise or impose, be that by the system’s rules or its 
arrangement.  Such limits are found not only in express Constitutional 
restrictions, but also in less obvious places: the division of labour between 
legislatures and the Courts (being, respectively, the issuing of commands and the 
giving of effect to them); the Court’s function of interpretation; and a clever 
innovation of the Courts to attract for the benefit of some of its own decisions, 
the entrenchment which Constitutional provisions enjoy.   
II Sources of doctrinal limits 
 
Doctrinal limits might be categorised according to one of the two stages at which 
they take primary effect: there are limits which operate on legislation’s making; 
and those at the stage at which legislation is given effect.  There are limits also 
which operate at both these stages by reason of the deep-seated structural 
arrangements and the division of labour which Anglo-American systems of law 
have developed.  
There is very little in the modern vocabulary of legislative jurisprudence 
that deals with limits.  The dominant discourse is one of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, a doctrine which A V Dicey did more to articulate in the 19
th
 
century than other legal scholar, and in a way that seems to have captured all the 
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Parliament can legally legislate on any topic whatever which, in the 
judgment of Parliament, is a fit subject for legislation.  There is no power 
which, under the English constitution, can come into rivalry with the 
legislative sovereignty of Parliament. 
 
Dicey’s classic description of the doctrine (whose name alone belies its absolutist 
nature) was as follows:
2
 
The principle … of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less 
than this, namely, that “Parliament” has “the right to make or unmake any 
law whatever, and further, that no person or body is recognised by the law 
of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament” … 
… 
A law may, for our present purpose, be defined as “any rule which will be 
enforced by the Courts.” 
 
This relatively absolutist formulation might be contrasted to the position in the 
18
th
 and earlier Centuries outlined in Chapter 1.  
For Dicey, the limits (a word he never uses in this connection) on 
legislative power were those which Parliament itself decided: there are laws that, 
he said, ‘… Parliament never would and (to speak plainly) never could pass’.
3
  
But if Parliament is sovereign and might make or unmake any law whatever, 
there is no means by which, if Parliament were minded to pass an obnoxious law, 
it could be restrained from doing so or by which that law might later be declared 
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of no effect, whether by judicial or other forms of review.  Parliament was, to 
Dicey, self-limited.   
Dicey did more than any other 19
th
 century legal scholar to articulate, to 
weave into English legal imagination, and to advance, this doctrine.  The degree, 
however, to which it reflects the practical reality of the structure and workings of 
English Constitutional arrangements is, I suggest, open to question.  Even if it 
could be said that Dicey’s doctrine accurately states the formality of that system, 
it fails to incorporate either the limits which written Constitutions impose and 
those which are offered by the (Constitutionally-sanctioned) division of labour 
between the sources of law in particular.  Dicey’s decision not to countenance 
the limits offered by written Constitutions is understandable (they are not, after 
all, a home-grown English innovation), but it only heightens an interest in the 
extent and nature of those limits and how they might cause to be re-assessed, 
Dicey’s classic articulation of so important a doctrine.  
Dicey’s approach is the one that articulates the most supreme role for 
Parliament.  Austin’s, for example, was more restrained, shown particularly in 
his notion of public trust reposing in Parliament:
4
 
Adopting the language of some of the writers who have treated of the 
British constitution, I commonly suppose that the present parliament, or 
the parliament for the time being, is possessed of the sovereignty: or I 
commonly suppose that the King and the Lords, with the members of the 
Commons' house, form a tripartite body which is sovereign or supreme.  
But, speaking accurately, the members of the Commons' house are merely 
trustees for the body by which they are elected and appointed: and, 
consequently, the sovereignty always resides in the King and the Peers, 
with the electoral body of the Commons.  That a trust is imposed by the 
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party delegating, and that the party representing engages to discharge the 
trust, seems to be imported by the correlative expressions delegation and 
representation.  It [would be] absurd to suppose that the delegating 
empowers the representative party to defeat or abandon any of the 
purposes for which the latter is appointed: to suppose, for example, that 
the Commons empower their representatives in parliament to relinquish 
their share in the sovereignty to the King and the Lords.  [my emphasis] 
 
Austin’s language seems to find little or no support, however, in doctrine.  As 
Dicey pointed out, no English judge ever conceded, or, under the English 
Constitution, could concede, that Parliament is in any legal sense a ‘trustee’.
5
  
Dicey was, perhaps, correct.  But within Austin’s formulation seems to be a 
recognition of restraints of a less formal or precise kind on Parliament’s power. 
Whether limits be found in the trust-like quality of which Austin spoke, or 
whether they be embedded in the structure and arrangement of the various 
sources of law, such limits do, I suggest, exist.  I begin by considering those 
limits, and how they operate at the stage at which legislation is made.  I turn later 
to those limits which operate when legislation is given effect.   
III Limits on the making of legislation 
 
Constitutionalism: ‘England will perish’ 
British Courts never, historically, sought to review enactments of the legislature.  
In the wider Anglo-American world, judicial review of legislation is 
commonplace, following, in particular: Marbury v Madison;
6
 the establishment 
of written constitutions; and the development of a sophisticated system of 
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judicial review in the 20
th
 century, by which delegated legislation became 
subjected to scrutiny by the Courts.  
The British situation remains a special case in this respect, even 
compared to other Anglo-American systems.  European considerations aside, 
Britain’s Constitution remains customary and unwritten
7
 and therefore, explicitly 
at least, susceptible to deliberate, enacted alteration to it.  
Thomas Paine was outspoken in his opposition to this aspect of the English 
Constitution.
8
  He pointed in particular to Parliament’s alteration of the 
succession as an illustration of the capacity and willingness of Parliament to alter 
fundamental Constitutional arrangements.
9
  Royal tyranny had, he said, been 
replaced with Parliamentary absolutism.  Where before 1688 (in particular), there 
had existed a ‘rivalship of despotism’ between the Parliament, the Monarch and 
the Church (in addition to feudal despotism) there now existed, in Paine’s view, a 
singular despotic body.
10
   
Rivalship in the form of divided power we know to be one effective means 
of controlling power, whether it be in the division of functions between the 
Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary; between provincial and central 
governments in federations; between commands and adjudication in legal 
structure; or, as I suggest later, in the foils that strong forms of alternative 
sources of law might constitute, such as customary and judge-made law.      
                                                             
7
  Another perspective is that the Constitution is the collective expression of the various 
important texts, supplemented, no doubt, by the relevant customs.  I give consideration to 
this perspective later in this Chapter.  
8
  T Paine, The Rights of Man (1791) 69.  
9
  Paine (n 8) 61. 
10
  Paine (n 8) 14. 
87 
 
Besides just a very few limitations on Parliament’s legislative power (such 
as preservation of the Prerogative, Parliament being prevented from binding its 
successors and a prohibition on the abrogation of its authority) there are no 
formal constitutional limits on what Westminster may do.  The law of the United 
Kingdom, for the most part, today recognises and protects Parliamentary 
supremacy in the Diceyan manner.  Statutes remain inviolable to judicial 
challenge.  For example, in Labrador Co v R
11
 Lord Hannen said: 
Even if it could be proved that the legislature was deceived, it would not be 
competent for a court of law to disregard its enactments.  If a mistake has 
been made, the legislature alone can correct it.  The Act of Parliament has 
declared [a state of affairs] … .  The courts of law cannot sit in judgment 
on the legislature but must obey and give effect to its determination.  
  
In British Railways Board v Pickin,
12
 Lord Reid said, in a similar vein: 
The function of the court is to construe and apply the enactments of 
Parliament.  The court has no concern with the manner in which 
Parliament or its officers carrying out its Standing Orders perform these 
functions.  Any attempt to prove that they were misled by fraud or 
otherwise would necessarily involve an inquiry into the manner in which 
they had performed their functions in dealing with the Bill … 
and Lord Morris said:
13
 
It must surely be for Parliament to lay down the procedures which are to 
be followed before a Bill can become an Act.  It must be for Parliament to 
decide whether its decreed procedures have in fact been followed.  It must 
be for Parliament to lay down and construe its Standing Orders and 
further to decide whether they have been obeyed: it must be for Parliament 
to decide whether in any particular case to dispense with compliance with 
such orders.  It must be for Parliament to decide whether it is satisfied that 
an Act should be passed in the form and with the wording set out in the 
Act.  It must be for Parliament to decide what documentary material or 
testimony it requires and the extent to which Parliamentary privilege 
should attach.  It would be impracticable and undesirable for the High 
Court of Justice to embark upon an inquiry concerning the effect or 
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effectiveness of the internal procedures in the High Court of Parliament or 
any inquiry whether in any particular case those procedures were 
effectively followed. 
 
Some scholars now question the strength and correctness of the propositions I 
have set out since the United Kingdom’s joining the European Union and 
Westminster’s enactment of section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, to 
the effect that domestic statutes shall be construed and shall have effect subject 
to the incorporation of European Law.  
Nicholas Barber
14
 and Jeffrey Goldsworthy
15
 point to the House of Lords’ 
decision in R v Secretary of State for Transport; ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 
2)
16
 as changing the orthodox understanding of parliamentary sovereignty: its 
‘quiet death’ as Barber says.
17
  What section 2 of the European Communities Act 
prescribed was, they suggest, contrary to parliamentary sovereignty in the 
traditional sense.  Take as an example this possibility: a later statute is in conflict 
with an earlier one.  The earlier one would, on orthodox principles of 
parliamentary sovereignty, be repealed pro tanto.  But if the earlier statute were 
one incorporating European Law into English Law, then no such rule could 
apply, if section 2 were to be given full effect.   
The conflict in Factortame was between a provision of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988 (to the effect that fishing boats could only be registered as 
British vessels if they were owned three-quarters by British companies and three-
quarters of the company directors were British citizens) and duties arising from 
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European law not to discriminate on grounds of nationality.  Factortame, in its 
ultimate form, involved the House of Lords deciding that a ruling by the 
European Court of Justice that a national court was obliged to set aside any 
national rule that restricted its capacity to grant interim relief (relief which the 
House of Lords had earlier declined to give) meant that interim relief ought be 
granted suspending the statute’s operation. 
Various explanations and justifications have been offered for this important 
decision.  Some have sought to explain it as being the result of a non-legal 
Constitutional rule, said to have emerged for the purpose of requiring that the 
United Kingdom Parliament not legislate in conflict with Community law.
18
  
Some have reasoned that the limitations it applied to Parliament came from the 
European Communities Act and that it amounted to a ‘conduit’ through which 
European Law flowed into the English legal system.  If that were so, then the 
repeal of that Act would close this conduit.
19
  Other views are that the Common 
Law recognized the European Communities Act as being a statute of a special 




It matters not for my purposes which of these alternative possible 
explanations is ultimately correct.  The point of this discussion is that 
Westminster has, by the passage of the European Communities Act, subjected 
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itself to European regulations and institutions such that it is no longer true to say 
of Westminster’s enactments they, once passed, they are unchallengeably ‘law’.  
Thus, Barber says, it is no longer the case that ‘whatever the Queen-in-
Parliament enacts as a statute is law’: the Courts can sometimes set aside 
statutes which have been passed by Parliament.
21
 
A limit this may be, but it is a self-initiated one (Westminster, after all, 
passed the European Communities Act) which voluntarily incorporates EU law.  
It is a limitation, however, that ought not be confused with Constitutional 
limitations as experienced today by the former English colonies.  In their cases, 
the limitations are to be drawn from a single (albeit, perhaps amended) iconic 
Constitutional document, and one very much the product of national processes 
and sentiments.  The power to amend (rarely utilised in most cases) vests in the 
people.  Westminster’s position is very different: no written Constitution of its 
own
22
 and subject to what laws the European Parliament might from time to time 
enact.  
The limits on Parliament’s powers, in recent history, tend to have been 
found in the separation of that power from others (especially interpretive and 
adjudicative), the existence of rival sources of law, the fact that legislative power 
is vested in those who are also to be subject to the laws which are made (through 
the Commons, or Lower House as it is known in the Parliaments derived from 
Westminster) and the selection of proper candidates (its representative and 
democratic nature).  Limits these might be, but they rarely receive treatment as 
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such and the whole tendency has been to overlook them as having any such 
effect.   
A consequence of neglecting these limiting features of the architecture of 
the legal system and its component parts is to leave room for abuses and excesses 
by the legislative arm.  Is it recognised, for example, the extent of the trust which 
is reposed in those elected to Parliament (something to which Austin sought to 
give expression)?  The problem is one to which Blackstone alluded (drawing on 
Coke) in these terms:
23
 
So that it is a matter most essential to the liberties of this kingdom, that 
such members be delegated to this important trust, as are most eminent for 
their probity, their fortitude, and their knowledge; for it was a known 
apothegm of the great lord treasurer Burleigh, "that England could never 
be ruined but by a Parliament": and, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, this 
being the highest and greatest court over which none other can have 
jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should any 
way fall upon it, the subjects of this kingdom are left without all manner of 
remedy.  To the same purpose the president Montesquieu, though I trust, 
too hastily, presages; that as Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have lost their 
liberty and perished, so the constitution of England will in time lose it’s 
liberty, will perish: it will perish, whenever the legislative power shall 
become more corrupt than the executive. 
 
If that truly be the state of affairs which the English system brings about, an 
observer might enquire whether it is safe to place such reliance on Parliament 
and its representatives not becoming corrupted, and, for that reason, to do 
nothing to nurture those (perhaps few) limits on their activities which can be 
identified. 
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Constitutionalism in British-derived systems 
What I have set out above is the British situation only.  Entirely different 
arrangements exist in the major Anglo-American common law systems.  In those 
newer systems (all, of course, fashioned in the post-revolutionary world) the 
arrangements to which I refer are, very definitely, written and enacted.  
Immediately, of course, there is an irony in the solution to any perceived over-
reliance on trusting Parliament to enact legislation well and properly.  
Constitutions too are the acts of assemblies.  They too invoke the Parliamentary 
and legislative processes.  They too invoke text.   
I wish to look more closely at these systems to demonstrate that, although 
written constitutions do have the effect of placing limits on what assemblies may 
do, they are also capable of being a charter for legislative intervention rather than 
restraint.  Perhaps it was never the object of those measures to achieve legislative 
restraint as such, but to establish, following from the events in France and 
America in the late 18
th
 century in particular, the approach which legislation 
would take on certain subject matter, and especially to protect or advance rights.  
But in any event, cutting across any influence of restraint, however, as I will 
show, Constitutionalism has revived judge-made innovations, providing as it 
does a means by which the Court might exploit three facets:  their (Judges’) 
capacity to interpret law (including the Constitution); the declaratory nature of 
judicial decisions and Parliament’s lack of capacity to ‘supervise’ or abrogate 
those decisions, because of the entrenched nature of the Constitution in the major 
Anglo-American systems.  
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What might be described as the major three such systems: the United 
States, Canada and Australia, are all federal in structure.  Each of these has, 
therefore, an immediate and peculiar requirement that there be a written 
Constitution for the purpose, if for no other, of dividing power between the 
provinces and the central government, and providing mechanisms for the 
resolution of such conflicts.   
The drafters of the constitutions of those democracies took the 
opportunity to enshrine certain fundamental rights which ordinary Parliamentary 
legislation alone could not displace.  Amendments in many cases have sought to 
do likewise. 
Australia 
Leaving aside its Federal component, the Australian situation is the simplest, and 
the one which most closely follows the British.  Its Constitution contains few 
provisions directed to the protection of rights.  It has stood largely unaltered 
since its enactment in 1901.  The very few express protections which exist 
concern a right to trial by jury, the requirement that any acquisition of private 
property be on ‘just terms’, freedom of trade and secularity of government.  
There do not exist in the Australian Constitution positive rights anywhere 
approaching the number and extent of those in the Canadian and American 
systems.   
The developments in the Australian system which for present purposes are 
of interest are those which have occurred at the level of its highest appellate 
court, which is also its Constitutional Court.  In a series of decisions since 1980, 
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the High Court has found in the Constitution, several implied protections: the 
guarantee of a system of representative democracy; the necessity of each of the 
State and Federal Governments remaining as effective polities regulating their 
own affairs; and a freedom of political communication.
24
  These so-called 
implied freedoms were given expression in cases which came before the Court.  
Because their source is identified as the Commonwealth Constitution, Parliament 
is not itself at liberty to abrogate them, at least not without first complying with 
the high threshold for changing the Constitution itself: a majority of voters in a 
majority of States.
25
  Only eight proposals for alteration to the Commonwealth 
Constitution have succeeded in its 110 year history, which is a very small 
proportion of the 44 proposals for change which have been presented to the 
people. 
The implication in a written Constitution of rights or doctrines involves 
nuanced (some say impermissible) judicial tactics.  The principles articulated by 
the Courts are not ones identified as arising from customary or common law.  
Although those sources may inform the principle, the Court gives primacy to the 
written Constitution and purports to follow its implied commands.  But, having 
found that the rule identified is implied in that text or structure of the written 
document (the text only vaguely identified and the structure a matter of linguistic 
architecture) then the effect of the Constitution, from that time, carries with it 
that (judicially-identified) rule.  This last feature is only possible by reason of the 
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declaratory nature of common law decisions; the notion that when judges declare 
the law, they give expression to something which has always existed, and merely 
lay waiting to be found by them.     
This judicial approach is, I suggest, partly a response to the Courts being 
presented with a mass of written enacted law and the apparent deference now 
afforded to it over common law methods and reasoning.  Perhaps written text 
offers a simplicity which trawling through a mass of judicial decisions does not; 
perhaps reliance upon the written iconic text is thought to confer upon the 
relevant judicial decision the authority which the Constitution itself crystallised; 
or perhaps Courts themselves have run out of ideas and see their role as giving 
life and experience to written words.  
Canada  
The North American Constitutional approach is more rights-based than any other 
Anglo-American system. 
The Canadian Constitution has included, since 1982, the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, in the form of the Constitution Act 1982.  Preceding it was the 
Bill of Rights 1960.  The Charter contains a range of express restrictions on 
legislative (and other) action, including by protecting from interference, rights 
such as freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, 
democratic rights, and legal rights such as the right to life, liberty and security. 
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The Constitution (as the Supreme Law of Canada),
26
 which includes the 
Charter, has the effect of invalidating any law which is inconsistent with it.  The 
Courts may therefore strike down laws that violate the Charter.
27




Canada too has developed an implied rights jurisprudence based upon, 
principally, the preamble to the British North America Act 1867: 
Whereas the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have 
expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the 
Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a 
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom … 
 
This jurisprudence did not emerge in authoritative form until the Remuneration 
Reference in 1997.
29
  That case held that political institutions were fundamental 
to the basic structure of the Constitution, and that governments (legislatures and 
the Executive) could not undermine the mechanisms of political accountability 
which gives those institutions definition, direction and legitimacy.
30
  The 
Secession Reference,
31
 which followed only shortly after the Remuneration 
Reference, adopted language which suggested a life that Constitutional principles 
and their ‘powerful normative force’ might assume in Court decisions and which 
would result in the invalidating of legislation on grounds other than those 
expressly articulated in the Constitution itself.  But, as Grant Huscroft has 
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 the Secession Reference has not lived up to the grandiose expectations 
of it, and underlying constitutional principles have not been invoked to invalidate 
legislation.  Perhaps the reason why the Canadian Supreme Court has not found 
it necessary to invalidate legislation on the grounds of implied rights in the 
Constitution is the greater number and breadth of rights expressly stated there 
compared to all other major Anglo-American systems and culture of rights-based 
legislators.  
The United States 
Constitutional interpretation in the United States too has included a doctrine of 
implied rights.  The Ninth Amendment leaves open (in an express sense), the 
existence of other rights: 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.   
 
The United States, principally through its three Charters of Freedoms, recognises 
certain individual rights.  They are well known: freedom of religion (ie 
prohibiting Congress from establishing a religion and protecting the right to the 
free exercise of religion); freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of 
assembly and so forth.  
Many implied rights have been interpreted by Courts as arising under the 
United States Constitution, including: freedom of association;
33
 a right to 
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 the right to travel;
35
 and the right to educate children according to 
parental wishes.
36
  The due process clause in the 14
th
 Amendment continues to 




The Canadian and US Constitutions are, consistent with the Australian 
experience, difficult to change.
38
  Judicially-recognised (but not express) facets 
of Constitutions are a means by which the Common Law achieves some 
ascendancy (but by a sidewind) over legislation.  It is here that we find a 
fundamental division between constitutionality in the Anglo-American ‘colonies’ 
and that of Britain itself.  Britain’s is a common law bill of rights, one which, as 
Thomas Paine complained, was principle perhaps, but no real impediment to the 
erosion of fundamental rights.  In each of the major Anglo-American systems, 
not only have certain matters been placed beyond the reach of the legislature, but 
it has provided a means by which the Courts might achieve a common law bill of 
rights to supplement those parts which are written, and to enjoy for those 
doctrines, the entrenchment which expressly articulated provisions enjoy. 
Written constitutions would seem, on one view, to be forces for legislative 
restraint.  But we do not see in Canada, America, or Australia for that matter any 
readily identifiable model for greater legislative restraint than in, for example, 
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Britain.  If anything, the opposite is discernible.  While rights might operate as 
restraints on legislative action (by preventing the legislature enacting legislation 
or because, if such legislation is passed, Courts strike it down) even those rights 
require legislative intervention for their definition and elaborate bureaucratic and 
other processes to support them.   
Consequences for legislation of Constitutionalism 
There are two other aspects of Constitutionalism which bear upon its more 
general effect in terms of legislation. 
First, there is the status and respect afforded to written Constitutions as 
iconic texts.  We repose in a text and the process preceding its framing, a trust of 
the most fundamental kind.  The belief is that the document will perpetuate 
orderly and democratic government, that it will strike the right balance between 
the organs of government, that it will prescribe pre-requisites for its alteration 
which are sufficiently stringent, yet not unachievable when change ought occur.  
We place trust in its articulation of rights: not too prescriptive, yet not 
unrealistically unambitious.  We often place trust in it to articulate the national 
character and define its qualities.  If we are prepared to do all those things for a 
written Constitution, it says something also, I suggest, about the respect we 
might be willing to afford lesser texts, but texts all the same.  It is also indicative 
of the respect which we have for the processes by which texts are framed.  
Constitutional processes might be more special than regular legislative activities, 
but there is a connection between the respect for the capacity of a ‘big meeting’ 
adequately enough to reflect the wishes of the people at the Constitutional level, 
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just as there is for the big meeting (ie Parliament) to do so when it comes to more 
mundane matters.   
Secondly, like all written texts, there is a tendency to regard subject matter 
with which it does not deal as lacking authority, as if the decision to not enact a 
particular rule has consigned it to oblivion.  This argument, against which 
implied rights doctrines have to some extent been a reaction, is perhaps the 
product of the superficial attractiveness of the simplicity of a statute: there is one 
source to which recourse need be had; the document has an orderly structure; it is 
(hopefully) clear in its expression and when I communicate with others about it 
or the commands it makes, I can limit with safety my knowledge of the subject 
matter to what that document contains.   
I am suggesting that text-based rules play to our inherent laziness or desire 
for order, and appeal to our wish (distinctly modern) to believe that such 
documents are capable of containing exhaustive statements of the relevant 
considerations.  Proof of this lies in the fact that it was considered necessary in 




It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating 
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights 
which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by 
implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to 
be assigned into the hands of the Central Government, and were 
consequently unsecure.  
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To return to my theme: despite looking very much like fetters on law-making 
power, the positive rights in the American and Canadian Constitutions seem to 
have proved to be a charter for the exercise of law making power as much 
perhaps as for the restraint of it.  They provide a justification for legislating so as 
to provide the rights sought to be secured and so as to remove impediments to 
them.  For example, the right to mobility justifies imposing standards of 
construction on private dwellings, commercial buildings and public infrastructure 
and transport, and the right to security justifies police powers and health and 
safety standards.  Similarly, anti-discrimination and equal opportunity legislation 
furthered Constitutional objectives of fair and equal treatment. 
Although many laws are invalidated by the Courts for contravening one or 
more of these constitutional restrictions, and no doubt many more are never or 
only momentarily contemplated because of them, many laws are passed in 
furtherance of the objectives they articulate.  That follows in part also from the 
nature of such aspirations.  Many are positive rights.  So the achievement of 
them naturally encourages legislation.  
We can see, therefore, that Constitutional protections have a dual effect: on 
the one hand they have only lately reinvigorated the Common Law, which has 
sought to take advantage of the entrenched nature of those protections; on the 
other, they have provided a justification for legislative intervention to give effect 





IV Limits on giving effect to legislation 
 
So far we have looked at internal limits which operate at the stage at which 
legislation is made, or immediately afterwards.  Constitutional restrictions might 
limit the legislature’s power to pass legislation on a particular topic or limit it 
having a particular effect.  But the enactment of a statute does not bring to an end 
the countervailing forces which might operate against it.  Maitland was aware of 
an excessive tendency to focus, when looking at legislation, on the processes 




Some people seem to think that a Bill loses all its importance at the very 
moment when it becomes law, that it ceases to be a subject for 
constitutional history, or indeed history of any kind, when the last division 
has been taken.  
 
Administrative historians are much more alert to the importance of the way in 
which legislation is given effect: the obedience it commands, the bureaucracy’s 
implementation of it, and the way in which the Courts, in practice, apply it.  
Henry Parris, for example, in his work Constitutional Bureaucracy, identified 
this as the ‘Mikado effect’, citing Gilbert and Sullivan:
41
 
That’s the pathetic part of it.  Unfortunately, the fool of an Act says 
“compassing the death of the Heir Apparent”.  There’s not a word about a 
mistake, or not knowing, or having no notion, or not being there.  There 
should be, of course, but there isn’t.  That’s the slovenly way in which 
these Acts are always drawn.  However, cheer up, it’ll be right.  I’ll have it 
altered next session.  
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Attention to legislation in its post-enactment life is justified on grounds which go 
beyond alleged deficiencies in its drafting.  The purpose of any statute is to have 
its commands obeyed, so looking to its formation and its culmination in an 
enactment seems to assume that the process of the statute’s application is a 
matter, if not of mechanics, unworthy of serious attention.   
Francis Bennion
42
 and Lord Denning
43
 have both noted the very large 
number of cases which involve statutory interpretation, perhaps the result of the 
increasing volume of statute law.  Even with sophisticated techniques of 
statutory drafting, and all the rules of statutory construction, there remains room 
for genuine contests about how a statute ought be applied.  
The post-enactment life of legislation is, however, one of the stages in 
which we might expect to find doctrinal limitations.  The statute has yet to prove 
capable of implementation, of being applied and enforced by the Courts and by 
the Administration, and, I will suggest, of showing the extent to which it is 
capable of withstanding the forces of the Common Law.  
From the discussion which follows, there are notable omissions for which I 
make no apology.  I do not consider the rules of statutory construction in any 
detail, or the various presumptions which accompany them.  These have ceased, 
in my view, to constitute any real form of restraint upon legislation for two 
principal reasons.  First, so far as the rules of statutory interpretation exist in the 
form of presumptions against, for example, the legislature’s interference with the 
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liberty of the subject, or with property, or vested, rights, they are presumptions 
only, and can be displaced by express statutory language, by manifest intention 
or ‘necessary intendment’.  Secondly, the nature and content of many of these 
rules have, quite ironically, been neutralised by statute, in the form of the various 
Acts prescribing the rules for the interpretation of statutes.
44
  Legislation of that 
kind directs the Courts in the principles to be applied and the ones which are to 
be preferred over others.  It would be interesting to know, but it is not within the 
scope of my exercise here, and to trace, how and why the Courts were generally 
uncritical or passive in response to this incursion into their function, and why it 
was thought desirable to have the legislature demolish the long-maintained 
division between judicial and legislative functions by reaching its hand in to 
manipulate the rules by which the Courts interpret and give effect to its 
commands.  One answer might be that if the Courts are to obey statutes, there is 
no reason why Parliament ought not lay down the rules of a more general kind by 
which all its commands ought to be construed.  It might also be noted, for 
completeness, that the Courts too, on occasion, confess the unhelpfulness of such 
rules with modern drafting practices.  Lord Justice Rose, for example, in R 
(Crown Prosecution Service) v South East Surrey Youth Court,
45
 after referring 
to the provisions of the relevant Act being ‘deeply confusing’, said: 
We find little comfort or assistance in the historic canons of construction 
for determining the will of Parliament which were fashioned in a more 
leisurely age and at a time when clarity of thought and language were to 
be found in legislation as a matter of course rather than exception.  
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We would, for these reasons, be wasting time were we to look in that direction 
for real limits on legislation.    
The topics which, on the other hand, return our investment in their 
consideration are the division of labour between command-issuing and 
interpreting, and applying commands, and the different methods each adopts. 
Division of labour   
Legislatures, because they are assemblies, express themselves only through a 
singular text which purports to encapsulate, so far as there is one, the rule which 
all its members, or at least a majority of them, are content to adopt.  Such a 
system ‘presupposes an intelligible method of making known to the organs of 
administration, courts or otherwise, its [the legislature’s] desires and hopes’.
46
 
But those collective law-givers, with one important exception, lose, at the 
point they agree upon the framing of the rule, any real control over how the rule 
is interpreted and given effect in particular cases.  The exceptions are the rules of 
statutory construction which, although entirely a matter for the Courts, have in 
the last several decades, become ‘statutised’ – hijacked I suggested above – by 
the legislature in the form of Acts Interpretation statutes better to secure what 
Parliament intended.  The second exception is of course Parliament’s ability, 
upon seeing how its rules are being applied, to, if its processes permit, amend the 
command so as better to express either what the majority is thought to have 
intended in the first place, or to adjust the command to take account of something 
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which, in its practical operation, emerged as an unintended effect or matter 
which ought to have received treatment but did not.  
Statute law we regard as written law, yet judicial decisions we regard as 
unwritten, despite the latter being every bit as documentary as the former.  The 
difference, of course, lies not only in how the bodies are constituted (Courts 
mostly comprise a single Judge for trial and a very small number, and rarely 
more than 9, on appellate benches), but also in very fundamental ways in what 
they seek to achieve and how they go about doing so.  This is a theme upon 
which I wish to expand.   
Assemblies must state such rules as they wish to enact by way of 
command, and ordinarily prospectively.  When they do so, they know that there 
will be no opportunity to revisit those commands before the practical effects of 
them are manifest.  For that reason, and because the Assembly will play no 
active part in any contest about the commands’ meaning and application, at the 
next stage of the process, those commands must be as clear as possible in stating 
what they require.  The whole purpose of issuing textual commands is that they 
remain unmodified until the receipt of them by the subject.  
The rules which an Assembly enacts need have no prior existence or be 
supported by any historical or philosophical considerations.  It is enough that the 
Assembly issued its command by following the set process for doing so.  The 
commands it issues draw their legitimacy and coercive force from the mere fact 
that a majority of the Assembly had endorsed them and that they received such 
royal or Presidential assent (ordinarily a perfunctory act anyway).  The question 
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of the statute’s legitimacy is fused with the question whether it is valid.
47
  The 
reason for us approaching legislation in this manner is the product of several very 
deep-seated philosophical and historical perspectives. I confront them in Chapter 
5.  For now, however, I would simply observe that to subsume questions of 
legitimacy within that of validity is something that we can see to be generally 
consistent with two factors that I have already discussed.  First, doing so taps 
deep into the forces which assisted Parliament’s rise in the 17
th
 century and 
which I surveyed in Chapter 1, namely, respecting the place which Parliament 
has come to assume as the supreme law-maker.  Secondly, it has an elegant 
symmetry with Dicey’s absolutist doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. 
These elements of collective commanding self-sufficiency characterise, at 
a fundamental level, the legislative act.  The limitations of them, although 
perhaps not immediately apparent, become a little clearer when the legislative 
circumstance is compared to that of Judges. 
The Common Law is one of two means by which legislation might be 
given effect (if we leave aside people’s own willingness simply to obey it) the 
other being the bureaucracy.  That is a separate (and largely unexplored) topic all 
of its own.  By ‘giving effect’, I mean both interpreting and applying commands 
to specific instances.   
Giving effect to legislation is not, however, the Common Law’s only, or 
even its principal, function.  It also has a function of expressing law, an 
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expression which need bear no connection to that adopted by an Assembly.  Care 
of course is required when stating what the Common Law does when it comes to 
this aspect of its functions.  Orthodoxy would have common law judges finding 
or revealing those rules, whereas more modern realist doctrines would have them 
making those rules, albeit mostly within the bounds of common law reason.  
For so long as the idea that judges find and not make law persists, there 
exists a need for judges to articulate reasons for their decisions which evidences 
their having searched for the rule and not merely having, as Landis might 
cynically have said, made law according to their own views.   
The method of judicial reasoning is one which appellate courts expect and, 
in turn, exhibit themselves.  That method is one which, historically in particular, 
gave considerable respect to custom
48
 which deferred to the views of other 
judges, past and present, especially if more senior in the judicial hierarchy.
49
  
That, however, does not exhaust its characteristics, because it has also exhibited 
a practical reason of its own, a way of making sense of the often abstract legal 
rules (statutory or not) in the particular circumstances which comprise the cases 
which come before the Courts.   
There are at least three limiting features which a separation of the 
legislative (commanding) and adjudicative (ie interpreting and applying) 
functions bring.  First, those separate institutions, with their different 
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composition, location and histories, will inevitably develop their own procedures 
and self-awareness.  Secondly, the Common Law operates at the level of the 
specific case and in doing so engages with narrative in a way which legislation’s 
greater aloofness and generality do not permit.
50
  Thirdly, the separation between 
the Courts and the legislature means that there is a place within which Judges, 
when interpreting legislation, might adopt their own informed view of matters, 
and in doing so, to justify their approach by claiming it to be no more than what 
the legislature (itself unable by that stage to supplement or clarify its earlier 
command) intended.  It is the notion of intent and how the Courts make use of it 
upon which I now turn to focus.   
The Legislature’s Intent  
The particular way in which the Court might conduct itself when giving effect to 
legislation in a particular case will depend very much on the nature of the 
legislation in issue and the circumstances in which it comes to be applied.  At the 
simplest level, the Court might be called upon to apply relatively clear statutory 
language to facts as found by it.  There might be complexity in the fact-finding 
process (and, indeed, some room to find such facts as suit a particular statutory 
result),
51
 but the stage of applying a legislative command to those facts as found 
might be a straightforward task.  In the broadest sense only, this basic task 
involves interpretation.  
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Alternatively, the Court’s function might be exercising a discretion which 
has been expressly left to it by the legislature.  It might entail exercising that 
discretion directly (ie making such orders as in its discretion it considers just); it 
might be an appeal de novo from a decision of a public official; or it might be a 
form of judicial review of such decisions, and calling, in that context, for wide 
yet structured discretions to be exercised.  I mean to exclude from my analysis 
this kind of decision-making by Courts.  It involves little if any of the sense of 
limitation on legislation I would wish to consider.  In these instances, the 
legislature has devolved or delegated to the Courts activities of this kind, or left 
that field free, so there is little sense of the legislature itself being curtailed in its 
function.  (I might mention, however, the jealous way in which the Courts have 
protected their role of administrative review, by construing as narrowly as 
possibly any privative clause, and, in cases of fundamental or jurisdictional error, 
precluding entirely Parliament’s ability to restrict or prohibit review by the 
Courts of administrative decisions which are so tainted.)
52
 
Below these levels we begin to touch upon the kinds of interpretive 
activities in which there might be found limits, albeit that in doing so, the Courts, 
superficially at least, seek to give effect to the legislature’s intention.  The kinds 
of interpretive functions I have in mind are: deciding between two or more 
competing meanings to be given to words used by Parliament; striving to find 
some meaning in circumstances in which the text itself seems not to have 
contemplated a particular consequence, although purporting to deal with the 
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topic generally; and sometimes departing from the literal textual command to 
give effect to a purpose which must have motivated the legislature.  There are 
numerous examples of Courts finding a meaning in legislation which is different 
from that which a literal reading of the words used by the legislature convey.
53
 
The possibility which lies in the truly interpretive functions of Courts 
limiting legislation’s reach (beyond the fact of their separation and its 
consequences, with which I dealt above), is that Courts, when doing so, might 
exercise autonomy in ascribing meaning.  Historically, this autonomy manifests 
itself in the Courts refusing to give effect to legislative provisions which were 
contrary to right and reason.
54
  This is a direct example of common law assuming 
a position of rivalry with legislation.   
Examples in modern times of the exercise of autonomy will not be as 
unashamed perhaps, but that does not mean there is no purpose in searching for 
them, including in places in which they might be obscured.  The examples for 
which we might search are instances in which, from a range of possible 
meanings, the Court prefers one which appeals to it, but which differs from that 
which the legislature wished to impose.  We know that Parliament, on occasion, 
abrogates the effect of a judicial decision giving effect to legislation.  Each of 
these must at one level be an example of the exercise of judicial autonomy.  It is 
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overly simplistic to say in response that the Courts, in making that decision, 
simply mis-divined what the intent of the legislature was.  In such cases, 
especially where the statutory abrogation comes shortly after the passage of the 
legislation (so there is more likely to be the same minds having the same intent) 
there is a manifest disagreement by the very body whose intention the judicial 
decision claimed to be given effect, and that could only be understood as the 
Courts having acted contrary to Parliament’s intention.  
Nor is it an answer, I suggest, to say that all the Courts do when fulfilling 
their interpretive function is to do what Parliament might have done, had it 
adverted to the particular circumstances with which a particular Court was 
presented or because legislation must, however comprehensive and detailed it 
might appear, necessarily remain incomplete.
55
  This does not preclude, as I 
suggest occurs, the Courts having a distinct role in limiting legislation, albeit 
proceeding always under a test of divining and giving effect to Parliament’s 
intention.   
Much turns then, on the extent to which the Courts in truth fulfil their 
interpretive function by reference to what Parliament intended and what part of 
that function has autonomous features.  The exercise is a difficult one and that, I 
suggest, is part of its brilliance.  A task fulfilled by one body, but which purports 
to be acting on what the commander intended to say, but which is taken to speak 
definitively on that topic, and in circumstances in which no appeal can be made 
to the commander itself, is accompanied by a large degree of autonomy.  I will 
develop my argument in three parts: 
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1) exposing the unsatisfactory nature of the legislature’s intent as the 
basis for the Court’s interpretive function; 
 
2) elucidating some current approaches of the Courts to the relationship 
between common law and legislation at the highest appellate levels; 
 
3) understanding something of the debate about the relationship 
between common law and legislation. 
 
My ultimate propositions is that the Courts have found a safe harbour in 
legislative intent as the basis for their interpretative function.  There are signs 
(some theorists and judges aside) that the Courts increasingly resort to it and 
attempt to fit their own historical jurisprudence within statutory words.  But to do 
so is, I suggest, expedient and a convenient cover for what judges really do.  
There is, nonetheless, a place for it.  Not only does it provide the necessarily 
wide boundaries within which Judges might exercise their structured common 
law discretion, but it safely legitimises the task they conduct by bringing their 
function within the modern doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy.  Intent as the 
basis for Judges’ interpretive function is, in short, a convenient cover for what 
judges should (and actually) do.  That approach is an acceptable one, at least 
until there emerges some alternative theory capable of achieving both these 
objects at least as well as does the present doctrine.   
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The Legislature’s Intention: a problematic device  
One could read most recent decisions of final and intermediate appellate courts 
in the Anglo-American world and divine little of the serious reservations and 
limitations about it which academic commentary (even from those who 
champion it as a basis for the interpretive function) reveals.  The lines of 
authority I identify below as part of demonstrating some current trends are just 
one illustration of the subtleties which might exist in the stated juridical bases for 
statutory interpretation. 
The whole notion of a popularly elected body making laws, and Courts 
giving effect to the people’s commands in individual cases is elegant.  No truly 
realistic or informed analysis, however, could consider it so straightforward.  
By exposing the problematic nature of legislative intent in its 
employment by Courts in their interpretive function, I wish to show that it 
cannot, in a disciplined and realistic sense, offer a sufficient explanation for all 
that Courts do.  If my thesis be correct – that legislative intent is a convenient 
cover for a much wider discretionary exercise – we will not find any revelation 
of that in judicial decisions.  Judges will be doing their best to maintain all 
appearances of orthodoxy.  
Instead, I propose look to the idea itself and examine just what basis it 
might be capable of offering for the range of interpretive tasks which Judges 
undertake.  Radin considered the intent of the legislature to be undiscoverable 
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and, if discoverable, irrelevant.
56
  If that is right, or even partially, then what 
possible role might that doctrine fulfil?   
Parliament has neither a single mind nor even a single institutional 
composition.  In almost every instance it comprises a lower and an upper house
57
 
(both with different motivations, geographic electorates and methods of election) 
and some form of royal or like assent.  When it (and by this it must be 
understood its myriad component parts)
58
 votes on legislation, it has before it, in 
almost every case, text prepared by, and on the instructions of, the Executive.  
In any modern Parliament, there is a huge volume of legislation.  Few 
elected Members have legal training.  They might have the benefit of advice 
about, and summaries of, the legislation, but it is simply fanciful to think that, for 
the most part, the majority of Members of popular assemblies are able to give 
other than the most cursory attention to a particular Bill.  
There are limited responses which might be made to these very real 
problems.  Parliament might be compared to a corporation, which we often 
recognise as capable of having a purpose, objects or an intention.  Not every 
Member of Parliament or Congress need consider a Bill in detail for the decision 
as a whole to be an informed one.  Although Bills are drafted by unelected 
officials, the methods and forms of drafting are well established and have a 
science of their own.  All these explanations do provide substantial responses to 
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the criticisms made of the existence of, and ability to find, a reliable legislative 
intention.  Many have tried, and I will not therefore attempt to resolve, these 
competing positions.  What I would wish to identify however, is that even the 
most strident supporters of the legislature’s intent being the touchstone for the 
interpretation of legislation recognise to some extent what we might call the 
mystical nature of that pursuit.  That exercise is one undertaken by a specialist 
elite (ie judges) with their own traditions and methods (and perhaps their own or 
institutional purposes).  It therefore stands very much on its own two feet as an 
autonomous legal method.  
The discretion which the pursuit allows is reflected to some extent in the 
rules about the material to which a judge might have regard in finding or 
deciding the relevant intention.  Until only relatively recently in the United 
Kingdom,
59
 and only a little earlier in Australia
60
 and New Zealand, Courts 
considered unhelpful, records of proceedings of legislative assemblies.  The basis 
for excluding material concerning the Parliamentary history of amendments was, 




… the interpretative advantages which it might bring in the marginal case 
would be outweighed by the burden, which would be imposed on users of 
statutes in general, of obtaining copies of the amendments made or 
proposed and of elucidating their significance. 
 
The contrary view (and the one which prevails today) is that:
62
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The records of legislative assemblies once opened and read with a 
knowledge of legislative procedure often reveal the richest kind of evidence 
[of the meaning which the assembly attached to the words used].  To insist 
that each individual legislator besides his aye vote must also have 
expressed the meaning he attaches to the bill as a condition precedent to 
predicating an intent on the part of the legislature, is to disregard the 
realities of legislative procedure.  Through the committee report, the 
explanation of the committee chairman, and otherwise, a mere expression 
of assent becomes in reality a concurrence in the views of another.  A 
particular determinate thus becomes the common possession of the 
majority of the Legislature, and as such a real discoverable intent. 
 
One of Landis’s concerns was that:
63
 
Strong judges prefer to override the intention of the legislature in order to 
make law according to their own views.   
 
Perhaps some judges do have that purpose.  We cannot impute to them a desire 
to act in bad faith or to give effect to wild prejudices.  The views they hold will 
be ones which their training and experience might provoke or which the narrative 
to which they have been more directly exposed than the legislature might 
compel.
64
  But that view can be given effect more subtly, in some cases at least, 
by appealing to a legislative intention which corresponds with it.   
The language of judges in many cases belies, I suggest, this very 
occurrence.  When we see, for example, statements about a result which 
Parliament could not have intended, we might see it as a judge’s (not 
uninformed) view in a particular instance, and having had the benefit of those 
facts, being one which is translated into legislative intention so that it might be 
transposed back as authority for the particular way in which the Judge seeks to 
give effect to the statute. 
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The present doctrinal position which the English Courts adopt is to deny 
any attempt to find any subjective intent on the part of Parliament, and to search 
instead, using the words of the statute (and such extrinsic material as it is 
permitted) to do so, for its objective intention.
65
  But if that be the actual 
exercise, then it leaves the task at risk of being self-fulfilling: the intent of 
Parliament is what the Courts say the words of the legislation mean.  The wider 
the sources to which the Courts might have regard, the more flexibility there 
might be in the Courts deciding what was Parliament’s intention.  For example, if 
a statute regulates conduct in a particular way, but the extrinsic material 
articulates the mischief which is to be targeted and the result sought to be 
achieved, the Courts would have flexibility in how to construe the regulation of 
the intervening conduct and to be more malleable with the statute’s treatment of 
that subject matter. 
So far, I have limited my consideration to judicial interpretation of ordinary 
statutes.  Written constitutions, however, as statutes of a special kind, require 
separate attention.  Questions of interpretation and the drafters’ intention with 
respect to them, as long-enduring iconic documents, have been no less 
controversial than ordinary legislation.
66
  There are differences of course 
between a written constitution and an ordinary statute.  Although both are 
enactments of popular assemblies, the range and strength of approaches to their 
construction differs.  Constitutions are special.  Their terms are usually broad and 
general, dealing, as they must, with matters of high policy and governmental 
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arrangements.  This calls, on one view, for some flexibility in their application to 
the varying conditions which society’s development involves.
67
 
On one side of the debate are true originalists, who would interpret the 
Constitution according to what the framers intended, and having regard to the 
meaning of those things at the moment of Constitutional creation.  There are also 
originalists who would give primacy to the framers’ intention, but on the basis 
that the words used be given the meaning they would assume as society and legal 
thinking have evolved.  Non-originalists, however, would give no primacy to 
intent and rely instead on the words as they stand to be interpreted at the time of 
decision and overlay, in doing so, what contemporary circumstances might be 
thought to justify. 
In the United States in particular, these debates have assumed considerable 
prominence.  Ought the words be applied only in circumstances which the 
framers contemplated?  Might words and old Constitutional principles be applied 
to new circumstances?  Or, as those who do not take any originalist view might 
suggest, might the Constitution change, even so that what it once prohibited it 
now permits and that which it once allowed it now prohibits?
68
  And even if 
interpretation were to come down to an assessment of intention, could that 
intention be determined objectively, and from the Constitutional provisions 
themselves, rather than from a more subjective intention of either its framers or 
its makers?   
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Although intent, whether it be in the context of a statute or a Constitution, 
might involve a fictitious element, it does serve to focus the Judge on an 
important task, that is, what use might be made of the past and how might the 
written document interact with the future.  This is the purpose which Popkin saw 
for the pursuit of intention, and it is one with which I wholeheartedly agree:
69
 
The simple act of thinking about the meaning of statutory language in this 
broader context – which the judge must do – requires judgment about how 
the text should interact with its past and future.  That is why, despite its 
being an obvious fiction, the judge when engaged in statutory 
interpretation is unable to do without the concept of legislative intent.  
Intent is matched with text as an essential aspect of statutory meaning, not 
because the judge has any confidence that legislative intent is knowable, 
but because 'intent' (or 'will') captures the idea that choices must be made 
in order to apply a text to facts.  Legislative intent is a useful judicial 
construct because the judge is required to make the choices that best 
express the statutory text's meaning. 
 
There is much to suggest that the search for intent masks an inquiry of a different 
kind.  The search for meaning, in a case where the meaning of particular words is 
not clear or uncontested, is for the Judge.  He or she might have a view about the 
particular result which the case in their mind justifies.  Or he or she might, by 
reason of a jurisprudential disposition (eg originalism), favour one of the 
possible approaches mentioned above.  In that case, the Judge finds the result by 
having a preferred approach to construction. 
On any traditional approach, the latter is to be preferred to the former.  In 
the former, the Judge is capricious, deciding each case on his or her prejudices 
and resistant to guidance from the range of established permissible methods of 
construction.  Even though making a selection from the range of possible 
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approaches to interpretation itself entails a prejudice of sorts, it is one which, 
being at least one step removed from seeking a particular result in specific cases, 
is not without judicial integrity. 
Mention here ought be made of two recent analyses on the topic of 
legislative intent: that of Neil Duxbury in his Elements of Legislation (2013) and 
of Richard Ekins in The Nature of Legislative Intent (2012).  Both recognise that 
the idea of legislative intent plays a constraining role, and both defend it.  
Duxbury shows how judges may discover a previously unearthed dimension to 
the actual statutory language
70
, which accords with the view I expressed above 
that legislative intent is in some cases a means by which judges have a greater 
say in what effect legislation has than might at first appear.  Ekins however stops 
sort of an analysis that touches in any direct way upon the point I would seek to 
make.  His is an account of legislative intent as the exercise of the legislature’s 
‘rational agency’
71
 more than the way in which Courts have interested 
themselves in it.   
Dworkin, like Popkin perhaps, recognises the legitimacy of the process 
upon which the search for intent sends the inquirer:
72
 
 [C]onstitutional interpretation must begin in what the framers said, and, 
just as our judgment about what friends and strangers say relies on 
specific information about them and the context in which they speak, so 
does our understanding of what the framers said.  History is therefore 
plainly relevant.  But only in a particular way.  We turn to history to 
answer the question of what they intended to say, not the different question 
of what other intentions they had.  We have no need to decide what they 
expected to happen, or hoped would happen, in consequence of their 
having said what they did, for example; their purpose, in that sense, is not 
part of our study.  That is a crucial distinction.  
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The reason for this brief detour about intent in its Constitutional context is to 
illustrate the possibility of that inquiry prompting, especially in that rather unique 
context, a task of a more general epistemic kind, and far more nuanced than a 
mere search for what the framers might, subjectively speaking, have meant. 
In recent times, Courts at the highest appellate levels in the United 
Kingdom and Australia have tended to approach their task of statutory 
interpretation by giving close attention to statutory language.  There are instances 
of these Courts, however, striving more assiduously than might be explained by 
the ordinary approaches, to seek to attach to the Common Law, the authority or 
kudos which attaches to Parliament and legislation.  I offer below one such 
example, selected as a clear illustration of a recent attempt by the highest Court 
of the United Kingdom to search for and apply legislative authority to rules 
which at common law already enjoyed an authority of their own.  The example I 
give occurred in the United Kingdom Supreme Court, but all the observations I 
make apply also to the Australian High Court (that country’s highest Court) 




The Crown has occasion, from time to time, to take land from private holders of 
it for purposes which are considered to be public ones.  There are early examples 
of it in the time of Charles II, who acquired land following the Great Fire of 
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London for what we might now classify as fire safety and town planning 
purposes. 
Often the acquisitions were provoked by the promotion by a private 
entrepreneur of a particular scheme.  In order to implement the scheme, if land 
were needed to achieve it, statute would be required to effect takings.  Before 
1845, the relevant Act would not only confer the power to take land, but also 
prescribe a procedure by which to do so, including, in almost all cases, coming to 
suitable arrangements with the landowner to compensate him or her for its 
acquisition.  Those procedures became the subject of the Land Clauses 
Consolidation Act 1845 which ‘enacted a standard code which would apply 
except in so far as varied by a particular Act’.
74
  That Act did not state the basis 
upon which compensation was to be assessed, instead making this general 
statement (in s 63): 
… regard shall be had … not only to the value of the land to be purchased 
or taken by the promoters of the undertaking, but also the damage, if any, 
to be sustained by the owner of the land by reason of …  
 
Value, especially when it comes to land, can be assessed in many different ways, 
for example:  according to the various assumptions to be made about the market 
at the relevant time; by having regard to the value (or cost) of improvements 
made to or upon it; and by making (or not making) allowance for (if any) the 
scheme for which the acquisition was effected, which scheme might increase or 
decrease the market value of the land.  
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It has always been accepted that value in this context meant value to the 




It has always been recognised that the value of the land means the value to 
the owner and does not mean its value to the promoters of its value in the 
open market.  If the owner is in occupation the value of the land to him 
may far exceed its value in the open market.  If he wishes to continue his 
activities he will not only have to obtain other premises but he will have to 
pay costs of removal and if he is carrying on business the move may cause 
loss of profits and other loss.  He will not be fully compensated unless this 
is taken into account.  
 
The consequence of this was that even where a statute was silent on the question 
of value (as was the case in Melwood Units Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Main 
Roads)
76
 the Common Law would provide the answer because, it was said: 
… it is a part of the common law deriving as a matter of principle from the 
nature of compensation for resumption or compulsory acquisition, that 
neither relevantly attributable appreciation nor depreciation in value is to 
be regarded in the assessment of land compensation.  
Until very recently, Courts treated this issue as one of common law principle and 
upon which the Common Law insisted as a necessary accompaniment to the 
deprivation of a landowner of his or her private property for public purposes.  
The Court referred to it as ‘principle’, and to the basis for it being the need to 
give ‘full’ compensation to the landowner.  Nowhere in the judgments is this 
principle expressed as one which may be abrogated, and there is no authoritative 
statement in any appellate English Court, until very recent years, which would 
seek to cast the rule in any other light.   
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It may be that the principle was, in reality, always vulnerable to express 
statutory abrogation, but it was never cast or explained in those terms and the 
way in which the Courts gave expression to it suggested, rightly or wrongly, that 
the rule was so fundamental as to be something which the legislature was both 
correct to leave alone and which it could never be so bold as to seek to abrogate 
or curtail.  
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, has, however, recently 
revisited how it regards the relationship between these common law attitudes and 
statutory provisions which touch the same topic.  In Transport for London v 
Spirerose Limited,
77
 at issue was a principle which took its name from the case in 
which it was most prominently articulated: Pointe Gourde Quarrying and 
Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands.
78
  
In Pointe Gourde, land in Trinidad had been compulsorily acquired so that 
it could be leased by the United States as a naval base.  The land had on it, a 
limestone quarry.  The owner claimed that its value should reflect the special 
need of the United States of the stone for the building of the naval base.   




It is well settled that compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land 
cannot include an increase in value which is entirely due to the scheme 
underlying the acquisition.  
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By ‘well settled’, the Judicial Committee could only have meant by common law 
principle.  Legislation never stated the requirement, and the reasoning may well 
have been a matter of common sense or ordinary fairness, but those things were 
given expression in judicial decisions and by that means took effect. 
We can see, however, a distinct trend to re-characterise those common law 
principles as ones which have a primarily legislative life.  Some examples from 
the reasons of Lords Walker and Lord Collins in Spirerose demonstrate the point.  
Lord Walker considered the Pointe Gourde principle to be in the nature of a 
rebuttable presumption ‘adopted by the court in the interpretation of statutes 
concerned with compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land’.
80
  His 
Lordship went on to say that the principle is simply part of the notion of ‘value’ 
being ‘value to the owner’.   
Lord Collins framed the question for determination to be the juridical 
basis for the Pointe Gourde principle.
81
  His Lordship traced the English 
decisions of high authority and concluded that the principle had been given 
express statutory expression.  His Lordship referred to the decision of the House 
of Lords in Waters v Welsh Development Agency
82
 and said that, on one view 
there had been a significant extension of the principle.  His Lordship made 
reference to the following passage from the speech of Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead:
83
   
The courts … found themselves driven to conclude that the statutory code 
is not exhaustive and that the Pointe Gourde principle still applies.  This 
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conclusion is open to the criticism that in many instances this makes the 
statutory provisions otiose.  This is so, but this is less repugnant as an 
interpretation of the Act than the alternative.  
 
 
The juridical basis of the Pointe Gourde principle was considered by Lord 
Collins to be in the terms Lord Nicholls expressed in Waters v Welsh 
Development Agency,
84
 namely ‘no more than the name given to one aspect of 
the long established “value to the owner” principle’ and to be a principle of 
statutory interpretation, ‘mainly designed and used to explain and amplify the 
expression “value”’.
85
  It had, his Lordship accepted, ‘sometimes’ been referred 
to as a common law principle.
86
  His Lordship went on to say:
87
   
In Rugby Joint Water Board v Shaw-Fox
88
 Lord Pearson reviewed the 
authorities and concluded that although the Pointe Gourde principle had 
been described as a ‘common law principle’, it could not be such a 
principle ‘because compulsory acquisition and compensation for it are 
entirely creations of statute’.
89
  He went on: ‘The Pointe Gourde principle 
in my opinion involves an interpretation of the word “value” in those 
statutory provisions which require the compensation for compulsory 
acquisition to include the value of the lands taken’.
90
 I am satisfied that 
this is the right approach and that there is nothing in Lord Nicholls’s 
speech in Waters v Welsh Development Agency which is inconsistent with 
this view. 
 
What flows from the juridical basis for the principle being statute and not the 
Common Law and what significance arises from the Court’s apparent re-
classification of it as such?   
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An analysis of the kind I have just attempted is often justified by the 
Courts on the basis that close attention is being given to statutory language.  It is 
an odd appeal to make.  It assumes an attentiveness and precision in 
Parliamentary text-making which is unrealistic.  It is one thing to seek to give 
effect to legislation based upon an intention which can be imputed to the 
legislature.  It is quite another, however, to impute to Parliament (or at least its 
elected members as distinct from the draftspeople it retains) as close a 
consideration of statutory text as judges might be likely to give to it.  It also 
assumes also that recourse to text is a valid inquiry by which to resolve the 
particular issue, when all that such an inquiry might be capable of offering is the 
comfort of a (and not necessarily the best) pre-determined solution to the issue.  
There are many good reasons why a Judge might use legislation in this manner, 
and the argument runs like this: Parliament expresses itself through text; Courts 
decide the meaning of text; in deciding what the text means, the Court is only 
ascertaining what the elected representatives said or meant to say; so the Court’s 
decision is not only the exercise of the Court’s heuristic function, it is the 
expression of Parliamentary (and therefore democratic) will. 
On the one hand, then, we see the Courts giving common law reasoning 
some statutory character and attracting for it some of the legitimating force of 
democratic will.  But by doing so, the rules become ones which the legislature 
might curtail or even abrogate.  And by deferring in such a way to the legislature, 
some of the Common Law’s autonomy and strength dissipates.    
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The Courts have been opportunistic (but perhaps short-sighted) in taking 
this approach and must have made a careful judgment about the opposing merits 
of these two aspects of their approach.  On the one hand, greater legitimacy 
might be thought to attach to common law processes, but on the other, it tends 
rather to suggest that the Common Law requires the imprimatur of statute to 
acquire full force.  The first consideration is of great benefit.  The Common Law, 
by this device, now draws its strength as the product of traditional reasoning by 
independent persons (Judges) in addition to a statutory-style legitimacy.  When 
in the future the Courts further develop the notion of ‘value’, the accretion will 
be to a body of principle which cannot be impugned owing to its statutory basis 
(as distinct from innovations of unelected judges).  For Courts to take this 
approach sacrifices very little: already Parliament may affect fundamental 
common law rights by clear language or manifest intention.  The device I have 
identified does little more than make that position a little firmer.  At the same 
time, however, it does suggest a lack of self-confidence in judicial decisions, 
reasoning and the system of precedent. 
The attitude which I have identified above as being manifested in the 
Court’s attitude to common law and ‘ordinary’ legislation stands in contrast with 
the higher Courts’ approach to Constitutional interpretation.  Courts have tended, 
in recent times, to strive to give effect to statutory language.  But, as I have said, 
they have been far more willing to find implied in written Constitutions, 
implications of very fundamental kinds.
91
  And it is not entirely clear that there is 
any valid point of distinction between the two forms of enactment such as would 
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  A brief survey of these is set out earlier in this Chapter. 
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satisfactorily explain their different treatment.  Constitutions, as I indicated 
above, are clearly special.  The manner of their interpretation, however, and 
whether the Courts ought to have flexibility in applying their terms to the varying 
conditions which society’s development involves, is a different matter altogether.  
Whether the reasons be the more general nature of written Constitutions, their 
(ordinarily) long-standing status and infrequent alteration, or the entrenchment 
which they enjoy, it is hard to see, in recent history at least, any of these being 
well-established or uncontentious bases for treating Constitutions as susceptible 
to implications by the Courts, and at the same time Courts being strictly obedient 
to the express words of ordinary statutes.  
So far I have treated Constitutions as if they are of two entirely separate 
kinds: customary (unwritten) and enacted (written).  To have done so proceeds 
along traditional, but perhaps overly simplistic, lines.  The United Kingdom’s 
Constitution, although on no view encapsulated within any one iconic document, 
does gain expression in various historic and contemporary instruments.  We 
know of the influence of Magna Carta and of the Bill of Rights.  But often left 
out of account are those instruments which serve, albeit in a piecemeal and 
fragmentary way, very much the same purposes as Constitutional requirements.  
For present purposes, we might focus upon the Treaty of Union (1707) and the 
Scottish devolution arrangements more recently established.  Both, I suggest, are 
constitutional in character and their existence and effect challenges the notion of 
both Diceyan Parliamentary sovereignty and of a clear dichotomy between 
written and unwritten constitutions.  
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MacCormick v Lord Advocate,
92
 a case decided by the Scottish Inner 
House, offers an insight into the different views within the United Kingdom itself 
as to what might be regarded as Constitutional sources and their effect.  
MacCormick’s case concerned a challenge by Scottish petitioners to the style of 
the reigning Monarch ‘Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom of Great Britain’ 
(being the first Elizabeth to reign in Scotland).  The objection was based upon 
the effect of the Treaty of Union and legislation enacted as a consequence of it.  
The challenge failed, but the case has significance nonetheless for the use which 
the Courts might make of these constitutional fragments. 
The Lord President said:
93
 
The principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a distinctively 
English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law.  
It derives its origin from Coke and Blackstone, and was widely popularised 
during the nineteenth century by Bagehot and Dicey, the latter having 
stated the doctrine in its classic form in his Law of the Constitution.  
Considering that the Union legislation extinguished the Parliaments of 
Scotland and England and replaced them by a new Parliament, I have 
difficulty in seeing why it should have been supposed that the new 
Parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of 
the English Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if all that 
happened in 1707 was that Scottish representatives were admitted to the 
Parliament of England.  That is not what was done.  Further, the Treaty 
and the associated legislation, by which the Parliament of Great Britain 
was brought into being as the successor of the separate Parliaments of 
Scotland and England, contain some clauses which expressly reserve to the 
Parliament of Great Britain powers of subsequent modification, and other 
clauses which either contain no such power or emphatically exclude 
subsequent alteration by declarations that the provision shall be 
fundamental and unalterable in all time coming, or declarations of a like 
effect.  I have never been able to understand how it is possible to reconcile 
with elementary canons of construction the adoption by the English 
constitutional theorists of the same attitude to these markedly different 
types of provisions. 
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  1953 SC 396 at 411. 
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The Lord President considered it an impediment to the Petitioners’ succeeding 
that any Court in the United Kingdom had jurisdiction to determine whether a 
governmental act of the kind challenged conformed to the provisions of a treaty.  
But the interest of the decision for present purposes is the Lord President’s 
(obiter) rejection of Dicey’s (and others’) ‘popularised’ view of parliamentary 
sovereignty in Scotland: that the principle of the unlimited sovereignty of 
Parliament was a distinctively English principle, having no counterpart in the 
constitutional law of Scotland; and that the united Parliament established by the 
Treaty of Union did not have unlimited sovereignty in the alteration of 
provisions of it.   
If this be so, then Westminster is not unlimited in the enactments it might 
make.  There exists a Constitutional-style restriction in, at the very least, the 
Treaty of Union.  Such limitations, however, on the authority of MacCormick, 
are not policed through the Courts via judicial review.  This leaves the 
possibility, then, of limits which are more political than legal in character.  The 
Lord President was alive to this issue, observing, as he did:  ‘…it is of little avail 
to ask whether the Parliament of Great Britain “can” do this thing or that, 
without going on to inquire who can stop them if they do.’  The Lord President 
thought there to be only two answers:   
1) that Parliament would not normally act beyond such limits (ie that it 
would be ‘rash’ as Dicey said,
94
 for the Imperial Parliament to 
abolish the ‘Scotch law Courts’, and assimilate the law of Scotland to 
that of England); and,  
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2) there may be room for the invocation of an ‘advisory opinion’ from 
the International Court of Justice.   
The first of these is not, in the true sense, a limit.  No force external to 
Parliament (except, perhaps, the electorate) would prevent Parliament from 
acting in that manner.  The second has little more force.  It too depends upon 
Parliament itself respecting, and agreeing to recognise, despite their often 
contentious character, such limits, and limits articulated by a body likely to have 
a very different approach to questions of English and Scottish Constitutional law 
and their intersection and which, to date, has no experience of them.  
MacCormick’s case shows, nonetheless, the different themes which lie beneath 
the surface of too simplistic or absolutist a notion of Parliamentary supremacy. 
Common law as a rival to legislation? 
The last of the means by which I seek to advance my argument that limits exist 
in the Court’s function of giving effect to legislation is the relationship which 
common law and legislation have and how that relationship is regarded and takes 
form.  
Some have noted that legislation has a rival in the Common Law and 
characterise the relationship as being as one of ‘oil and water’, in which the two 
flow next to each other, but in separate streams.
95
  A rivalrous relationship is one 
which must produce limitations in the points at which the two sources of law 
compete for primacy: one operating as a foil for the other.  Dicey cast that 
interaction as boosting rather than diminishing the influence of legislation, by 
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characterising common law legislation (ie law making by judges) as being 
derived from legislation: ‘… subordinate legislation, carried on with the assent 
and subject to the supervision of Parliament’.
96
   
We know that ‘judicial legislation’ exists, but views differ on the extent to 
which judges should, and to which they actually do, change the law.  But this 
aspect of their functions, be it actively or conservatively exercised (a debate 
which for present purposes I need not resolve), requires no assent from 
Parliament.  It is, as I have shown in Chapter 1, a function which was being 
exercised long before Parliament assumed a form which approximates its modern 
existence.  Even without an ability to review legislation, or perhaps because of 
that, English Courts did employ approaches to construction which tended to 
bring legislation in its practical application closer to basic common law principle.  
Courtenay Ilbert noted this tendency, over one hundred years ago:
97
 
There has been a tendency on the part of judges to place a narrow 
construction on enactments which appeared to them to conflict with what 
they have regarded as fundamental principles of common law, to round off 
their angles, to adapt them to their environment by means of ingenious and 
sometimes far-fetched glosses, and the process has occasionally been 
carried to such an unwarrantable extent as to justify the expression of 
driving a coach and four through Acts of Parliament. 
 
Whether judicial legislation is subject to Parliament’s supervision is a different 
matter.  We know that Parliament may expressly abrogate a judicial decision, 
and that, no matter how recent is a judicial decision or a line of them, and no 
matter how senior be the Court or judges, Parliament is free to change judge-
made law.  All this looks very much like supervision, and a supervision very 
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much more powerful than that possessed by the Stuart kings – absolute as they 
claimed to be.  Whereas the Common Law had capacity in the 17
th
 century to 
limit and influence the legislative functions of the then supreme legislator (the 
King) illustrated by, for example, the Case of Proclamations, that the Common 
Law might so operate today is unthinkable. 
I take no objection to the Courts employing legislative intent in the way 
they do:  it is a useful way of maintaining an activity which, on current 
Constitutional theory, is otherwise impossible.  The task is an absolutely 
necessary one.  Courts have been doing it for a very long time.  My principal 
point, however, is that under cover of a notion which would deny the exercise of 
any great discretion in the interpretation of legislation lies, nevertheless, just that 
reality and, with it, some very real (albeit bounded) limits on legislation.      
 
V Legislative self-restraint? 
 
Legislation, recognising some of its limitations, has established some few 
measures of its own to guard against the response to every problem being a 
statutory one.  I mention this additional doctrinal attempt at restraint because it 
demonstrates not only a perceived need for limits on legislation, but also an 
approach to that problem which miscarries, because it involves legislation 
limiting itself.  It is a mark of just how much confidence is placed in legislation 
that even the task of limitation is one of which legislation is itself thought to be 
capable.  Moreover, how Parliaments perceive the problems which legislation 
might bring about, and the preventative measures it offers for avoiding or 
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minimising them, offer insights of an insider’s kind into how far legislation 
admits of its own shortcomings and what those shortcomings might be. 
Ex-ante evaluation, or regulatory impact assessment, is something which 
many Anglo-American legal systems require be undertaken before legislation is 
enacted.  It is widely accepted as being desirable, including by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which promotes such 
assessments as ‘an important tool to encourage the consideration of alternatives 
early in the policy chain’.
98
  Some jurisdictions have made the carrying out of a 
regulatory impact assessment a statutory requirement.99 
In its UK context, regulatory impact assessment is ‘… a tool to help policy 
makers understand the consequences of possible Government regulation’.
100
 The 
detached observer might rightly ask ‘has your government really been enacting 
legislation without understanding the possible consequences of it?’.  The desire 
that such an assessment be made seems to be linked with, at least, an implicit 
concern that that has in fact been occurring, and that the desire to regulate by 
legislation often overshadows factors which might weigh against doing so.     
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It is Government policy that regulation, where it is needed, should have a 
light touch with the right balance struck between under-regulating (so 
failing to protect the public) and over-regulating (so creating excessive 
bureaucracy).  To this end, policy makers in departments and agencies are 
required to undertake a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) before taking 
action which has a regulatory impact on business.  
 
 
The inquiry is put in terms of the need to strike a balance between regulation and 
‘failing to protect the public’.  Stating the problem in this way does little to solve 
it.  It prompts me to recall Hayek’s criticism that the legislature cannot [ie is 
unwilling to] refuse responsibility for anything and that there is no particular 
grievance that it is not regarded as capable of removing.
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 Nowhere is there an 
attempt to articulate or frame principles by which the balance can be assessed.  
Moreover, the assessment is undertaken by those who will, by necessity, have a 
less than fulsome understanding of the likely burdens of the proposed regulation 
and their significance because the assessors are people removed from those 
activities by reason of being within the professional public service.  And even 
when the assessment is undertaken, and even when it does accurately state the 
likely ramifications for those who will be subject to it, the tendency will always 
be for the regulator to decide that the ‘balance’ (uniformed by any stated 
principles) is in favour of regulation, the burdens being outweighed by the need 
to ‘protect the public’.  If the choice is to be cast as being between regulating and 
failing to protect the public (a false dichotomy) it is no wonder that legislation 
and regulation have proliferated. 




  F A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1982) vol 1 143. 
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It is perhaps not surprising then that ex-ante evaluation has been 
unsuccessful in preventing legislation from being enacted which adopts a heavy 
touch.  The legislators themselves are the assessors and it is they who weigh up 
the options of not legislating.  They have demonstrated a firm propensity to 
regulate.  There has been an obvious and massive expansion in the volume and 
scope of legislation.  Ex ante evaluation has not resulted in the development of 
principled guidance about the weighing it seeks to achieve, and thereby to define 
limits on the legislative function.   
Regulatory impact assessments are one way of requiring legislation-makers 
to turn their minds to consequences and to change their focus from the abstract to 
the practical effects of the rules they propose to make.  It is something which, 
whether so formalised or not, they ought to have been doing in any event.  But it 
has proved impotent on that front also: it has not altered the way regulators think 
about legislation according to the UK National Audit Office.
103
  For there to have 
been a need to re-assert the desirability of such an assessment illustrates how 
regulators – Parliament and bureaucrats alike – have lost the means for restraint 
on their activities, means which have always existed but been demoted or 
expunged.  
This concludes my survey of the doctrinal limits on legislation.  I have 
tried to show the extent and nature of the doctrinal limits on the making of, and 
giving effect to, legislation.  In some cases, those limits do offer some real 
limiting effect, but some others of them are either weak or ineffective.  
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In Chapter 1, I urged the disentanglement from the prestige that history would 
justify being attached to popular assemblies and how we might properly regard 
legislation.  In the Chapter 2, I sought to illustrate the relatively few restraints 
and limits that doctrine recognises in Anglo-American systems, and to show how 
those approaches which urge the frequent, ambitious, energetic and unbounded 
deployment of legislation have prevailed.   
I confront in this Chapter the principal modern proponent of such an 
approach.  Jeremy Waldron advocates for the wider recognition of legislation’s 
dignity as a justification for its energetic deployment.  That argument is one 
heavily premised upon the deliberative qualities of popular assemblies; that the 
multitude in this configuration is more likely to reach the right result.  His is an 
argument that is built upon the deliberative characteristics that legislatures 
possess.  I would seek to meet that claim, but not by seeking positively to 
disprove it.  My claim is that the approach which Waldron represents is one that 
is partial only in its treatment of the problems with popular assemblies legislating 
in a relatively unrestrained way.  This poses a great difficulty, because it is for 
those who advocate an omnicompetent role for legislation and its energetic 
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deployment to meet each of the major problems that confront such an argument.  
The even greater difficulty – and the loss I identify as the principal claim of this 
project – is that when popular assemblies act upon this approach, they do so upon 
a foundation which is intellectually incomplete.  That loss, it follows, is of a 
normative kind.  
In this Chapter, after considering the Waldron view, I turn my focus to the 
limitations which legislatures and legislation possess.  They fall into two 
(related) categories: those which are practical in nature and those which might be 
attributed to the very nature or structure of the institution of the representative 
assembly as it has evolved to its present form.  
I conclude by suggesting that Waldron’s argument gives incomplete 
treatment only to the problems which accompany the multitude having the 
relatively unbounded legislative capacity for which he argues.   
 
II Popular assemblies: wise, dignified and more likely to get it 
right? 
 
Waldron’s Dignity of Legislation is an exercise in seeking to restore legislation’s 
good name.  His work identifies an underlying Anglo-American preference for 
judicial decisions over legislation.  He then advances a defence of legislation and 
the technique of popular assemblies.     
Waldron’s thesis is of interest here for several reasons.  First, his is the 
primary modern defence of legislation and legislatures.  Secondly, the fact that 
such a defence was considered necessary says something, I suggest, about 
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present perceptions of the comparative strengths of the Common Law and 
legislation in Anglo-American systems.  Thirdly, Waldron’s thesis in my view 
overlooks or assumes away the kinds of practical and institutional limitations that 
legislatures possess which I discuss later in this Chapter.  This brings into 
question whether popular assemblies can properly claim to be uncontaminated 
conduits for the expression of public will and to be forums in which the 
multitude’s numerous views and desires can be debated, made known, and 
reduced to sensible commands in the form of legislation. 
Waldron’s central thesis 
Waldron advocates the confident use of Parliamentary power.  His 
arguments, if accepted, would justify clear preference being afforded to 
legislative over common law activity.  
But first to Waldron’s self-declared purpose.   He seeks to restore 
legislation’s ‘good name’ in political theory by emphasising the positive features 
of democracy and representative assemblies.
1
  His impetus for doing so is that 
legislation and legislatures have a ‘bad name’ and one which stands in sharp 
contrast to the position of judicial decision making:
2
 a disreputable picture of 
legislating versus an idealised picture of judging.
3
 
Waldron attempts to ‘recover and highlight ways of thinking about 
legislation that present it as a dignified mode of governance and as a reputable 
source of law’.  It is upon the democratic quality of popular assemblies that 
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3
  Waldron (n 1) 2 
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Waldron focuses, but in a way that openly acknowledges and respects (rather 
than conceals, he says) differences of opinion among the people.
4
 
Waldron begins by identifying prominent historical figures who, although 
advocating legislation to effect change, conveyed some distaste for a capitalist 
state continually engaged in doing so:  Seeley; Maine; Bagehot and Blackstone 
are his main examples.  Waldron sees the same attitude in present times, given 
expression in views such as that of Guido Calabresi’s that we are ‘choking on 
statutes’,
5
 and Langdell’s suggestion (to which I referred in the Introduction) that 
legislation is not law.
6
  He supplements these with his own characterisations of 
the way in which those figures must have viewed legislation:
7
 
While the Common Law has been evolving for centuries, ‘working itself 
pure’ in Lord Mansfield's phrase – so that each precedent or each 
doctrine, however much we dislike it in itself, has something in its lineage 
that elicits our respect – a statute thrusts itself before us as a low-bred 
parvenu, all surface and no depth, all power and no heritage, as arbitrary 
in its provenance as the temporary coalescence of a parliamentary or 
congressional majority.  I suspect that it is on account of this pedigree – or 
lack of pedigree – that statutes are considered unworthy by jurists like 
Langdell of the appellation ‘law’ with all that that implies. 
 
Heritage, Waldron emphasises, is particularly important in comparing the 
legislative and common law methods.  On the one hand, there is common law’s 
respect for lineage, and on the other there is legislation’s ‘brazen’ approach to 
change.
8
  Surprising then, is Waldron’s revelation that legislation is not at the 
centre of the positivist tradition in jurisprudence, but is instead a ‘contingent and 
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5
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6
  Waldron (n 1) 10. 
7
  Waldron (n 1) 10-11 (footnotes omitted). 
8
  Waldron (n 1) 12, 26. 
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philosophical peripheral aspect of law’
9
 and that a greater sense of comfort 
exists with judicial law-making.   




… embarrassment about legislation as an instance of a more general 
nervousness about the role of deliberate intellectualization in politics. 
 
Is there, then, a source of knowledge which deliberate intellectualisation cannot 
access, about which we are intuitively and correctly sceptical, and on which 
positivism (legal or not) is lost?  Waldron paraphrases the English philosopher 
Oakeshott when he says:
11
 
We have lost faith … in the emergence and evolution of social frameworks.  
We see the business of law as technical problem-solving in society, and we 
are reluctant to regard anything as a solution, or as standing in place of a 
solution, which we have not deliberately set up as such.   
 
Waldron associates Oakeshott with Hayek, the latter being ‘the other main 
theoretical critic of rationalism and the prominence of legislation in modern 
government’.
12
  Hayek’s criticism is more explicit than Oakeshott’s.  Hayek 
advocated government by general laws and that their change be gradual and 
spontaneous, not planned and orchestrated by a legislator.
13
  His main concern 
however, was to see that society was free from management by social legislation, 
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thereby affecting liberty, and, as he said, constitutionalism and the rule of law.
14
  
Hayek’s approach necessarily challenges Bentham’s.  Hayek considered 
Benthamites to be labouring under one major and fundamental error: that it is 
possible at any one time to know all the facts necessary deliberately to change 
the way society operates.  This he referred to as the ‘synoptic delusion’.   
Waldron shows, however, that Oakeshott and Hayek are at one with legal 
positivists who also distance themselves from jurisprudence centred on deliberate 
and self-conscious law making and are fixated on the courts and judicial 
reasoning – on organic and spontaneous systems.  The concern of Oakeshott and 
Hayek, Waldron points out, is a political but not a philosophical problem.  
Waldron suggests the problem is not so much one of constructivism (to which 
Hayek is directly opposed) but the susceptibility of legislation to politics versus 
the apparent neutrality of the Common Law:  law-making bodies which deny 
they make law convey their own impression of being more neutral and less the 
product of dateable individual decisions than a system which maintains a public 
face (at least) of restraint in law making.
15
  
Whether the Common Law is truly so neutral is of course contestable, but 
legislation does not even make the pretence.  In the end, Waldron seeks to bolster 
the claim that can be made on behalf of legislation by reason of it being the 
product of a popular assembly and therefore a respectable source of law,
16
 and 
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These claims are associated with Waldron’s view of the sources of 
legislation’s authority.  He argues that it is derived from practical reasoning 
performed under particular conditions:  that bigger groups are more likely to 
arrive at the best result.  This view is based upon his ‘doctrine of wisdom of the 
multitude’, meaning, in effect, that people, acting as a body, are capable of 
making better decisions by pooling their knowledge, experience and insight than 
any individual member of the body, however excellent, is capable of making on 
his or her own. 
Waldron’s general themes can be seen in other of his works.  One example 
is his Chapter 16 of the Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory.  There, he characterises legislatures as dedicated explicitly to law-
making and contrasts that to courts which are not set up in a way calculated to 
make law-making legitimate.  The claim of legislatures to the legitimacy of the 
new law they make is on democratic grounds, a democracy in which there is free 
and public debate in the elected assembly resulting in a dignity which comes 
from the support for that final decision from a majority in that assembly.  His 
Law and Disagreement (1999) immediately preceded Waldron’s Dignity of 
Legislation, but it too pursued his central agenda of presenting legislation as a 
dignified mode of governance and a respectable source of law.  Law and 
Disagreement focuses less than does his Dignity of Legislation on particular 
theorists and proceeds more by way of argument and reflection.  
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Points of contention  
There are two main aspects to Waldron’s defence of legislation with which I take 
issue here: 
1) the first is that Waldron considered it necessary to advocate the 
recognition or restoration of legislation’s dignity and the democratic 
attributes of popular assemblies.  In doing so, he acknowledges a 
general view which favours judge-made law over legislation.  
Legislation has had a long time to prove itself.  It has become the 
dominant mode of law-making.  It is difficult to say that those who 
take a different view of legislation from Waldron are unaware of the 
attributes of legislation.  They are aware no doubt also of its 
drawbacks.  The very need, therefore, for Waldron’s project, shows 
in part his object to be a futile one; 
2) the second aspect is how Waldron comes to terms with the kinds of 
practical limitations which attend popular assemblies that I discuss 
below.  Despite advancing a view that the multitude is more likely 
than smaller groups to arrive at ‘correct answers’
18
 (drawing on 
Condorcet), Waldron never grapples with how it can be said that 
popular assemblies can truly be said to be a forum in which the range 
of views which comprise the multitude can be aired, as distinct from 
sectional and vested interests, or the positions of highly disciplined 
political parties.  This constitutes a gap in his argument, and one 
which necessarily assumes that assemblies are places in which the 
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multitude comes together, not highly structured and managed, but 
through free and fierce debate.  Before Waldron can succeed in his 
attempt to recover and highlight ways of thinking about legislation 
which present it as being dignified, he must first show how, despite 
the realities of modern legislatures, the assumptions he makes hold 
good. 
III Practical Limitations 
 
My starting point is to focus, for the moment, upon practical matters, to put aside 
so far as possible considerations of history and theory, and to identify the limits 
to which legislation is subject at the level of its making and actual operation.  
The factors relevant to this are particular aspects of how legislation is made, 
some characteristics of its author (the various Parliaments and other popular 
assemblies), the response of society to legislation and some impediments to 
Parliament ascertaining and giving effect to public will. 
My discussion of this topic takes place in this isolated way (that is, without 
a substantial historical or philosophical overlay) so as to take legislation and 
popular assemblies in the form in which they currently present themselves.  
Many of the points I cover are, however, closely entwined with normative 
considerations.  For example, views about what is and is not practical, 
necessarily hinge upon what purpose or object is sought to be achieved.  
Moreover, history explains and informs Parliament’s modern manner of giving 
effect to public will. 
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The topics I have selected for consideration are those which most 
prominently present themselves as part of the modern experience of legislation: 
1) the volume and complexity of legislation; 
2) the extent to which elected officials draft legislation and truly 
scrutinise its terms and consider its likely effect before enactment; 
3) the role and influence of the non-political Executive in the drafting of 
legislation and setting the legislative agenda; 
4) the extent to which Parliament is a forum in which free public 
deliberation takes place, including by reason of the discipline and 
influence which political parties exert and the susceptibility of public 
opinion to manipulation and misrepresentation. 
Legislation galore  
There is, in every Anglo-American jurisdiction, very much legislation, and 
legislation which has not limited itself to general commands, but descended to 
the most prescriptive of detail.  Elaborate regimes exist, for example, in the field 
of income tax, for the obtaining of mining tenements, for environmental 
approvals before major development can commence, and for electricity 
generation and water supply and the pricing of them.  Increasingly, legislation 
engages criminal sanctions in order to encourage compliance with it.  One recent 
estimate is that in the decade 1997 to 2007, more than 3,000 new criminal or 
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regulatory offences were added to the United Kingdom’s statute book.
19
  And the 
quality of the supporting legislation can be poor.  The provisions of the Criminal 




A comparison between the legislation of today’s assemblies and those of 
the early 20
th
 century reveals a marked difference in style, in the level of detail to 
which legislation is willing to descend, and in the extent to which it seems 
willing to impose on those who will be subject to it, a regime which legislation 
has devised, rather than by taking the world more or less as it finds it.  This is of 
course a generalisation, but it is one which finds support, for example, in 
Parliament’s detailed competition law, in its imposition of town planning 
requirements, and its regimes for the licensing and regulation of so many 
occupations, from lawyers and doctors to scrap metal dealers
21




One prominent feature of modern legislation, and not just in these limited 
fields, is the growth in its volume and complexity.  That growth has been 
exponential since Victorian times in particular.  Regularly we see statistics said 
to evidence how fast legislation is formulated, the widening topics with which it 
                                                             
19
  Lord Sumption, The Limits of Law, 27
th
 Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, 20 November 2013 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech-131120.pdf. 
20
  R v Lang [2006] 1 WLR 2509 at [16] and [153].  Other like observations, about the same 
Act, were made also by Rose LJ in R (Crown Prosecution Service) v South East Surrey 
Youth Court [2006] 1 WLR 2543 at [14]. 
21
  Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 (UK). 
22
  Road Traffic Act 1988 (UK); Driving Instruction (Suspension and Exemption Powers) 
Act 2009 (UK). 
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is prepared to deal, and, within various legislative topics, how large and detailed 
particular enactments have become.
23
 
The legislature would seem now to regard no topic as too small or too 
ambitious for its attention:  ‘there shall be an anti-slavery day’, commands the 
UK legislature,
24
 and despite its purpose being obvious, the legislature goes on, 
lest there be any doubt, to tell us that it is to acknowledge that millions of men, 
women and children continue to be victims of slavery, depriving them of basic 
human dignity and freedom.
25
  The day is not a public holiday and there is no 
apparent need for coercive power in requiring a day to be so described.  The 
legislature, nevertheless, considers it worthy of an Act and worthwhile to have 
mobilised the legislative machine to do nothing more than identify a day as one 
to acknowledge this state of affairs. 
Legislation is often engaged to articulate aspirational (and often ill-
defined) social objectives.  Take as an example the ‘fuel poverty’ provisions of 
the Energy Act 2010 (UK).  The Act seeks to reduce it, but it nowhere tells the 
reader what fuel poverty is.  Having aspired to that aim, the legislation authorises 
the closer regulation of the energy sector including requiring the giving of certain 
financial benefits in a particular way.
26
  The scheme is a wealth-redistribution 
                                                             
23
  One recent study is that undertaken by the Social and General Statistics Section of the 
House of Commons Library.  It shows that the number of Acts passed since 1950 has 
decreased, but there to have been a steady increase in the number of Statutory 
Instruments: Acts and Statutory Instruments: the volume of UK legislation 1950 to 2012, 
House of Commons Library, Standard Note SN/SG/2911 (2012) available at 
www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN02911.pdf. Another example is the Sixth Sir David 
Williams Lecture delivered by Lord Bingham of Cornhill: see T H Bingham, ‘The Rule of 
Law’ (2007) 66 CLJ 67 at 70.  
24
  Anti Slavery Day Act 2010 (UK). 
25
  Anti Slavery Day Act 2010 (UK) s 1(2)(a). 
26
  Anti Slavery Day Act 2010 (UK) s 9(7). 
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mechanism: whether the support schemes are funded by the state or by the 
industry, they necessarily entail making adjustments which favour those living in 
the (perhaps ambiguous) state of fuel poverty to the detriment of those perceived 
not to suffer from that condition. 
The Sustainable Communities Act 2007 (UK) commands the Secretary of 
State to invite local authorities to make proposals which they consider would 
contribute to promoting the sustainability of local communities.
27
  The Secretary 
is commanded also to make regulations about the procedure to be followed in 
him or her doing so.
28
  All this might have been achieved, were the Secretary and 
local authorities to see merit in doing so, through the Secretary merely making 
such a request and the local authority responding (or not responding) to it.  Even 
an exchange of this kind is treated as worthy of Parliamentary attention.   
I am not seeking to challenge these laws on any individual basis by saying 
there did not exist reason or justification to pass them.  But these examples – all 
very recent  ones and selected with ease more or less at random – might leave the 
citizen wondering whether there exists a relevance threshold before which 
Parliament’s attention might justifiably be engaged, or some (any) weighing of 
competing priorities in deciding what new laws Parliament ought to make.   
I suggest here that no such analysis in any structured sense takes place, and 
that there exists no juridical or other means by which Parliament might know 
when it ought decline to legislate.  Instead, the legislative agenda is decided in 
large part not by the electorate but by political parties, by the non-political 
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Executive and by what has become a mantra of ‘public will’, but which, by the 
time it comes to be expressed in Parliament, is open to have been so manipulated 
and aggregated that it is unsafe in truth to think of it as such.  Yet the incantation 
of public will, even in that mutilated form, seems to excuse a whole range of 
prescriptive, oppressive, mundane and intrusive legislation. 
Having briefly introduced some of the bases for the practical and 
institutional limits of Parliament, I consider now a practical modern example (by 
no means isolated) of some of these problems.  This provides the discipline of 
maintaining a practical focus, and is also a way of understanding, in a very 
concrete manner, the kinds of problems which legislative proliferation throws up. 
Case study: external scrutiny of government bodies in Scotland 
The Crerar Review of Regulation, Audit, Inspection and Complaints Handling of 
Public Services in Scotland
29
 found Scotland’s integrity laws for external 
scrutiny of government action to be unduly complex, the arrangement of them to 
have lacked rigorous assessment and that, when new measures had been 
introduced, for there to have been no real prioritisation against existing 




The Crerar Review’s conclusions, although expressed in the context of a 
particular subject matter which legislation, along with other governmental action, 
had brought about, could be applied equally to a range of legislated subject 
                                                             
29
  L D Crerar, ‘Report of the Independent Review of Regulation, Audit, Inspection and 
Complaints Handling of Public Services in Scotland’ (2007) (‘Crerar Review’). 
30
  Crerar Review (n 29) III (Foreword). 
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matter.  This Review exposed many of the practical problems which legislative 
proliferation tends to present.  The report is a considered analysis of the practical 
effects which the volume and complexity of legislation might have.  It focuses, 
for my purposes, on a relevant target, because external scrutiny arrangements are 
almost entirely a product of statute or subordinate legislation. 
The Crerar Review found legislative external scrutiny arrangements to 
have evolved to suit government intentions at particular points in time.  Those 




  Eleven completely new 
bodies had been created between 1999 and 2007 (when the review was 
completed).
33
  The result was found to be a disproportionate approach to scrutiny 
that was considered to be unsustainable.
34
  The regime, as it had grown up, 
placed a disproportionate burden on bodies subject to it, and it distracted 
resources from front-line delivery and outweighed the benefits of it.
35
  There was 
duplication
36
 and what was referred to as a ‘crowded scrutiny landscape’, 
resulting in very many bodies serving a scrutiny role over local authorities.
37
  




The Crerar Report observed also that this crowded regulatory landscape 
constrained joint working between agencies because of its prescriptive nature 
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  Crerar Review (n 29) 55. 
32
  Crerar Review (n 29) 55, 56. 
33
  Crerar Review (n 29) 38.  
34
  Crerar Review (n 29) 39. 
35
   Crerar Review (n 29) 40. 
36
   Crerar Review (n 29) 40. 
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   Crerar Review (n 29) 41. 
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   Crerar Review (n 29) 41. 
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about what functions were permissible,
39
 that the cost of the proliferation of 
agencies and their activities could not be estimated with precision
40
 and that the 
benefits of external scrutiny were difficult to assess, but with service providers 
expressing the view that the added value of external scrutiny did not justify the 
cost of compliance.
41
  Of concern also was that, while there existed a risk of 
corrupt or improper behaviour on the part of public officials, and there was a 
need for external scrutiny, there had not been consistent consideration whether 
the scale of the regime which had grown up was proportionate to the risk with 
which it was established to deal.
42
  
I would say finally, lest the case study I have chosen be regarded as an 
isolated example of problems having resulted from legislative proliferation, that 
almost identical problems were experienced recently in Australia.
43
  Indeed, the 
same sentiments as informed the Crerar review inform the objectives of red tape 
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  Including, at the time of writing: the Government of Canada 
(http://actionplan.gc.ca/en/initiative/reducing-red-tape accessed 2 November 2013); 
Queensland (an Australian State) (see 
http://www.treasury.qld.gov.au/office/services/regulatory-reform/reducing-the-regulatory-
burden.shtml accessed 2 November 2013) which plans to reduce red tape by 20 per cent 
by 2018; UK (Red Tape Reduction Challenge 




Cognoscibility?    
We need not have recourse to statistics to know that there is an enormous volume 
of legislation, and such a volume that even the most knowledgeable and 
experienced practitioner could not be expected to know in detail more than a 
handful of enactments in the field of his or her practice.  The knowledge of 
practitioners, however, need not be a primary concern.  They are accustomed 
(and usually paid) to undertake research of this kind.  Specialists inevitably 
emerge whose focus is a particular field and who can reasonably be expected to 
know or have the means to find out, the rules which bear upon their subject. 
There are more pressing concerns.  For those who must obey the law, there 
is the problem of knowing what the law is.  For the private citizen, there are 
obvious difficulties if the law changes rapidly or there are detailed legislative 
requirements to learn.  Corporations too face the same challenges.  Some of them 
(the larger corporations and the wealthier individuals) will have the means to 
engage specialists to monitor their legal obligations and compliance with them.  
‘Compliance’ has, for this reason, become an industry all of its own.  
Government agencies find they need more money and higher staff numbers to 
maintain those regimes, cater for the instances of contact with government for 
which they provide and for themselves to remain apprised of the rules and their 
legal consequences. 
These factors suggest two principal problems:  
156 
 
1) at a practical level, the capacity of citizens (corporate and individual) 
to know what is expected of them, and the costs which are imposed 
in their acquiring that knowledge; 
2) at a more theoretical level, the threat which it poses to a liberal 
democracy by putting those subject to the law in a position where 
they cannot, utilising their own knowledge and resources, know all 
the law with which they are, often under exposure to criminal 
penalty, obliged to comply. 
Returning to the practical problem of too much, and unduly complex, 
legislation and the demands it places on the time and resources of those subject 
to its commands, the capacity of individuals to know the law has its limits.  
People have limited time, perhaps limited interest and, in many cases, limited 
inclination.  And it might be questioned, in any event, what claim law justifiably 
has to occupy an ever-greater part of the lives of the ordinary (non-legal) person.  
These realities govern, in turn, the extent to which citizens will be able to 
know their rights and obligations in an increasingly legislated world.  The more 
ambitious the legislative agenda, the more the citizen must know or sift through 
to arrive at a state of satisfaction about the legislated position.  If ignorance be no 
excuse for a breach of the law, the law’s knowability (or ‘cognoscibility’, to use 
Bentham’s term)
45
 must be at least a practical prerequisite.  
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  J Bentham, Letter to the President of the United States of America (1811);  J Bentham, 
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the Superintendence of his Executor, 
John Bowring (1838-1843) Vol 3 243, 260.  
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There are, however, factors which operate against legislative proliferation 
having less unsatisfactory effects than it otherwise would.  Not every legislative 
change affects the ordinary citizen, and some legislation enshrines or builds upon 
what people already know, by long experience and custom, already to be the law.  
As human affairs become more complex, and technological capacity grows, it is 
not unreasonable to require those who participate in those spheres to come to 
know the rules by which that engagement is to occur.  Moreover, law has been 
expected to replace other restraints on the autonomy and self-interest of 




Nevertheless, there must be a point at which legislation, by reason of its 
volume and complexity, has or will cause the system to collapse under its own 
weight: by those who are subjected to it being unable in a practical sense to come 
to grips with those parts that concern them; giving up attempts to do so; or 
simply deciding not to undertake those activities which would require them to 
expend effort to learn the legislated rules.  Having a proliferation of legislated 
rules tends to favour the larger corporations, better resourced individuals and 
those who have already established themselves in an enterprise.  These ‘barriers 
to entry’, as they are called, are something upon which (legislated) competition 
law frowns,
47
 but without any apparent realisation than it is legislation itself that 
often gives rise to such obstacles.  A well-off individual, a large corporation 
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  Lord Sumption (n 19) at 3.  I give some attention in Chapter 5 to the relationship between 
the dwindling influence of faith and our greater reliance upon legislation. 
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  Competition Act 1998 (UK); Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art 101 
and 102 (formerly art 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty); see also Guidelines published by the 
Office of Fair Trading as general advice and information about the application and 
enforcement by that office of Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and prohibitions in ch I 
and II of the Competition Act 1998.     
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already deriving reasonable profits, and an incumbent enterprise which has 
already mastered the existing rules and made allowances for them in its 
operations will be better placed to learn and adjust to new and additional 
legislated rules than will those that face the task anew.  One practical problem, 
therefore, to which legislative proliferation gives rise, is the assistance it offers to 
the established elite.  The same problems, it might be noted, do not arise to 
anywhere near the same extent in the Common Law’s method of legal 
development.  It moves incrementally and, more importantly for present 
purposes, along customary lines, always with one eye on practicality, the 
individual case and the effect on real players of any new or adjusted rule. 
Parliamentarians spread too thin 
Another point at which to test the point of maximal legislative volume and 
complexity for practical purposes is when the assemblies that we expect to 
prepare and properly to consider legislation find it impossible in practice and 
despite diligence, to do so.  That point has in my view been reached. 
Various figures are suggested from time to time about the volume and 
complexity of legislation presented to Parliament each year.
48
  It is beyond 
question that the volume and complexity of it, whatever those statistics, place a 
very heavy burden on those charged with scrutiny of it. 
The legislature itself, we know from the time which its members have 
available and the expertise they possess, must have passed the point beyond 
which, without placing considerable reliance upon the Executive, it can ascertain 
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with certainty the subsisting position to which new legislation is to adjust or with 
which it must cohere. 
Parliamentarians are burdened with responsibilities.  By the time they have 
attended to their electorate business, their considerable administrative 
commitments, their party responsibilities, their public engagements and 
participated in ordinary Parliamentary business, there is precious little time 
remaining for the scrutiny (let alone the drafting) of legislation.   
Parliamentarians are not, of course, unassisted.  They have their own staff, 
they have a party machine which provides some assistance, they have access to 
researchers and library staff, and members of the public might assist by making 
submissions, sending petitions and making their views known in interviews and 
otherwise.  
The Committee system is another way in which greater attention than 
might otherwise be the case can be given to proposed legislation.  Committees 
are generally assisted by research and administrative staff.  But Committee 
functions too consume the time of Parliamentarians. 
It is unrealistic, however, even once these countervailing factors are taken 
into account, to think that Parliamentarians (often not lawyers) have a proper 
opportunity themselves to scrutinise legislation, and not merely on a standalone 




The Executive  
One very important practical consideration which stems from the 
discussion immediately above is the extent to which legislation has become not 
an activity of the legislature, but the preserve of the non-political Executive.  
Once we recognise a heavy reliance by elected officials on the bureaucratic 
Executive in the legislative process, it calls into question whether, when that 
occurs, legislating is truly an act which only elected members discharge. 
On the one hand, we see a large non-political Executive drafting legislation 
for Parliamentary consideration, and on the other we have a relatively small 
number (and no less busy) of elected representatives with the function of 
satisfying themselves about the merits of that legislation.  Inevitably, there has 
been a shift in responsibility, by reason of time constraints alone, from 
Parliament to the Executive.  It is remarkable, however, that this transition is 
often sanctioned and encouraged rather than identified as what it is: mission 
creep by the non-political Executive. 
Walkland, for example, in his Legislative Process in Great Britain, 
characterised the growing Executive role in legislation (and not just with 
subordinate legislation) as being part of the [legitimate] legislative process.
49
  
Part of the justification he gave for an increased role for the non-political 
Executive is the growing technical complexity of legislation,
50
 and that technical 
specialization calls for different and perhaps more specific skills than the 
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  Miers and Page estimated in 1990 that the great 




I take a less sanguine approach than did Walkland to the increasingly 
heavy involvement of the non-political Executive in the legislative process.  It is 
by no means accidental that assemblies have become burdened with a great 
volume of legislation.  The greater the pressure of legislation presented to 
Parliament, the smaller the available time to consider it all.  To this, the 
legislature has two alternative courses open to it: resist the pressure and refuse to 
pass legislation which it has not had an opportunity properly to consider; or 
resign itself to the insurmountable wave of work which faces it, commit itself 
only to the most cursory scrutiny and place trust in the non-political Executive to 
have prepared and presented legislation which is soundly-based and well drafted.  
The tendency has been, as recent history has shown, that Parliament has given 
way to the latter course.  It is an approach which induces elected representatives 
to welcome, and rely heavily upon, the Executive.  The non-political Executive 
must know, however, that the less time Parliament has to scrutinise, the less 
likely it is that there will be substantial change to what the bureaucracy has 
offered as the legislative text and approach.  
The bureaucracy, as a consequence, has greater control over the legislative 
agenda, legislative content and volume than would be revealed by an analysis, 
however detailed, of the doctrinal rules regarding the respective formal roles of 
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those arms of government.  The non-political Executive’s attainment of this 
position has been very gradual, assisted initially by the existence of competent, 
permanent statutory draftspeople and the development of an office of 
Parliamentary Counsel.  
Parliament as a forum for discussion and deliberation: parties and the 
manipulation of public opinion  
Carl Schmitt, a 20
th
 century leading legal scholar of the Weimar Republic, 
forcefully criticised the workings of the modern Parliament.  He considered the 
deficiency to be so potent as to have reduced Parliamentary debate to an ‘empty 
ritual’.  He considered Parliament’s underpinnings to have been historical-
intellectual, in its having overcome and replaced the secret practices of 
absolutism.  That basis is something which we might see also from the attention I 
gave to the historical developments in Parliament’s rise in Chapter 1.   
Schmitt refined even further, however, the fundamental basis of 
Parliament, by stating its ‘intellectual centre’ to be ‘public deliberation of 
argument and counterargument, public debate and public discussion’.
53
  His 
most focussed exposition of this topic was in his Crisis of Parliamentary 
Democracy (1923).
54
  That premise may be criticised (as it was at the time by 
Richard Thoma).  For present purposes, however, of interest to me are Schmitt’s 
factual observations about the functioning of Parliament and the respects in 
which debate within it falls short of the notional ideal (whether it be the 
‘intellectual centre’ or not) of being free and fulsome.   
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Schmitt saw the central characteristic of all representative institutions to be 
that laws arise out of a conflict of opinions, and not a struggle of interests.  By 
this he meant, it seems, that members of an assembly ought to remain capable of 
being persuaded by discussion and debate and seek to discover what is 
‘rationally correct’.  This, necessarily, Schmitt says repeatedly, entails each 
member being free from selfish interests and from party ties.
55
  It also, he says, 
brings with it some assumption that there will be a genuine attempt to 
communicate what the constituents wish to be articulated.         
One of Schmitt’s targets as having contributed to Parliament’s having 
become an empty ritual and a place in which real public debate and discussion no 
longer took place was the party system.  
We might conceive of the nexus between Parliament and public will in 
various ways, but one orthodox notion of that intersection is that Parliament is 
the conduit through which public will is expressed in an untainted form and, 
ultimately, finds expression in legislation.  In that simple sense, Parliament is a 
vessel waiting to be filled by the desires of the citizens.   
One of the weaknesses, as I have said, to which Schmitt referred was ‘party 
organizations’, as a means by which public opinion might be controlled and 
public will ‘constructed’ (ie manipulated).
56
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The reality would seem to involve very much more than the public, 
through their elected representatives, communicating their desires and opinions 
through those big meetings.   
Pressure or lobby groups are another means by which elected 
representatives (and indeed the public itself) might be persuaded to give priority 
to some matter, or to change their views on a subject.  The function of such 
groups is to further specific interests and views.
57
  They are a way by which 
groups of citizens try to exercise influence, recognising that making their views 
known more disparately and perhaps less prominently and in a less directed 
manner might be unlikely to achieve near the same influence.   
Political parties 
Each of the major Anglo-American political systems is characterised by the 
dominance of popular assemblies by political parties.  The overwhelming 
majority of elected representatives are members of, ordinarily, no more than one 
or two and perhaps three parties.  In the United States, the division is principally 
between two parties: the Democrats and Republicans; in England until recently it 
has been between the Tories and the Labour party, in Canada federally, the 
Conservatives and the New Democrats dominate, and in Australia the Liberal 
and Labor parties share the field, with a smaller (mostly rural-based) National 
party. 
 The question of the extent to which an assembly that remains truly 
representative can be comprised of individual members who adhere to a form of 
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party discipline but yet who purport to represent the people, is a live one.  Within 
this inquiry is the immediate and practical question whether assembly members 
who are also members of political parties can truly be said to represent their 
constituents.   
 Two prominent examples of commentators critical of the effect political 
parties have on the representative quality of assemblies are Schmitt (of whom I 
have already made brief mention), and Strom, Muller and Bergman.
58
  Schmitt, 
as I have said, supported the Weimar Constitution but criticised what he saw as 
inconsistencies and some flawed premises of representative democracy.  One of 
the weakness to which he referred was ‘party organizations’, as a means by 
which public opinion might be controlled for the ‘construction’ (ie manipulation) 
of public will.
59
   Parties employ, Schmitt said, methods and techniques to create 
‘electoral propaganda, persuade the masses, and dominate public opinion’.
60
  In 
doing so, and in his more direct identification of political parties as impeding the 
true translation of public will through Parliament, Schmitt gave expression to a 
well-established body of criticism already then in existence.   
Hilaire Belloc and Cecil Chesterton, for example, in their 1911 definition 
of the party system, exposed the potential dangers of it:
61
 
… that method of government in which the representatives of the people 
are divided into two camps which are supposed to represent certain broad 
divergences of opinion.  Between these two the choice of election lies, and 
the side which secures the largest measure of support forms a Government, 
the minority undertaking the work of opposition. 
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They, even then, discerned growing dissatisfaction with the party system:
62
 
… there is a section of the public, not perhaps large, but certainly 
increasing, which is beginning to be uneasy about the Party System.  It is 
natural to men to wish to have voice in the government of their native land, 
and many are beginning to feel that they have no such effective voice 
today.  Laws which they detest are passed, passed easily by the consent of 
both parties, and they are powerless or defeat or even to protest against 
them.  Measures which they ardently desire and which they know that most 
of their neighbours ardently desire are never mentioned.   
 
Modern political parties ordinarily demand adherence by their parliamentary 
members to the party platform, which would dictate in almost every case the 
position in voting which each member must take on proposed legislation.  Most 
Parliamentary contests about legislation, unless the statute concerns matters so 
routine as to be uncontroversial, or one of the smaller Parties hold the balance of 
power in the lower house, is resolved on party lines.  Since 1832 and the Reform 
Act at least, only proposed laws which elicit a favourable response from the party 
commanding the government stand any real chance of reaching the statute 
book.
63
  Much is done behind the scenes and well away from the public forum of 
the assembly.  Topics for legislation, Miers and Page observe, are typically 
identified by political Parties when in opposition and a party’s election manifesto 
constitutes the most important initial source of inspiration for legislation when 
elected.
64
  With that said, those authors point out that the proportion of 
legislation attributable to the party element in Government tends to decline over 
the life of a parliament, although they do warn that the part played by Parties 
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(and government departments) cannot be measured solely by reference to the 
origins of legislative proposals.
65
    
The tendency of Parties to exercise strong control over elected members is 
less pronounced, it has been found,
66
 in assemblies such as the British House of 
Commons.  Some have argued that political Parties contrive a ‘legislative cartel’ 
which focuses efforts on securing control of the legislative agenda and governing 
the structure of legislation.
67
 
True it is, almost by definition, that the party which commands loyalty 
from the largest number of elected representatives has had its policy platform 
endorsed in general elections by the majority of voters, in what is now often 
referred to as the Government’s ‘mandate’.  It is common for the respective 
major parties to present quite detailed policies during an election campaign as to 
the way in which they propose to exercise legislative power and the ends (often 
ideological) which they will seek to achieve.   
But, even so, it would be mythical to think of Parliament as guided by as 
many free-thinking agents as there are elected representatives.  The reality is 
that, on most occasions on which legislation is scrutinised, the party 
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commanding the majority in the relevant Assembly will decide the fate – and 
shape – of the law to be enacted.   
To Dicey, a system of party discipline contravened the very fundamentals 
of democracy.  Systematic party discipline, he said:
68
 
… violates the essential principles of Democracy, for it very much limits 
the control over their Government exercised by the people, and it sacrifices 
the public service to purely individual interests. 
 
The ‘evil’, he said, ‘is very apparent in England’ and it will, he accurately 
prophesied, ‘become more so’.
69
 
 The point of this is to show that popular assemblies, far from being a 
melting pot of numerous individuals’ views, each carrying the concerns and 
views of his or her electorate into the big meeting for debate and to persuade 
those who might have a contrary view, comprise in truth far fewer competing 
positions.  Perhaps those more numerous views have a life before Parliamentary 
debate takes place, for example in the framing of party platforms and as part of 
voters deciding which party ought to take government.  But so far as Parliament 
being a big meeting is concerned, it is far less a forum for competing viewpoints 
than it is often promoted as being.  
Strom et al, although generally adopting a more favourable view of 
political parties and, in particular, the role they fulfil in ‘reducing agency costs 
                                                             
68
  See A V Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8
th
 edn (1915) 
(Liberty Classics reprint, ed R E Michener, 1982) xv (Foreword), quoting from Dicey’s 
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by bringing together voters and candidates with similar policy preferences’,
70
 
express concern about the extent to which Parties that are actually on offer are 
willing and reliable vehicles of popular representation.
71
  Those authors identify 
as likely problems in this field, Parties which are primarily protest movements 
with no serious intention of making policy, and those without the organisational 
capacity to make policy cohesively and effectively.  This tends to overlook 
Belloc and Chesterton’s concern of what seems to amount almost to collusion or 
a self-interested co-existence in which the Parties and not the electorate control 
the policy and legislative agendas.  It also overlooks the potential (at least) for 
Parties to corral public opinion into pre-determined ideological streams, and 
polarise electors on issues which they may, absent those streams, have taken 
differing attitudes to.         
Securing obedience 
Finally, I wish to mention the difficulty which legislation meets in 
commanding compliance, a problem which stems in part from legislative 
proliferation.    
Dicey criticised the constant addition to statute law (especially in the 
criminal law)
72
 of acts which the government considered to be anti-social but 
which citizens did not consider immoral.  This, he said, offered an insight into 
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The sources of the problem were, for Dicey, the legislation which had been 
passed.
74
  He considered that there had developed a distrust of judges and of 
courts, and that there had recently ‘grown up … a new doctrine as to 
lawlessness’,
75
 namely ‘respectable persons’ believing that it is allowable (even 
praiseworthy) to break the law if the law-breaker is pursuing some end which to 
him or to her seems to be just and desirable.   
I wish to focus for a moment on Dicey’s arguments about the core features 
of a democracy and some of the limitations it presents.   
Dicey’s view was that, under a democratic government, any law is unjust 
which is opposed to the real or deliberate conviction of a large number of 
citizens.
76
  Such a conviction, he said, would cause persons who considered a 
law to be unjust (wrong in his view though it was, to oppose that law by the use 
of force).  The consequence, he thought, was that it ought to be accepted that 
such deference to public opinion could not co-exist with the amount and coercive 
nature of government.   
The problem Dicey raises is not of course one which brings into question 
the validity of legislation.  It is a far more practical problem.  It raises squarely 
the conundrum that seeking to regulate more and more fields of human activity 
and doing so in more intrusive ways and by the imposition of harsher 
consequences (including by the deployment of the criminal law) will heighten 
the likelihood of more than just the odd disgruntled citizen taking issue with the 
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legal rule and deliberately disobeying it.  One response to this (the legislative 
one) is to punish the objector and to continue on unaffected.  An alternative 
would be to institute a form of prioritisation, in which the legislative object 
sought to be achieved could be assessed against the extent to which the rule 
would cause a departure from ‘a real or deliberate conviction of a large number 
of citizens’.  This could only mean customary behaviour, albeit not unreasoned or 
time-out-of-mind.  I take up that theme in Chapter 4 in comparing the features of 
made and unmade law. 
We are constantly being desensitised to legislation’s intrusions.  Its march 
is relentless.  We only have to look back to the remarks of Dicey to see how, a 
century ago, real complaints were being levelled at legislative proliferation and 
intrusion, and how legislation has, despite this, been permitted to continue on its 
path.   
   I have dealt above with the major practical problems that modern 
legislatures pose.  It is not possible entirely to separate the practical problems 
from what might be described as institutional limitations and those which emerge 
from normative considerations.  My intent, however, in dealing separately with 
the most practical aspects, has been to give some perspective to the challenges 
which modern legislatures face, to question the idealistic and simplistic view of 
popular assemblies being a forum for free debate of a multitude of viewpoints, 
and to introduce some of the concepts which emerge in more complex forms in 
my consideration of institutional limitations and in better understanding the 
historical and philosophical forces that contributed to our current attitude to 
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legislation.  Without such viewpoints, we lack any broader understanding of 
what it is we would wish Parliament to achieve and why, how it might go about 
doing so, and what might be the causes of the trusting or unquestioning 
disposition we presently have towards legislation and legislatures.  The tendency 
is, without such a perspective, that we know the route which Parliament has 
historically taken, but lack all means to understand why, or to know now 
whether, Parliament conforms even to those demands which history and 
philosophy might reveal to be necessary.  
IV Institutional Limitations 
 
Another of the reference points I offer in testing the adequacy of doctrinal 
limits is the institutional limitations which popular assemblies possess.  Some of 
them are practical matters also, and they have been discussed in the preceding 
part of this Chapter.  Here I focus upon those aspects of legislatures which have 
featured most prominently in the debates about the institutional characteristics of 
popular assemblies and how we ought to regard the capacity of them to make 
good decisions.  I do so because ascertaining what limits legislation has must 
involve an appraisal of the capacities of its author to meet standards by which the 
law it makes is to be judged.  
I consider two perspectives, being the points upon which the major debates 
in this field turn:  
1)  the relevance of inputs to, and outputs from, popular assemblies in 
terms of appraising their operation (following Fritz Scharpf’s input 
and output legitimacy);  
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2)   what might direct democracy (on one view more democracy), or its 
deliberate absence, reveal about our own underlying attitudes to the 
institutional limitations of popular assemblies?   
Legitimacy: inputs and outputs  
Fritz Scharpf
77
 has explained democratic legitimacy as importing two 
dimensions: the inputs and the outputs of a political system.  Scharpf equates his 
two dimensions to the expression in the Gettysburg Address, ‘Government by the 
people, for the people’.
78
 
The input aspect involves mechanisms or procedures that connect political 
decisions with voters’ preferences.  Mechanisms of that kind are found in the 
choice of members via regular elections.  Democracy, however, Scharpf argues, 
would be an ‘empty ritual’ (hearkening to Schmitt) were democratic processes 
not to produce outcomes which might be regarded as satisfactory.
79
  He frames 




The first of these notions concerns itself with the input side of the equation: 
the mechanisms that translate the ‘will of the people’ into political decisions.  If 
the electors judge those mechanisms to be ‘democratic’ or ‘good’, then there is 
input legitimacy.  Elections are the primary means by which electors influence 
policy-making.   
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The second of Scharpf’s notions focusses upon ‘output’ or ‘epistemic’ 
legitimacy.  This notion of legitimacy turns upon the extent to which government 
performance is effective, that is, the extent to which what the assembly does 
achieves the basic functions of government.  Difficulty, however, is encountered 
in ascertaining what are the ‘basic functions of government’ (or what they ought 
to be).  Scharpf’s notion of these refers to the extent to which democratic 
procedures are able effectively to promote the constituency’s common welfare
81
 
as well as, once again, ‘achieving the goals citizens collectively care about’.
82
  
These objective and subjective components both possess a utilitarian character. 
The objective component is directed to ascertaining if policy outcomes 
succeed in solving social problems effectively.  The literature on this topic often 
makes mention of the direct participation of citizens and other stakeholders in the 
policy- making process as producing better and ‘more intelligent’ outcomes.
83
  
This assumption is based on the idea (which we must attribute to Hayek in his 
criticism of constructivism and what he called the ‘synoptic delusion’) that ‘no 
single actor, public or private, has all knowledge and information required to 
solve complex, dynamic and diversified problems’.
84
  By ensuring citizens 
participate in the policy arena, the argument runs, the expertise and information 
that citizens offer can be used by administrators to solve complex social issues.  
In a democracy, this happens through the process of elections and the 
representations of electors, via constituencies, in the relevant assembly. 
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The ‘subjective’ component of output legitimacy is directed to the extent to 
which citizens are satisfied with the content of government policy.  It is more 
likely that people will be satisfied if they have participated in the policy and law-
making process by reaching their own goals and recognising their preferences in 
political decisions.  Interactive processes, it is hoped, bring the content of policy 
more into line with citizens’ preferences and this increases the likelihood that 
citizens will judge positively the content of the policy (and, perhaps, comply 
with it).  
Both types of legitimacy are closely related and are not by any means 
mutually exclusive.  Output legitimacy derives from the effectiveness of 
government policy.  However, effectiveness has content only if we can know 
citizens’ preferences.  If effective results are to be achieved, procedures or 
mechanisms are needed to ascertain those preferences and in order to translate 
them into political decisions.  
Direct democracy as a reality check   
We might test just how far the thread of representative democracy can be 
stretched in order to expose some of the underlying assumptions we make about 
it by giving some consideration to direct democracy.  Scharpf’s dimensions of 
democracy in particular give cause to consider whether some form of direct or 
interactive democracy might not improve and make even more democratic the 
systems as they operate in most Anglo-American systems.   
Direct democracy involves citizens indicating their approval or disapproval 
of specific proposals between general elections.  It offers a notional alternative 
176 
 
by which we might test whether greater involvement by citizens is something 
which fits with our views of how the present system might operate or by which it 
might be improved.  Its limited adoption in Anglo-American systems also offers, 
I suggest, an insight into the limitations of our mechanisms to ascertain and give 
effect to popular expressions of public will, something to which I gave 
consideration earlier in this Chapter.  
  In part, the idea of direct democracy arises because of new technological 
possibilities.  It would now, theoretically at least, be possible for citizens to vote 
directly by electronic means
85
 upon specific policy options which an elected 
government might pursue.  Switzerland has one of the most developed forms of 
direct democracy.   
The Swiss electorate has a right of veto on all proposed federal laws.  If 
50,000 citizens demand a referendum, one must be held within 3 months.
86
  It is 
only necessary for a federal law to pass, that a majority of the national electorate 
vote in favour of it (not a majority of cantons).
87
   
A system of popular initiative also exists.  If 100,000 citizens (about 2.5 
per cent of the electorate) demand a change of the Constitution, federal 
parliament must discuss the initiative, may recommend it or reject it or may 
propose an alternative.
88
  Whatever the decision made by Parliament, all citizens 
have the opportunity to decide in a referendum whether to accept it, to adopt an 
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alternate proposal or to have no change at all. 
Advocates of direct or ‘interactive’ democracy argue that electoral 
institutions are insufficient instruments of democracy, as they fail to provide real 
opportunities for citizens effectively to influence policy-making.
89
  Social choice 
theorists
90
 argue that electoral outcomes do not necessarily reflect ‘the popular 
will’, as they are merely ‘artefacts’ of the procedures by which votes are 
counted.
91
  Some theorists of that persuasion also argue that there exists no single 




Direct democracy therefore focusses upon deliberation as the central 
mechanism by which to link political decisions with citizens’ preferences.  It is 
an approach that focuses most closely upon input legitimacy.   
Those who advocate direct democracy traditionally advance several 
arguments in support of their claim that deliberation is an important source for 
input-oriented legitimacy: 
1) representative institutions do not, and cannot, live up to the 
expectations that we have of them in terms of ‘democratic 
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2) they take a populist idea of democracy and look for how citizen 
involvement might be expanded so that the democratic system might 
look more like the Athenian ideal; 
3) they conceive of a strong democracy as self-government by citizens 
rather than representative government in the name of citizens.  They 
say that it is only through this means that popular sovereignty and 
political equality can prevail;
94
 
4) they also say that the direct participation of citizens leads to a 
cohesive society in which social exclusion is reduced.
95
 
Other arguments made in favour of direct democracy include that citizens, 
when they participate in a deliberative process between legislators and other 
citizens, learn from doing so.  They validate their own preferences when they 
confront their perceptions with those of others.
96
   
 This assists us then to expose what might be the strengths of 
representative versus direct democracy. 
Schmitt saw the possibility (then – in the 1920s – hypothetical) that:
97
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… every single person, without leaving his apartment, could continuously 
express his opinions on political questions through an apparatus and that 
all these opinions on would automatically be registered by a central office, 
where one would only need to read them off.        
Schmitt’s difficulty with this however, was that it would result ‘only in a sum of 
private opinions’, and that no common will would arise, only a mass of 
individual ones.
98
   
‘Indirect democracy’ is premised upon there being some advantage to there 
being (notionally) present in the assembly, representatives rather than citizens 
themselves.  In part that premise might be thought to be practical:  it is 
impossible to have all citizens engaged directly in even the most important and 
major of legislative and other public decisions which are to be made.  But there 
do seem to be other reasons also why a representative model evolved and 
continues to exist.  Representative democracy, of the kind which Madison 
endorsed in the Federalist No 10, for example, does offer a more dispassionate 
reflection of the common good than would a more direct (or ‘pure’ as Madison 
says) form of democracy.  Representative democracy, he argued, operates:
99
 
… to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the 
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the 
true interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will 
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.  Under 
such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by 
the representatives of the people will be consonant to the public good than 
if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. 
It would also, he said, bring within the compass of government a greater number 
of citizens and wider extent of territory, thus making it less probable that a 
majority would have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.  
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That is because it would require a larger body to comprise the majority, and they 
would be less proximate to each other, rendering majoritarian domination less 
practicable.    
We might pause here also to reflect upon Madison’s reference to the 
protection representative democracy afforded against sacrificing the ‘true 
interest of [the] country’ to temporary or partial considerations.  The idea seems 
to be that the chosen representatives will not be motivated in precisely the same 
way as citizens themselves and will, on occasion, act as a brake upon what pure 
democracy might demand. 
The employment of interactive governance might be seen as a reaction to 
social developments.  Some say that traditional representative institutions have 
not coped with the social changes which increased diversity in the society has 
brought.
100
  This, it might be thought, justified new institutional arrangements to 
address a perceived shortcoming.  In an immediate sense, direct democracy 
would assist in overcoming this by enhancing input-oriented legitimacy by 
stimulating citizens’ involvement in the making of public policy.  Moreover, 
there exists greater complexity in social problems.  There are new ideas about 
policy-making, ones in which hierarchical structures are replaced by more 
horizontal modes of cooperation between governmental and social actors.
101
 
The possibilities of a more pure form of democracy which technology has 
made a reality poses a threat to representative democracy.  That is, the realisation 
that technology now permits to be overcome some at least of the practical 
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reasons why direct democracy might not have been favoured earlier than now, 
begs the question why direct democracy ought not be embraced.  And, as I point 
out later in Chapter 5, it is a distinctly modern disposition to consider that, 
because something is possible, it ought be done.      
No longer could it be said (as Madison suggested) that the only 
practicable ‘pure’ form of democracy (ie one in which each citizen himself or 
herself assembles) could exist in small societies.  Provided the act of assembling 
could be satisfied via an electronic medium, a society might be very large, but 
permit the notional meeting of citizens by the on-line registration of their 
preferences. 
What is left unsolved by even the most advanced form of electronic media 
for mass citizen direct participation is the physical act of meeting, of debating 
and doing so through the refining and perhaps restraining influence of the elected 
representative.  It is one thing for a system to permit voting preferences to be 
expressed en masse, but it is quite another for there to be a public face-to-face 
meeting at which the options are debated, weighed and voted upon (as occurs in 
assembly processes).  These elements of representative democracy seem to be 
unanswered by the mere employment of technology. 
Proponents of interactive governance argue that interaction between 
various actors is an important source of legitimacy.  On the one hand, direct 
participation by citizens in political decision-making could be seen as a 
mechanism to link political decisions with citizens’ preferences.  The 
involvement of citizens might generate better or more effective political 
182 
 
outcomes.  Interactive governance, they say, improves legitimacy on the input, as 
well as the output, side. 
Dicey advocated the use of referenda as a people’s veto of proposed 
legislation after initial opposition to the referendum as ‘one of the most dubious 
devices of Swiss democracy’.
102
  He came round, however, to a different view as 
the House of Lords, in his view, gradually lost its legitimacy and with it, the 
traditional check on the power of the Commons.
103
  This, he said, was a problem 
made worse by the erosion of informal restraints on Parliament, ones which 
prevented it from exceeding its mandate.  His ultimate proposal was for a 
referendum which would act as a people’s veto to preclude ‘the passing of any 
important Act which does not command the sanction of the electors’.
104
  This he 
intended to be the check on party tyranny while preserving the system of 
representative government.  There is no little irony in the fact that the man who 
did so much to cement the absolutist notion of Parliamentary supremacy in the 
consciousness of the Anglo-American world, would also himself recognise so 
perspicaciously the problem of an unrestrained Parliament.            
I will not delve into the factors that provoked Dicey to change his view 
(one was the establishment of Irish Home Rule).  But his views are an illustration 
of a crisis of confidence in representative democracy and an indication of 
Parliament’s capacity and willingness to act in a manner contrary to the will of 
the electors.  
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The points to be drawn from this consideration of direct democracy for 
present purposes are three-fold: 
1) most legislatures in Anglo-American systems operate firmly on a 
system of representative and not ‘pure’ democracy; 
2) the representative component of those systems adds a refinement and 
provides a buffer between raw constituent enthusiasm and 
majoritarian domination to which direct democracy is more 
vulnerable; 
3) technological advances do not overcome some at least of the primary 
reasons why representative democracy is in these systems almost 
uniformly preferred over more direct means.   
If we accept these points as holding true for almost all Anglo-American 
assemblies, we must also accept that those assemblies cannot purport to act as 
mere conduits for public will, popularly expressed.  Instead, they seek to refine 
it, and to introduce into the expression of public will, the influence of officials, 
thought to be less susceptible to temporary or partial considerations and better 
able to pronounce the public voice in a way that promotes the public good than 
the citizens themselves doing so without such mediating forces.      
The claim that popular assemblies might be mere conduits for the 
expression of public will and the translation of it into legislative form is, 
accordingly, fraught.  Other forces intervene.  It is something which Waldron’s  
advocacy of popular assemblies as dignified and as being the means for the 
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expression of the ‘wisdom of the multitude’ seems not to meet. 
V Concluding remarks 
 
I set out in this Chapter to introduce the principal modern defence of popular 
assemblies embracing legislative hyperactivity and to show how it is incomplete 
in its treatment of the principal practical and institutional limitations of popular 
assemblies and the laws they make.  Much of the support for popular assemblies 
is premised upon them being no more than conduits for the expression of public 
will.  Questions of the extent to which they are necessarily so, import 
considerations of how and to what extent we expect assemblies merely to convey 
the expressed wishes of their electors.    
It is at this point, however, that the matters I have raised take us deep into 
the domain of theory and value judgments.  For that reason I turn, later, in 
Chapter 5, to seek to understand the intellectual influences that have given rise to 
our modern overreliance upon legislation, or at least our having allowed 
legislation to proliferate in the manner and to the extent that it has.   
Before doing so, however, I contrast the characteristics of legislation and 
custom (made and unmade law) as offering another way in which the wisdom of 
the multitude might find expression, and one far more organic and less 
deliberately intellectualised than popular assemblies and the processes that 
accompanying their legislative activities.  This I do in the next Chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 
Unmade Law and the Wisdom of the Multitude  
 
Legislation involves rule-making by the most posited of means.  It is created by 
deliberate act, and one which involves a highly formalised process of enactment, 
with specific mechanisms to be followed.  The prominence of legislation in 
current times has tended to eclipse in our legal imagination the possibility of 
other forms of rule-making with the exception, perhaps, of judge-made law.  
Even judge-made law, as we saw in Chapter 3, has come under attack from those 
who favour legislatures and legislation (most latterly, Jeremy Waldron) and who 
would seek to characterise them as being dignified and more likely to reach the 
right result. 
This overshadowing of other possible forms of rule-finding, and rule-
making, has left little room for us to conceive of a system of law in which rules 
are other than enacted by a popular assembly, as if this were the only possible 
form of proper rule-making, and legislation the only means through which the 
wisdom of the multitude might be expressed. 
In one sense there is a tension between the view to which Waldron gives 
expression (that we tend to have a dim view of legislation) and our apparent 
overreliance upon it.  The apparent disconformity is explicable on one or more of 
several grounds.  We seem to acquiesce in system of legislation dominance 
rather than positively to endorse it.  One of the features of that regime is that it 
tends to overwhelm citizens, by keeping them constantly on the move in keeping 
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up with its hyperactivity, suggesting reform is necessary and urgent.  Any 
resistance to this state of affairs can be met with the retort that the hyperactivity – 
if it be that – is something that the public wills, being the mode of operation of 
the popular assembly.  There is an underlying risk, however: that the force at 
work is far more sinister.  On one view, there is a diminished level of trust in the 
electorate to make choices and in people’s capacity to organise their own affairs.  
If this were so, it would constitute the legislature treating its own constituents 
with disdain.  But it would also explain why citizens might regard legislation less 
well.  After all, if legislation is not the product of their will (despite its claim to 
be) they are entitled to regard it cynically. 
There are other possible reasons for legislation being regarded so poorly.  
One is that there is an unthinking acceptance of its dominance.  This state of 
affairs, I suggest in the next Chapter, is more attributable to us having lost the 
ability to conceive of a system any differently from the one which predominates, 
something which subsists in part because we have, in recent times, consciously 
theorised little about legislation, legislatures, the legislative method, and are less 
and less inclined to recall or conceive of alternative possibilities to the one to 
which we are subject.  One object of this Chapter is to recall a source of law 
which is one alternative to legislation (and the expression of the wisdom of the 
multitude by that means).   
I  Why consider custom? 
 
Here I compare characteristics of customary law with legislation, as a further 
major means (ie other than legislation and case law) by which rules might be 
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devised and adhered to.  In doing so, I suggest that there exists a viable 
alternative to enacted law which, although not by any means a complete 
substitute for it, is an avenue of rule-finding, and rule-making that offers benefits 
over legislation in some circumstances.  One of the central arguments I advance 
is that it is impossible to ascertain fully the characteristics which made law ought 
possess (especially in order to maintain its majesty and continue to command 
respect) without first obtaining some understanding of customary law.  
Moreover, customary law is a means by which the wisdom of the multitude (if it 
exists) finds expression.  It offers a point from which to test Waldron’s assertion 
that popular assemblies, having deliberative characteristics, are better placed 
than other forms of law-making to get it right.   
I do not suggest that customary law is entirely separate from judge-made 
law or from legislation.  The connection between judge-made law and custom is 
well-known and it is a topic I have touched upon in earlier Chapters.  So too 
legislation might draw upon either for inspiration or more directly, the rules to 
which the populace adheres by customary practice.  I give an example below of 
just that happening.   
The influence of custom on modern law has tended to be categorised as 
either a stage in the development of civilisations towards a more sophisticated or 
‘made’ system of law, and, in common law systems, as the origin, probably now 
distant, of many of the rules which comprise it.  Contrary to this, custom does, I 
suggest, offer a useful benchmark by which to assess the characteristics of other 
forms of law-making, and especially that which stands as its opposite on the 
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scale of deliberateness in rule-making: legislation.  Custom possesses qualities 
which legislation does not in its practicality and in-built mechanisms of 
efficiency and prioritisation. 
To illustrate this, I draw upon two related features of the English Common 
Law: its restraint in regulating the affairs of merchants (leaving those affairs to 
be governed by custom) and then, from the mid-18
th
 century, deliberately and 
deferentially receiving those customs as rules of the Common Law. 
The neglect of custom as a means of social ordering is part of the 
increasing tendency for modern made law to lack certain qualities which custom 
possesses.  I have already noted the tendency for made law to be overly 
ambitious in what it attempts.  This is a pitfall which custom (whatever be its 
other weaknesses), by its nature, avoids. 
I adopt the terminology ‘made’ and ‘unmade’ as the basis for my 
discussion in distinguishing between custom and legislation.  We might also 
understand that distinction in terms of posited and more organic forms of law, as 
law-making in a centralised versus more devolved manner, or as conscious rule-
making as against more spontaneous forms of ordering.  There is a spectrum of 
these forms.  At one end is legislation which is the purest form of made law: 
centralised in representative assemblies; and the product of conscious, highly 
process-driven rule-making activities.  At the other end is custom: so 
decentralised as to have undetectable specific individual or group originators; 
and only spontaneously or incidentally bringing rules into existence.  Somewhere 
between those two, lies the Common Law: centralised to an extent, but generally 
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conditionally so (due to the right of appeal and its susceptibility to legislative 
countermand); ‘made’ in the sense that the judge is requested to, and applies, a 
rule as between the parties, but limited too in that respect by it being, primarily at 
least, a process by which rules are applied more than made and because, 
historically perhaps more than now, of its conscious reliance upon custom.  In 
describing, then, custom as ‘unmade’ law, I am seeking to contrast it, in 
particular, to that which lies at the opposite end of the spectrum in relevant 
respects – legislation as ‘made’ law.  Beneath these distinctions, and indeed 
beneath many of the theories about legislation I have referred to above, is a belief 
about the immanence or otherwise of the underlying order in the world.  Those 
who urge against legislative overreach may come to the debate with a belief in an 
immanent order, and order which, whether it be God-given or inherent and 
detectable by the natural sciences or moral theories, ought not be fundamentally 
interfered with (following Adam Smith, Hayek, Fuller and Lord Kames).  Those 
(like Waldron) who favour legislative omnicompetence seem to be motivated by 
a belief (undeclared) that such order as there is, whatever be its source, is open to 
adjustment, radical or otherwise, better suit our needs as humans and that we 
have the ability, after deliberation and reflection, to make such judgments.  The 
belief itself, one way or the other, is not something that is readily challenged.  
Paolo Grossi has demonstrated with clarity the movement from the medieval 
respect for the order inscribed in the natural world in particular and its 
incompleteness in political power to the modern ‘totalizing and all-
encompassing’ mentality of which the nation state is a part.
1
  In the former, the 
                                                             
1
   P Grossi, A History of European Private Law (2007) 2-4.  
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bottom-up generation of law affords respect for that natural order.  In the latter, 
law is the expression of superior will, descending from the top down, and 
bringing with it a capacity to do violence to objective reality in its arbitrariness 
and artifice.  My complaint, however, with Waldron’s approach is that 
underlying motivation for it goes undeclared, which constitutes a further 
incompleteness in his advocacy for legislative activity.  This incompleteness is 
one which emerges most clearly from comparing custom and legislation, for a 
theorist who truly has respect for the wisdom of the multitude would respect 
custom as well as legislation.  But a preference for legislation over custom is one 
which uncovers a preference for a constructed order and a rejection of the 
immanent and spontaneous.  
 
II Custom in modern scholarship 
 
Custom has tended, in modern legal scholarship, to be characterised as 
being of historical relevance only: a primitive form of regulation comprising 
convention and habit,
2
 produced by an unsophisticated mind-set which could not 
conceive of humankind’s manipulating norms for its own benefit and merely 
requiring compliance by all with the immemorial ways and means of interacting 
                                                             
2
  Aristotle recognised a distinction between two elemental notions of habit (ethos) and 
convention (nomos): J B Murphy, ‘Habit and Convention at the Foundation of Custom’ in 
A Perreau-Saussine & J B Murphy (eds) The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical 
and Philosophical Perspectives (2007) 59-65.    
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and living.  Belief in law as custom has waned,
3




This view of custom as having historical relevance may have been a 
consequence, at least in part, of the influential writings of Sir Henry Sumner 
Maine
5
 and Sir John Seeley.
6
  Maine, in his anthropological and historical 
analysis of ‘ancient law’, characterised legal systems as developing in stages and 
in a fixed order.  He saw custom pervading two of his six ‘stages’.  First came 
‘habit’, which simply subsisted.  Neither law nor judgments on disputes were 
thought of as more than declarations of the way things were:
7
 
It is certain that, in the infancy of mankind, no sort of legislature, nor 
even a distinct author of law, is contemplated or conceived of.  Law has 
scarcely reached the footing of custom; it is rather a habit.  It is, to use a 
French phrase “in the air”.  The only authoritative statement of right and 
wrong is a judicial sentence after the facts, not one presupposing a law 
which has been violated.  
 
Maine’s second stage was customary law.
8
   It differs from the earlier stage only 
in that, by this time, there has developed a mode of conduct which, having 
become a practice or custom, is the reason for others following that same course.  
This brings with it recognition that there is more than one way of achieving a 
desired result, but that the course taken by others and comprising custom is the 
                                                             
3
  M Loughlin, Sword and Scales: The Relationship Between Law and Politics (2000) 11. 
4
  A Perreau-Saussine & J B Murphy, Preamble I, and ‘The Character of Customary Law: 
An Introduction’ 1, in A Perreau-Saussine & J B Murphy (eds) (n 2). 
5
  Most notably in H S Maine’s Ancient Law: Its Connection With the Early History of 
Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas, first published in 1861.  The references to that 
work here are to the 1930 edition, which includes introduction and notes by Sir Frederick 
Pollock.  As to its influence, G W Carey, for example, notes that it has frequently been 
compared to Darwin’s Origin of Species: ‘Introduction’ 16 in H S Maine, Popular 
Government (1883) (Liberty Fund Edition, 1976)). 
6
  Sir J R Seeley, Introduction to Political Science (1919). 
7




  See Maine (1861) (n 5) 11-13. 
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In instances where there is an element of choice in [peoples’] 
conformity, they may follow custom because of a perception of the need 
for shared and accepted rules of conduct and a realization that a 
departure from established rules would act disruptively. 
   
After these stages, Maine describes law as being embodied in Codes, then there 
emerged legal fictions (a rudimentary form of legislation), followed by reform of 
the law permitted by these fictions and, finally, legislation.     
Maine’s account assumes that all legal systems developed linearly, 
progressing through set stages.  In this set order, customary forms of law lie at 
the primitive end and legislation is the sophisticated terminus.  The narrative is 
one of legal systems moving from organic, unmade norms to more sophisticated, 
designed and enacted rules: that is, ‘made’ law.  Maine’s approach in particular 
was one which was premised upon the movement of society towards some more 
sophisticated state: in his case an almost entirely made system of law.   
Both the linear nature of Maine’s stages, and apparent assumption of their 
universal presence in developing legal systems, have been criticised for being too 
conjectural about prehistoric times,
10
 too simplistic about societies being the 
same,
11
 for viewing custom in its origin as essentially non-litigious
12
 and being 
ignorant (quite understandably) of matters which subsequently came to light.
13
  
                                                             
9
  L Fuller, Anatomy of Law (1968) 50. 
10
  Fuller (n 9) 49. 
11
  Fuller (n 9) 49. 
12
  H F Jolowicz, Lectures on Jurisprudence (J A Jolowicz ed) (1963) 197.  
13
  Fuller (n 9) 49 eg, ancient codes. 
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Maine set out to link early ideas with modern thought.
14
  This was an approach 
tended to promote a view of sophisticated legal systems as one in which enacted 
law, and especially statute, was employed confidently and beneficially for 
society’s ends.  It is not far from that point to Bentham’s absolutist
15
 notions of 
the legislative method.  Maine saw Bentham’s attitude to legislation and law 
reform as more unique to modernity than even Bentham himself had perceived.  
Maine says, for example, of Bentham’s ‘historical theory’, that societies have 
not always modified their laws on the grounds of what is utilitarian and 
expedient.  The ‘impulse which prompts modification’, Maine seems to 
suggest,
16
 was less likely to arise in ancient times, and Bentham had underrated 
the power of tradition and custom in those societies. 
These illustrations serve to show what probably needs no further 
explanation: that late 19
th
 century thought tended to view a system by which law 
was modified by positive means in the interests of utilitarianism and expediency 
as more sophisticated and modern and therefore better than one governed more 
powerfully by tradition and custom.  But, as Lon Fuller pointed out, that custom 
might have operated as the basis of norms and perhaps operated to resist 
modification of them in a primitive system, or that it regulated primitive forms of 
interaction, are not sufficient bases to characterise customary law as 
‘primitive’.
17
  Nor is it a sufficient basis to conclude that custom has no relevance 
to questions which arise about the shape and nature of modern forms of law or 
                                                             
14
  See the full title to the work itself: ie, Ancient law: Its Connection with the early History 
of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas. 
15
  A term used by, among others, J Cairns ‘Adam Smith and the Role of the Courts in 
Serving Justice and Liberty’ in R P Malloy & J Evensky (eds), Adam Smith and The 
Philosophy of Law and Economics (1994) 32.  
16
  Maine (1861) (n 5) 135.  See also Sir Fredrick Pollock’s notes on this point, 183-184. 
17
  See Fuller (n 9) 117. 
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that an understanding of custom has little or nothing to add to our understanding 
of made law. 
Nineteenth century (and later) accounts tended to place made law at the 
peak of the developmental scale, influenced no doubt by the movement in 
philosophical thinking away from natural law and conceptions of law’s 
derivation from something ‘outside and bigger than [man] himself’,
18
 and 
towards a humanist rationality: trends predicated upon the evolution of society 
from the organic and unmade (at least by conscious human activity) to the 
designed and reasoned.  The 18
th
 century belief in reason, Jolowicz says, as the 
only justifiable basis for law, leads to a low opinion of custom.
19
    
It follows, on this approach, that if legal systems moved from the 
customary to the positive, then enacted law might know no bounds in terms of 
what it might legitimately achieve, at the expense of the unmade primitive law, 
and, by analogy, at the expense of common law, itself possessing decidedly 
customary qualities.  
Another sense in which modern scholarship treats custom is its role in the 
development of the Common Law.  Common law is thought to have a close and 
necessary connection with custom in two respects.  First, it adopted rules which 
were customary in character as its own rules.  Secondly, its method has a 
customary flavour: incremental, careful, and forged in real and specific factual 
contexts. 
                                                             
18
  Fuller (n 9) 56-57. 
19
  Jolowicz (n 12) 202. 
195 
 
Common law is, to many theorists, customary law itself, rationally applied 




… all common law was assumed to be custom, elaborated, summarised and 
enforced by statute; and all custom was assumed to be immemorial, in the 
sense that any declaration or even change of custom – uttered by a judge 
from his bench, recorded by a court in a precedent, or registered by king-
in-parliament as a statute – presupposed a custom already ancient and not 
necessarily recorded at the time of the writing. 
 
Many of the influential common law commentators prominently proclaimed the 
common law’s customary qualities.  Blackstone’s common law, for example, 
was the ‘ancient collection of unwritten maxims and customs’
21
 which drew their 
force from ‘general reception and usage’.  To Sir Matthew Hale, the Common 
Law and its custom were ‘the great substratum of the law’
22
 and the Common 
Law, the means for receiving and approving the law.  To Glanvill, the common 
law comprised ‘laws and customs of the realm’.
23
   
These themes remain, albeit less prominently, in modern scholarship.  
Brian Tamanaha and Gerald Postema, for example, characterise the Common 
Law as essentially customary, and as:
24
 
the lived ways of the community, their collective wisdom recognized and 
reformed into law – “the expression of commonly shared values and 
conceptions of reasonableness and the common good”.  
                                                             
20
  J G A Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English 
Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (1957) 261. 
21
  1 Bl Comm 17. 
22
  M Hale, History of the Common Law of England, 4
th
 edn, (xxxx) 68. 
23
  Glanvill, G D G Hall (ed), The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England 
Commonly Called Glanvill (1993) 1-3.  
24
  B Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (2006) 13, quoting G Postema, Bentham and the 
Common Law Tradition (1986) 4. 
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There are differences, nevertheless, between commentators, both now and then, 
about the extent to which the Common Law can properly be seen as consisting of 
the custom of the realm and the extent to which the two can be considered 
separate.  The difficulties with interpreting the works of the English 
commentators have been well noted, owing to a lack of organisation in some 
cases, inconsistent use of terminology and imprecise language in distinguishing 
between the Common Law, local usages and general custom.
25
  There is also a 
lack of certainty whether, in some cases, the term ‘common law’ is used to 
describe custom in some posited form, or something entirely separate from it.  
For example, Coke’s perspective was that common law included custom of the 
realm, if it be the general custom of the realm (as distinct from local usages).
26
  
Coke’s view seems to regard the Common Law as including more than just rules 
derived from custom.  The lexicographic problems which are inherent in any 
attempt to understand the precise distinctions between habit, convention, usage, 
custom (local and more general), practices which fall within established patterns 
and written law have been well documented.
27
  What these studies also do, 
however, show, is that the body of laws in pre-modern times included, in some 
guise or another, custom as a source of law, albeit alongside and not always 
completely distinct from, written law.  
                                                             
25
  See, for example, J W Tubbs The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Conceptions 
(2000) 189. 
26
  Co Inst I:115b. 
27
  See, for example, J G H Hudson ‘Introduction: Customs, Laws and the Interpretation of 
Medieval Law’ in P Andersen and M Munster-Swendsen (eds), Custom: The Development 
and Use of a Legal Concept in the Middle Ages (Proceedings of the Fifth Carlsberg 
Academy Conference on Medieval Legal History, 2008) (2009) 1-5; Tubbs (n 25) 189; 
Jolowicz (n 12) 201.  
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The Common Law may not have been uniformly customary in character,
28
 
but to the extent it was not, its method was customary, the custom of the courts.
29
   
If there be a division between the commentators, it is between an orientation of 
the Common Law as having a customary basis (a view firmly held by 
Blackstone) and those (Bacon and Selden included) whose approach has been 
described as more humanistic and ‘scholarly’.
30
  J W Tubbs, for example, 
concludes in his study ‘The Common Law Mind’:
31
 
... it is possible to identify two broad orientations toward the common 
law.  Coke, Davies and Hedley are representative of the more 
traditional of the two orientations: in important passages, if not 
consistently, they emphasize the antiquity of the common law and 
identify it with custom.  Bacon, Dodderidge, Finch, and Selden are 
representative of those lawyers who brought either their educations in 
philosophy, logic, and other legal systems or their training in the 
methods of humanistic scholarship to bear on their consideration of the 
common law; hence, they are less prone to limit their discussions to 
traditional formulas. 
 
It is easy to see how these differences quickly distil into preferences or beliefs 
about the respect which might be afforded to tradition, to spontaneous collective 
human interaction.  These facets of human existence, although superficially 
opposed, share a quality of transcending the immediate and the rational.  Against 
them can be juxtaposed an immediate capacity, collective or otherwise, 
consciously to construct a desirable social order, a method more familiar to made 
law.  Each is informed in some way by an underlying belief about the 
immanence of the underlying order and the extent to which we as humans ought 
                                                             
28
  See, for example, Tubbs (n 25) esp 195. 
29
  D Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law (2010) 30. 
30
  This division is Tubbs’: (n 25) esp 195. 
31
  Tubbs (n 25) 194-195. 
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interfere with it, and indeed, the extent to which we are intellectually and morally 
equipped to do so.  




 Centuries, gave custom 
authority by force of ‘reason’, but reason in this sense seems only to have been a 
prerequisite to the law being binding, not the primary or proximate cause of its 
status as such.
32
  Nevertheless, it is the thrust of a recent thorough analysis of this 
topic by Tubbs, that, with few exceptions from the late 12
th
 century on, common 
lawyers recognised custom as an authoritative source of law, albeit that not all 
English law was customary in nature.
33
   
It is not my purpose here to assert that the Common Law was influenced 
by custom to the extent that Blackstone and others seem in their times to 
consider it to have been.  I seek only to record the views of these influential 
writers that the Common Law’s relationship with custom is, historically at least, 
a very close one. 
As a postscript on this point, modern legal thinking tends to epitomise 
custom as an unthinking attitude to, or acceptance of, the practices of the past, an 
anachronism, a time-out-of-mind adoption of what has tacitly gone before and as 
an unwelcome restraint on the willingness to enact made law.   Learned Hand, 
for example, took just that view:
34
 
The respect all men feel in some measure for customary law lies deep in 
their nature; we accept the verdict of the past until the need for change 
                                                             
32
  Tubbs (n 25) esp 188. 
33
  Tubbs (n 25) 188. 
34
  L Hand, ‘The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilisation’, in Winters (ed), 
Handbook for Judges (1975) 43 at 44. 
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cries out loudly enough to force upon us a choice between the comforts 
of further inertia and the irksomeness of action.  
 
These views implicitly express faith in our ability to legislate anew in a manner 
more wise and less imperfect than mere custom.  The theme is reminiscent of 
Maine: the impulse to modify in ancient times was stifled by custom and 
tradition.   
There is perceptible in recent times a revival, faint perhaps, of the study of 
custom and its role in law, both historical and theoretical.
35
  To some extent, this 
revival is the result of a renewed interest and relevance of a European ius 
commune, custom as a basis of international law and a perceived imperative from 
some quarters for international uniformity in commercial law.  Beneath these 
more practical imperatives are deeper and more complex questions whether, and 
to what extent, the revival might have been influenced by the perfection of the 
state’s near hegemony over law-making and by the postmodern dislike for that 
absolute structure and a desire for more pluralist alternatives.  Custom tends to 
invert current conceptions of the sources of law:  bottom-up rather than top-
down. 
The question of what is custom and customary law is accompanied by 
problems of definition and boundaries.  The same, of course, could be said of law 
itself.  Fuller’s ‘language of interaction’ or Parsons and Shils’ ‘complementary 
expectations’
36
 seem to be the best way of describing an amorphous topic – 
                                                             
35
  See Bederman (n 29); Perreau-Sassine & Murphy (eds), (n 2); Andersen & Munster-
Swendsen (eds) (n 27); L Sheleff, The Future of Tradition: Customary Law, Common Law 
and Legal Pluralism (1999). 
36
  T Parsons & E Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (1951). 
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interaction between members of society in some recognisable pattern, such as to 
allow the actions of others to be reasonably accurately anticipated or predicted.  
For present purposes, it is enough to articulate custom in this way and 
acknowledge its connection in that guise to the spontaneous ways in which 
humans interact and, at least sometimes and perhaps often, achieve social order. 
 
III The Law Merchant: custom embraced 
 
Custom, nonetheless, has vitality.  It has infiltrated modern law and filled 
lacunae created by reliance upon made law.  One example is the Common Law’s 
most recent major engagement with custom and its deferential treatment of it: 
that of the Law Merchant.  My purpose here is not to suggest that the modern 
legal system ought operate as the Law Merchant did before its reception.  For 
one thing, the Law Merchant governed a topic well suited to convenient 
spontaneous law-making in a customary manner by merchants, who can here be 
appropriately styled the ‘participant class’.  I adopt that terminology because it is 
a theme upon which I draw in identifying attributes of the custom from which 
legislation might learn.  It is a notion too that can be seen in Blackstone’s 
treatment of custom, in speaking of ‘a particular system of customs used only 
among one set of the king's subjects, called the custom of merchants or lex 
mercatoria’.
37
 The ‘one set’ of subjects is the basis of my ‘participant class’, a 
group among whom frequency and reciprocity of like dealings give rise to 
special significance. 
                                                             
37
  3 Bl Comm 75. 
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For present purposes, a study of the Law Merchant offers not only an 
understanding of the manner in which state-made law might recognise and defer 
to such customs, but also insights into the features of custom which made it such 
an attractive target for transformation into made law. 
The Law Merchant 
Between 1756 and 1788, and in his capacity as Chief Justice of England, Lord 
Mansfield executed a programme by which customary rules between merchants 
were ‘found’ and applied.  As a consequence, purely customary matters, as 
proved and found by a jury comprised of those within the class ‘bound’ by the 
customs, came to have all the features of formal legal rules.      
The phenomena, both of English law leaving to commercial people the 
regulation of their own affairs according to their usages and practices, and the 
law’s reception of them (a treatment both pragmatic and deferential to those 
customs) assist in understanding custom, its features, and its relationship to 
modern law.  The relevance of these features comes both from their being the 
most recent considered and programmatic interaction of law and custom, 
combined with the sustained attention given to the task by one of the finest 
judges of the era. 





 century legal historian and 
barrister, Sir William Holdsworth and by Clive Schmitthoff and his French 
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  Schmitthoff and Goldman in particular 
promoted and revived, in the mid-20
th
 century, the study of mercantile law and 
gave it modern relevance.  
This body of work demonstrates several points which are of importance for 
present purposes:  that the Law Merchant was an incarnation of custom; that its 
precepts had a supra-national quality; that it maintained a life separate from 
English general law until the mid-18
th
 century; and, that it was received into the 
general law itself, initially by transformation into common law rules, and later, 
into statute.  
Three lives are evident in the Law Merchant’s development: 
1) its early life, as practices between merchants, and administered by 
specialist merchant ‘courts’, known variously in England as the 
courts of Pie Powder, Staple and Tolsey, and (more so 
internationally) as Fair Courts; 
 
2) its incorporation into the Common Law under Lord Mansfield’s 
supervision and, later still, into the general law through a range of 
codification statutes including the Sale of Goods Act; 
 
3) its contemporary emanations.  
                                                             
39
  Goldman was Romanian-born, and became Professor of Law at the University of Dijon. 
Schmitthoff was born in Germany and had a successful appellate practice there.  Fleeing 
the Nazi regime, he practised as a barrister in England and became, upon retirement, 
Professor Emeritus of the City of London Polytechnic.  He was also Visiting Professor of 
Law at the University of Kent at Canterbury, among other things: Chia-Jui Chen (ed) 
Clive M Schmitthoff’s Select Essays on International Trade Law (1988) XIII – XV.  Both 




As with other ancient fields of law, it is impossible reliably to identify the 
genesis of the rules by which merchants engaged with each other in trade.  Some 
speculate that its origins lie (at least predominantly) in arrangements between 
Italian merchants.
40
  Others point to possible Arab or Phoenician origins.
41
  What 
is not in doubt is that the source of these rules lies in the practices and usages of 
merchants; the customs which arose between them.
42
  
Those customs supervened local usages and were, at least to an extent, 
supra-national.  Blackstone considered the international character of mercantile 
affairs to have rendered municipal law inadequate for the task of regulating this 
field both on the grounds of complexity of the subject matter and jurisdictional 
reach.
43
  This was a consequence of the trade which gave rise to these customs 
having occurred both along the ‘Silk Road’, principally; the East-West trade 
route stretching from Western Europe to China and in international fairs.  That 
trade ‘relay’,
44
 as it is perhaps more accurately described, intersected Mecca.  It 
included the Mediterranean shipping trade.
45
 
Malynes’ Consuetudo vel Lex Mercatoria (1622) highlights the 
separation of the Law Merchant from the Common Law of his day in saying that 
the customs of which he wrote were unknown to him and ‘legally impossible’ in 
                                                             
40
  See Bewes (n 38) 1; H C Gutteridge, Comparative Law (1949) 14; K Berger, The 
Creeping Codification of the New Lex Mercatoria, 2
nd
 edn (2010) 8. 
41
  Bewes (n 38) 2-11. 
42
  L Trakman, The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law (1983) 7-8; Bewes (n 
38) 9.  
43
  1 Bl Comm 273 ‘... whereas no municipal laws can be sufficient to order and determine 
the very extensive and complicated affairs of traffic and merchandise; neither can they 
have proper authority for this purpose ...’ 
44
  G Blainey, Short History of the World (2000) 160-161. 
45
  Bewes (n 38) 2. 
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the Common Law.  But Malynes saw the Law Merchant, notwithstanding its 
customary nature and its separateness from the Common Law, as a system 




I have intituled the Booke according to the ancient name of Lex 
Mercatoria and not Ius Mercatorum because it is customary Law approve 
by the authorities of all Kingdoms and Commonweales, and not a Law 
established by the Soveraignte of any Prince.     
 
The Courts in which the Law Merchant was administered and disputes 
determined were not courts in which the state had any direct involvement or over 
which it had sought to exercise control. 
What is known of the merchant courts suggests they were highly practical 
bodies, administering commercial custom pragmatically and with an eye to those 
rules being facilitative of commerce.  The courts dispensed justice in a summary 
way, more or less as a court of conscience, acting speedily.
47
 
Crucially for present purposes, the rules these courts administered were 
not, by any positive or explicit process at least, state-sanctioned.  In the medieval 
period’s ‘dislike of absolutism in the temporal sphere’, its ‘elaborate distribution 
of power’ and ‘its sense of corporate life’,
48
 the Merchant Guilds, as associations 
of traders, contributed not only to the management of trade, but to the 
formulation of rules.   
                                                             
46
  G Malynes, Consuetudo vel Lex Mercatoria, 1622 ‘Introduction to the Law Merchant’.  
47
  In some cases, they were required to give judgment ‘before the third tide’:  see, for 
example, W Stubbs (ed), Select Charters and other Illustrations of English Constitutional 
History: from the earliest times to the reign of Edward the first (1874) 112. 
48
  G M Trevelyan, ‘Some Points of Contrast Between Medieval and Modern Civilisation’ 




The rules of merchants were administered outside the ever-developing common 
law system until as late as the mid-18
th
 century.  At that time, a conscious 
programme was initiated which was to continue for some three decades, by 
which the customs which governed the dealings of merchants came to receive the 
imprimatur of law, and thus to be applied by the Common Law.  That is not to 
say that there was an entirely clear division between the Law Merchant and the 
Common Law up until its formal reception.  Holdsworth notes that the 
relationship between the Common Law and Law Merchant was ‘close’.
49
  For 
example, there were attempts in the 17
th
 century to bring the Law Merchant 
within the purview of the Common Law, as the Common Law courts ‘sought 
absolute domination over the English system of law’.
50
  
The incorporation of the Law Merchant into the ‘mainstream’ body of 
legal principles administered by the central common law courts occurred in two 
main phases: first through a deliberate programme of its reception into the 
Common Law; and, second, through codification of elements of it.   
The ‘Mansfield era’ 
No one person in modern times is more responsible for the development 
of the Law Merchant than Lord Mansfield (William Murray, 1705-1793).  He 
was born in Scotland to Scottish parents, and moved to London at the age of 
thirteen.  He later studied at Oxford University, was called to the Bar in 1730 and 
developed a successful practice.  He entered politics in 1742, becoming Attorney 
                                                             
49
  W S Holdsworth, A History of English Law (1938) vol 12 537-544.  
50
  Trakman (n 42) 26. 
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General.  He was a legal historian and was influenced (heavily it seems) by 
Roman law.
51
  His Scottish background
52
 and his interest in Grotius, Pufendorf 




Lord Mansfield’s lengthy period of service as Chief Justice, combined 
with his obvious skill and practicality, meant his influence on English common 
law, and especially commercial law, was considerable.  
At the time Lord Mansfield assumed the position of Chief Justice, the 
commercial law of England lagged behind that of other parts of Europe, and 
Parliament had not responded to the needs of a growing merchant class.
54
  
England was later to dominate manufacturing and commerce.  In the second half 
of the 17
th
 century, there had been widespread dissatisfaction by merchants with 
the Common Law in England.
55
  Dissatisfaction too has been shown by 
Lieberman to have existed with the haphazard system of legislation.
56
  There was 
a tense relationship between the Law Merchant and the Common Law, partly 
owing to the unsatisfactory state of law reporting and partly because of the 
                                                             
51
  Holdsworth, among others, noted the influence of Civilian writers on Lord Mansfield:  
Holdsworth (n 49) vol 12, 467.  See also D Coquillette, ‘Legal Ideology and Incorporation 
IV: The Nature of Civilian Influence on Modern Anglo-American Commercial Law’ 
(1987) 67 B U L Rev 877 at 949-62 and J Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of 
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Withers (1758) 2 Burr 683 and Pelly v Royal Exchange Assurance Co (1760) 1 Burr 341. 
52
  To this might be added his father’s (Viscount Stormont’s) Jacobitism, that his native 
language was Scots, and the influence upon him of Alexander Pope.  Each probably 
fuelled his independence of mind. 
53
  W S Holdsworth, Sources and Literature of English Law (1952) 249.  See also Oldham (n 
51) 367. 
54
  T Lowry, ‘Lord Mansfield and the Law Merchant: Law and Economics in the Eighteenth 
Century’ (1973) 7 Journal of Economic Issues 605 at 605. 
55
  See, as examples, Josiah Child, A Discourse About Trade (1689); J Marius Advice 
Concerning Bills of Exchange (1651); John D Cary An Essay on the State of England in 
Relation to its Trade (1695). 
56
  D Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in eighteenth 
century Britain (1989) 1-28, 99. 
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personality of judges at the time, and especially Chief Justice Holt (1689-1709) 




Lord Mansfield’s genius was his use of a procedure endorsed in a 1645 
decision of the King’s Bench by which special juries
58
 were empanelled in 
commercial law cases who were, or became, experts in such law.  In that case, 
the Court granted a motion to empanel such a jury in deciding a commercial 
dispute.  Lilly’s Practice says of that innovation:
59
 
It was conceived they [the jurymen] might have better knowledge of the 
matters in difference ... than others ... who were not of that profession.   
Mansfield was not the first to seek to incorporate mercantile practices as 
common law rules, although he was the first to do so programmatically.  Nor was 
he the first to use special juries for that purpose. 
Lord Mansfield’s jurymen decided what commercial practice, in particular 
cases, required.  Other matters were referred to commercial arbitration, often 
with the same people as comprised the special juries being Arbitrators.  The so-
called ‘Mansfield jurymen’
60
 were ‘thus reared’ under Mansfield himself at 
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  C H S Fifoot, Lord Mansfield (1936) 17-21. 
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  Special juries were abolished by the Juries Act 1949, but preserved them in cases entered 
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  He clearly had the confidence to do more than guide the jury to the 
proper result, as Mansfield’s own notes show:
62
 
… he was prepared, on occasion, to coax jurors into reaching the desired 
conclusion. But jurors might still refuse to bow to judicial pressure, even 
when the matter was put to them more than once. He was less inclined than 
his contemporary, Buller J, to draw sharp lines between questions of law 
and fact, thereby removing questions from jurors and restricting the scope 
of their decision making powers. 
 
 
So close was the relationship between Mansfield and his jurymen that he invited 
them to dine with him frequently.
63
  By this and other means, Mansfield ‘trained 
a corps of jurors as a permanent liaison between law and commerce’.
64
  
  Lord Mansfield’s judgments give a clear understanding of his method and 
purpose.  First, he was prepared to have regard to sources of law, including 
foreign mercantile codes, in cases where the issue was not one to which the 
English law provided a clear answer.
65
  Second, he regarded the jurymen as 
advisors as much as fact finders.
66
  Third, his desire was that commercial law be 
universally applied, albeit with an overlay of protections afforded by common 
sense and reason.  In Pelly v Royal Exchange Assurance Company, he said:
67
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  Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices (1874) vol 4, ch XXXIV 120. 
62
  W Swain, ‘Lord Mansfield and Lord Denning: Some Pitfalls and Possibilities Presented 
by the Great Judge’s Approach to Legal History and the Law of Contract’, Paper 
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  Birkenhead (n 60) 186. 
64
  Fifoot (n 57) 105. 
65
  Luke v Lyde (1759) 2 Burr 882; 97 ER 614.  See also B Murphy, Luke v Lyde: An Analysis 
[2003] Auckland U L Rev 2.  
66
  Oldham (n 51) at 26. 
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  (1757) 1 Burr 341 at 347; 97 ER 342 at 346. 
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The mercantile law, in this respect, is the same all over the world.  For, 
from the same premises, the sound conclusions of reason and justice must 
universally be the same.  
Underlying Lord Mansfield’s method was a desire to bring within the knowledge 
of the Court, and thereby transform, a merely practical usage into a legal rule to 
govern like future affairs.
68
  Once so transformed, those practices ceased to have 
status as fact and could not be challenged as such in later cases.
69
  In Edie v East 
India Company
70
 Lord Mansfield said that once a point of commercial law was 
‘solemnly settled, no particular usage shall be admitted to weigh against it: this 
would send every thing to sea again’.  He is recorded as saying, in the same case 
but a different report of it
71
 ‘… I ought not to have admitted any evidence of the 
particular usage of merchants in such a case.  Of this, I say, I am now satisfied: 
for the law is already settled’. 
Lord Mansfield’s test for distinguishing between law and fact was:
72
 
If the reasonableness of the time &c depends on the particular 
circumstances of any case, this is a matter of fact, for the consideration of 
the jury; but if it depends on what may happen in a variety of like cases, it 
is a matter of law. 
Fifoot saw the programme in less dichotomous terms; and one over which 
Mansfield retained overall control:
73
 
The jury found a usage, the judge accepted or rejected it as furthering or 
impeding the convenience of trade.  The jury solved a particular problem, 
the judge rationalized the solution for future use.  The jury revealed a fresh 
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  Jolowicz (n 12) 207. 
69
  Lord Irvine, ‘The Law: An Engine for Trade’ (2001) 64 MLR 333 at 334-335. 
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   (1761) 1 W Black 295 at 298; 96 ER 166 at 167. 
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facet of human experience, the judge framed it in the general policy of the 
law.  By insisting upon these complementary functions, Lord Mansfield 
maintained an equilibrium between stability and expansion, and 
determined the axis about which the mercantile world could revolve. 
 Special juries were not the only way in which Lord Mansfield educated himself 
on commercial practice.  He also consulted with underwriters
74
 and other persons 
concerned with particular types of insurance contract.
75
 
Perhaps owing to his Scottish origins,
76
 or perhaps his understanding of 
Roman law, or even perhaps his mere clarity of purpose, Lord Mansfield has 
been attributed with re-establishing the connection between English law and the 
mercantile law of the continent.
77
  The Law Merchant, up until now the customs 
of merchants in various parts of the world, and spasmodically enforced by trade 
guilds, local courts in sea towns and by the Court of Admiralty, was, almost 
singlehandedly by Lord Mansfield’s efforts, recognised and enforced by 
common law courts and as rules in the modern, orthodox sense.  The real genius 
of Lord Mansfield, as Lieberman has observed, was his ability to mould 
individual cases into a system of commercial jurisprudence.
78
   
Deeper forces are implicit in Lord Mansfield’s programme.  It is part of the 
means by which the state came to have its near-hegemony over rule-making and 
the imposition of sanctions.  That power, in this case, was appropriated from the 
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Guilds and the merchants themselves, not unwillingly for the most part.  Lord 
Mansfield’s programme seems to have been a response in part to dissatisfaction 
with the state of commercial law.  Its management in his capable hands perhaps 
played a role in garnering the support of merchants for that undertaking.   
So too, no doubt, did his skilful employment of the jury in his programme.  
Juries in Mansfield’s day were not as passive as they are now.
79
  They were, 
nevertheless, a crucial mechanism to ensure that the customary quality of the 
relevant rule was preserved in its reception.   This was not a programme by 
which the Court itself found the custom, or adjusted common practice to suit 
what it perceived to be the demands of the day.  Employing a jury of skilled 
commercial people ensured that the usage which applied to the conduct under 
consideration was not only custom in the true sense, but that it would be received 
as such.  The choice of medium may have assured the outcome. 
At work in Lord Mansfield’s programme can be seen a critical juncture in 
legal terms.  Permitting the affairs of a class of people to be governed by their 
own practices and usages is one thing.  It is another for those practices to receive 
the imprimatur of law and thereby to be received into the more structured and 
conscious system of legal rules.  It is one way in which the line which divides 
unmade from made law is emphasised.  It demonstrates the apparent importance 
of there being a sanctioning not only before the unmade can pass as posited law, 
but also before being considered worthy of being enforced as such.  
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In the end, Lord Mansfield’s programme says as much about custom as it 
does about the legal system: a system which, in this case at least, can be seen as 
drawing its legitimacy from the communicative power of public opinion, here 
expressed as the usages of those who will be subject to the custom enshrined as 
law. 
These perspectives offer something by way of explanation of the gulf, real 
or contrived, between the conventions which govern human interaction on the 
one hand and legal norms on the other.  From a practical perspective, however, 
the metamorphosis of these practices into legal rules seems to have changed very 
little their substance.  Although remedies became available (they were absent in 
the mercantile courts), it was the effect which the rules would have as precedent 
in later cases (having been rationalised for future use) which seems to have 
constituted the major change. 
This programme, which a critical spectator might see in terms of a due 
diligence or sanitisation of practices, is one necessary only to maintain the 
magisterialism of made law and to emphasise its special place juxtaposed to 
custom.  Such cynicism is not entirely justified.  Lord Mansfield’s view seemed 
to be that commercial activity would benefit from its rules being brought within 
the Common Law fold.  Having the remedies which a state court offered, and 
overcoming jurisdictional complexities arising from the need to seek 




In effecting these improvements, Lord Mansfield recognised the supra-
national source of the customs, distinguishing in one case between ‘our 
Municipal laws’, ‘particular and local law’ and ‘general law’.
80
  And Foster J, in 
Edie and Laird v The East India Company
81
 was clear that the Law Merchant 
was general custom, not a special local custom. 
The programme over which Mansfield presided was one which conferred 
the necessary state sanction, but on norms which were, already, operating much 
as legal rules and which were ripe for reception as such.  In affording such 
deference to custom, Lord Mansfield recognised it as bringing benefits which 
purely ‘made’ law lacked.  But the programme he implemented, and especially 





The late Victorian era saw statutory enactments on various mercantile topics: the 
Bills of Exchange Act 1882; the Partnership Act 1890; the Sale of Goods Act 
1893; the Marine Insurance Act 1906, and the Companies Act 1862.  Sir 
Mackenzie Chalmers was the drafter of three of these.  He adopted a practical 
approach, the manifestation of which is the extent to which his statutes avoided 
protracted disputes about their terms.  Chalmers himself described the approach 
he had taken as uninventive:
83
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A practical and working code cannot spring from the head of the 
draftsman, as Pallas Athene is fabled to have sprung, fully equipped, from 
the head of her father, Zeus.  In legislation, as in other sciences, the a 
priori road is a dangerous one to tread.  When the principles of the law are 
well settled, and when the decided cases that accumulate are in the main 
mere illustrations of accepted general rules, then the law is ripe for 
codification ...  The province of a code, I venture to think, is to set out in 
concise language and logical form, those principles of the law which have 
already stood the test of time.  It co-ordinates and methodises, but does not 
invent, principles.   
 
This was codification, but of a common law kind.  It was not informed by any 
general or theoretical analysis of principle.  As Chalmers himself indicated, his 
role was not to invent, but to co-ordinate and methodise.  The approach taken by 
the English Courts was similarly restrained.  Only cautiously and gradually did 
they become receptive to codification.  Lord Herschell however (who had been 
involved in the drafting process along with Chalmers)
84
 was an early adherent.  
His observations in Bank of England v Vagliano Brothers
85
 were to some extent 
an admonition of contrary approaches (which must then not have been 
uncommon): 
The purpose of a statute [intended to embody in a code a particular field of 
the law] was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should 
be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as before, by 
roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the 
law was. 
Lord Herschell sought to set down canons for construction of a codifying Act:
86
 
I think the proper course is in the first instance to examine the language of 
the statute and to ask what is its natural meaning, uninfluenced by any 
considerations derived from the previous state of the law, and not to start 
with inquiring how the law previously stood, and then, assuming that it 
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was probably intended to leave it unaltered, to see if the words of the 
enactment will bear an interpretation in conformity with this view. 
The codifications were highly successful, by any measure.  The fact that they 
were adopted in more or less the same form in numerous other jurisdictions 
speaks for itself.  The success of the Codes accelerated the momentum of 
adoption.  Once adopted by some few other jurisdictions, there was a 
gravitational pull upon other jurisdictions who had not done so, if for no other 
reason than to enjoy one benefit which had led Lord Mansfield to act in the late 
18
th
 century: to achieve so far as possible, consistency for mercantile dealings 
between nations. 
Strangely, however, both its incorporation by this means into the Common 
Law and its later codification represented the loss to the Law Merchant of its 
supra-national character.  While the law retained its similarity to other 
jurisdictions, it also acquired more local peculiarities.  This manifests the Law 
Merchant’s metamorphosis from a truly international phenomenon to a 
nationalist system of law, albeit sharing common origins and some of its content 
with other national legal systems.  These rules, for so long distinctly un-
parochial, now derived, by virtue perhaps of their success, their force from 
national legislatures.
87
  The story of these rules, in more recent times, is to some 
extent one of the Law Merchant attempting to break free of these nationalist 
bounds, and restore itself, by various means, to a supra-national operation.  It is 
this centripetal feature which most prominently characterises mercantile law’s 
contemporary status. 
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Contemporary life  
In its most forthright form, the contemporary life of mercantile law is the basis 
upon which an autonomous international commercial law will evolve.
88
  Even in 
less forthright guises, the trend is still all one way. 
The Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
was concluded in 1980.
89
  Its effect was to reconcile to some extent the 
conflicting traditions of the Civil and Common Law.  More recent are the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, the aim of which 
is ‘progressive codification of the law of international trade’.
90
 
The TransLex principles comprise, at present, 128 principles and rules of 
the ‘new Law Merchant’.
91
  Its purpose is to allow the application of the rules 
and principles in practice, by offering the actual text online, well supported by 
comparative law references.  The Principles of European Contract Law were 
published in 1995 and prepared under the supervision of Professor Ole Lando.  
The so-called Lando Principles seek to contribute to the evolution of a new 
European ius commune and operate when parties agree that their bargain is to be 
governed by the lex mercatoria.   There are two main differences between the 
Lando and UNIDROIT principles:  the latter aims for global application whereas 
Lando is limited to member states of the European Union; and UNIDROIT seeks 
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to apply in business-to-business transactions.  Lando applies in business-to-
consumer transactions.  
The Draft Common Frame of Reference is an attempt to achieve a 
European private law by publishing a text which serves as a source of inspiration 
for law making and law teaching at all levels and which is offered (at least by 
those involved in the project)
92
 as a point of reference for European and national 
legislators and the European and national courts as to what is a commonly 
acceptable solution to a given problem,
93
 as a text which might be adopted 
voluntarily by contracting parties, and as a basis for teaching students of 
European universities.  
All these approaches, while perhaps craving for more, adopt an approach 
of ‘creeping codification’, an approach alive to the realpolitik, and also to the 
historical means by which the Law Merchant achieved its initial success: by 
adoption, in transactions between ‘ordinary’ participants, and not adoption by 
national legal systems. 
These more recent permutations of the Law Merchant are 
acknowledgements of its resilience and adaptability to changing legal structures.  
But they also show one most fundamental change:  from a body of rules devised 
spontaneously and unconsciously, and subsequently by trial and error, and 
proven utility by merchants and uniquely adapted to their purposes, to a body of 
rules which departs somewhat from that grass-roots source.  Both draft codes are 
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the product of international agencies, with little input from local legislatures and, 
perhaps more importantly, any merchant source.  But they do retain an organic 
quality because they were devised outside ordinary national legislative processes, 
which is a phenomenon observed by Berger:
94
 
Law-making no longer appears ‘in the splendid garment’ of the statute.  
Instead, it occurs ‘bottom up’ in a number of informal methods which 
create pragmatic, practice-made rules.  These rules are said to be 
economically more efficient than state legislation.  
What characterised the ‘old’ Law Merchant was its sensitivity to the 
practices and requirements of merchants, the formulation by them and their own 
trade associations of the rules, and, later, the careful formalising of those rules 
by, once again, drawing upon the practicality of merchants (as special juries) 
and, finally, the codification of those rules, but in an uninventive way, thereby 
preserving their practicality. 
So the modern life of the Law Merchant has now to some extent come full 
circle, as Schmitthoff observed (himself somewhat of a prophet and pioneer of 
modern international trade law)
95
, in the return to attempts to re-internationalise 
it and free it from the idiosyncrasies of national law.
96
  There can be no doubt, 
however, that the New Law Merchant has a centripetal quality, with its promise 
of more uniform regulation of trade and commerce, and, possibly, as a basis in 
the future for codification and possibly of contract
97
 and even private law.  One 
such view, promoted for example by those who developed the TransLex 
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principles, is that the New Law Merchant ought to be codified in a creeping 
manner, by offering an instrument to apply transnational commercial law in daily 
legal practice and also by ‘lead[ing] the New Law Merchant out of the 
codification dilemma in which it has been trapped over the past fifty years’ by, it 
seems, offering flexibility and openness.
98
 
IV Custom’s characteristics 
 
What are the features of custom which rendered it a valuable source of law in the 
ways mentioned above?  What is it about custom which impelled 18
th
 century 
courts to embrace it and for modern law to resile somewhat from it?  These 
questions call for closer attention to custom’s characteristics. 
Custom is practice  
Custom, by definition, accords with practice. The frequency of action which lies 
at its core means that there is no difference, as with other laws, between what is 
and what ought to be.  Custom has no pretence to call adherents to a code beyond 
that which practice dictates.  This is a product of its objects.  It seeks 
convenience, utility, and practicality and as such seduces adherents. 
There are debates about just whose practices constitute custom.   Is it the 
whole of the people acting in the particular field, or those of lawyers, or of some 
other group of insiders?  The debate is one which focuses more on custom as 
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received by the Common Law, than custom itself.  For example, Ibbetson has 
suggested that, in the context of the English Common Law:
99
 
At a very basic level, no doubt, the values espoused by the common law 
would have been generally recognised by people in England, but the 
detailed working out of the rules derived from these values would certainly 
not have had any such populist grounding.  This was all the work of 
lawyers, customary in the sense that the communis opinio doctorum might 
have been.   
The author has fallen into a positivist trap.  The lack of any representative quality 
in custom as received is a criticism of the Common Law, not custom as such.  It 
does not mean, for example, that the custom from which the rules were derived 
were those of an elite who, through self-interest, adopted practices which were 
ultimately received as law.  That is quite a different thing from saying, as must 
be the case, that the practices developed only amongst those whose concern it 
was to engage regularly in the relevant field of activity, for example, shipping 
and mercantile affairs: participant classes. 
In the case of the Law Merchant’s reception, this dilemma was avoided 
entirely.  It was a jury of the merchants who found the custom, thereby keeping 
the rules firmly founded in grass-roots sources. 
Custom as ‘higher law’ 
Custom has, to some, the status of a ‘higher law’; one in which no sovereign or 
legislature has played any part in devising and one which, for that reason, stands 
beyond the immediate control of ‘made’ law.  Its antiquity or immemoriality 
confers reverence, something which Bentham lamented: ‘[w]e inherited 
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[customary law] from our fathers, and, maugre all its inconveniences, are likely, 
I doubt, to transmit it to our children’.
100
 
Brian Tamanaha links the demise of custom with the erosion of the rule of 
law and its loss as part of the collapse of higher laws from which law itself drew 
autonomy.  It is topic that I take up in the next Chapter in the context more 
generally of the historical and philosophical developments that I there consider. 
Custom as common sense 
Custom is the product of what is often described as ‘common sense’: a species of 
practical reason.  The idea of there being some simple and collective intuition 
about what is right and practical finds diminishing acceptance in legal thinking.  
But the notion of such a sense is more than a vague homespun hypothesis.  A 
source of knowledge common to humankind has been recognised which 
produces truths not capable of proof by reason.
101
  The source is one which must 
have an intuitive quality and which is not derived from reason or other source of 




... that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not 
by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and 
irresistible impulse; derived neither from education nor from habit, but 
from nature; acting independently on our will, whenever its object is 
presented, according to an established law, and therefore properly called 
Sense; and acting in a similar manner upon all, or at least upon a great 
majority of mankind and therefore properly called Common Sense ... 
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At the heart of this view is the ability of man to perceive, without recourse to 
reason or religion explicitly, not only a way of conducting ourselves in a way 
which is well adapted to achieve tasks necessary for human existence (ie, 
practical), but also to act in a way which is morally acceptable.  If there be some 
innate ability to know what is good from bad, right from wrong, or workable 
from unworkable whether it be Aristotle’s phronesis, practical wisdom, the 
Enlightenment notion of moral sense,
103
 moral sentiments, the ‘the voice of God 
within us’,
104
 or Adam Smith’s theory of natural morality, custom must possess 
some of its benefits, being that which has been demonstrated to have offered a 
workable way of achieving a particular result.  Thomas Jefferson succinctly 
captured this idea when he said in the Preamble to the original draft of the 
Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom:
105
 
Well aware that the opinions and beliefs of men depend not upon their own 
will, but follow involuntarily the evidence proposed to their minds ... 
Custom, in this sense and many others, has strong similarities to language, itself 
a form of collective and spontaneous social order.  An illustration of common 
sense in operation is afforded by the transition undergone by the English 
language during the period in which it was displaced by Latin and French, after 
the Norman Invasion and up until, roughly speaking, the Peasants’ Revolt.  In 
this period, despite having no real life in state business or amongst the ruling 
class, the English language was simplified by, for example, the stripping away of 
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its genders, and by becoming better adapted to the needs of its users.  Trevelyan 
describes, almost poetically, that course of events:
106
 
One outcome of the Norman Conquest was the making of the English 
language.  As a result of Hastings, the Anglo-Saxon tongue, the speech of 
Alfred and Bede, was exiled from hall and bower, from court and cloister, 
and was despised as a peasants’ jargon, the talk of ignorant serfs.  It 
ceased almost, though not quite, to be a written language.  The learned 
and the pedantic lost all interest in its forms, for the clergy talked Latin 
and the gentry talked French.  Now when a language is seldom written and 
is not an object of interest to scholars, it quickly adapts itself in the mouths 
of plain people to the needs and uses of life.   This may be good or evil 
according to the circumstances.  If the grammar is clumsy and ungraceful, 
it can be altered much more easily when there are no grammarians to 
protest.  And so it fell out in England.  During the three centuries when our 
native language was a peasants’ dialect, it lost its clumsy inflections and 
elaborate genders, and acquired the grace, suppleness and adaptability 
which are among its chief merits.  ...  
 
Analogies have been drawn, by Fuller among others,
107
 between customary law 
as a ‘language of interaction’ and language itself.  Both are constantly shaped by 
standards that do not enter into our thought,
108
 both are a process of meaningful 
interaction in which the participants must move within some generally 
predictable pattern
109
 and we become aware of both only when the rules are 
broken, in which case that breach leads us to articulate the rules upon which we 
had previously proceeded without knowing it.
110
 
If there be such a thing as common sense, it is something which would be 
perhaps within the capability of a judge to utilise, but rarely within the 
legislator’s.  Such a sense could only be based upon standards shaped by 
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ordinary interaction and common experience.  So, the more removed the 
decision-maker from these forces and the more process-oriented and structured 
that function, the more detached those decision makers become from these 
organic sentiments.  Moreover, the legislator loses any collective quality in his or 
her actions because theirs is a more artificial activity than one by which decisions 
are made in cases impelled by the necessity of determining a dispute.  For these 
reasons, that there exists a legislators’ common sense has never been suggested, 
persuasively or otherwise. 
Custom as democratic: an expression of public will 
This organic sense of custom, spontaneous and not constructed or reasoned, is 
another of its characteristics.  It confers a democratic quality.
111
  It is certainly no 
less democratic than legislation: both are expressions of ‘the will of the group’.
112
  
In the case of custom, the group is the participant class, and the totality of the 
people who are bound by the usages.  In the case of legislation, in theory at least, 
statutes are the expression of the will of the majority of all the people of a 
democracy.  In practice, as I have shown in Chapter 3 in particular, the extent to 
which drafting legislation remains an activity of the legislature as distinct from 
the bureaucracy may be questioned, just as its enactment might be considered no 
less a product of party politics than the expression of the democratically 
articulated will of the electors. 
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Less resistance to change 
Custom may suffer less from statute’s and the Common Law’s in-built resistance 
to change.  Both forms of made law need to have mobilised the necessary forces 
to initiate reform.  Those forces need to overcome the Common Law’s 
essentially incremental attitude to development and change.   Precedent, as 
Salmond said, ‘cannot retrace a course once taken’.
113
 
Legislation has very formal barriers to change, and what amounts to an 
effective presumption against it, because statutes do not, officially at least, cease 
to operate through disuse.  Where custom is concerned, rules which are 
inefficient or no longer suitable for those affected by them are abandoned.  
Moreover, legislators are notoriously resistant to amendments and repeals.  
The Law Merchant is an example of a system refining itself into rules well 
suited to the peculiar interests of its masters.  A number of legal innovations 
were adopted, according to Benson, ‘because they promoted speed and 
informality in commerce and reduced transactions cost’.
114
  This state of affairs 
stands in contrast with the Common Law, in which developments are made 
incrementally, with attention to the way in which the change affects each specific 
case. 
Legislation, especially in its most formal state as a Code, has a tendency to 
ossify the law and make it resistant to adaptation and changing circumstances. 
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Custom which is at its core consensual, secures automatically, to borrow 
Austin’s famous phrase, habitual obedience.  But obedience is by the participant 
class.  These individuals have what might be described as ‘ownership’ of the 
practical effect of the custom, and therefore the rule itself.  Obedience becomes 
an expectation of members of that class, a feature observed by Hayek:
115
  
The significance of customs here is that they give rise to expectations 
that guide people’s actions, and what will be regarded as binding will 
therefore be those practices that everybody counts on being observed 
and which thereby condition the success of most activities. 
 
Customs, consequently, take hold as such, beyond mere habit, and owing to the 
expectations to which they give rise.  A habit of obedience is more than habitual 
conduct.  It also connotes the expectation held by others that the person, in the 
relevant circumstance, will conduct himself or herself in a particular way.  In 
short, custom more strongly assures compliance.  It is less likely than positive 
law, for that reason, to require adjudication and enforcement. 
The consensual nature of the mode of enforcement of custom immediately 
provokes concern whether, without state force, the alternative means of 
resolution is effective.  Benson has explained a phenomenon long known to exist 
in other fields of commercial endeavour, and especially stock exchanges: the 
power of isolation or ostracism in a participant class.  He uses, as an example, 
the lack of any real enforcement mechanism held by the mercantile courts:
116
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These courts’ decisions were accepted by winners and losers alike because 
they were backed by the threat of ostracism by the merchant community at 
large - a very effective boycott sanction.  A merchant who broke an 
agreement or refused to accept a court ruling would not be a merchant for 
long because his fellow merchants ultimately controlled his goods. The 
threat of a boycott of all future trade “proved, if anything, more effective 
than physical coercion”. 
 
 
But the effectiveness of such a system has its limits.  While it might well produce 
the desired effect for a relatively small group of merchants accustomed to 
dealing with one another to ostracise the errant member, or for a group to which 
it is necessary to obtain membership before undertaking the particular activity 
(such as a stock exchange), it seems that ostracism or exclusion would not have 
the necessary effect where there are other options for undertaking the same 
activity or where the relevant group is so wide and disparate that a boycott 
imposed by some would nevertheless leave a viable field in which the individual 
could continue to operate.  The lack of any formal enforcement of decisions of 
the mercantile courts seems not to have affected the Law Merchant’s efficacy, 
but perhaps because it operated in one of those areas where the threat of boycott 
was one which was likely to have real force.  After all, there are few other social 
dealings which possess commerce’s near perfect reciprocity, the strong self-
interest of its participants to remain regarded as worthy trading partners by 
reason of their propensity to adhere to common expectations, and such a 
frequency of like dealings. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
25 and ‘Enforcement of Private Property Rights in Primitive Societies: Law Without 




Questions remain about the extent to which a social order can arise 
spontaneously and remain just without the intervention of positive law and about 
the extent to which evolution of the law in this spontaneous way is capable of 
achieving ‘justice’.  Such concerns seek to understand the extent to which the 
notion of justice itself is evolutionary and is to be found within the social 
practices of man.  It is perhaps no surprise then that custom has found itself at the 
centre of the major debates between positivist and natural law theorists, a debate 
which seems to have at its core a difference in views about how law ought to be 
defined, but beneath which may not be much more than beliefs about whether 
there exists beyond humankind a source of wisdom with which we might have 
been imbued or which we might have some capacity to acquire and utilise.  At 
least one natural law theorist has been alive to this underlying tension:
117
 
… many of the disputes of legal philosophy hinge upon an undeclared 
preference between made law and implicit law. 
That preference may also be based not only upon the circumstances in 
which custom might operate as a just and effective source of norms, but also 
upon a view of the capacity of social practices spontaneously to produce norms 
which accord with notions of justice.  It strikes deep into legal positivism:
118
 
custom exists as a source of norms, but is not positive law; it is spontaneous not 
conscious, and this product of human effort has a teleology of its own, but it has 
become unfashionable to speak of it.  Custom is often discussed not in terms of 
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the rules it offers, but in terms of whether it ought to be regarded as law at all.
119
  




The prevailing tendency to regard social order as imposed from above has 
led to a general neglect of the phenomenon of customary law in modern 
legal scholarship. 
 
V Consequences of the neglect of custom 
 
The waning of a belief in custom as law has led to a lack of 
understanding of principles which assist in discerning the proper boundaries of 
legislation.  The result is a lack of what might be described, in 18
th
 century terms, 
as any science of, in particular, legislation.  In modern terms it manifests itself in 
a lack of willingness, because of positive law’s perceived pre-eminence, to 
investigate either what might constitute natural constraints upon it or the 
character which positive law ought to assume in order to be regarded, if not as 
‘law’, ‘good law’.  The neglect of custom and how the study of it might better 
inform the bounds of made law is part the lack of jurisprudence applicable to 
legislation (legisprudence) that I discuss in the next Chapter. 
There is a link between the neglect of custom and what it reveals about 
the conditions for social order, human behaviour, interaction with deficiencies in 
made law and, more deeply, about beliefs and preferences we might have about 
                                                             
119
  Wilson (ed) (n 108) 212.  
120
  Wilson (ed) (n 108) 177. 
230 
 
the immanence of the underlying order.  Some of these consequences are better 
recognised than others. 
Lon Fuller in his essay, Human Interaction and the Law, suggested the 
impossibility of understanding made law without first obtaining an 
understanding of customary law.  That essay first noted, as I have done here, the 
neglect of customary law.  That neglect Fuller saw as having done great damage 
to our thinking about law generally
121
 and to have been caused by a prevailing 
tendency to regard all social order as imposed from above, perhaps informed by 
a ‘linguistic tendency’ to regard law as standards which have received the 
imprimatur of the state.
122
  If this is indeed a linguistic tendency, then the 
tendency is exposed as founded upon a belief that social order is the preserve of 
the authors of made law, and not of spontaneous and collective self-ordering.  It 
also exposes positivism to have been less than candid; in seeking to redefine 
what is meant by law, rather than seek to articulate reasons why we ought to 
limit the notion of law in the way that positivists would. 
The basis for Fuller’s concern about the neglect is the loss of a 
fundamental understanding of law’s nature: what ought to be its forms of 
expression, what ambitions ought it set for itself, what guiding principles must it 
recognise to be successful and, perhaps most critically, are its proper objects the 
achievement of ends external to law, or are there internal principles which ought 
to guide its course?  Many of these themes feature prominently in contemporary 
                                                             
121
  Wilson (ed) (n 108) 213. 
122
  Wilson (ed) (n 108) 177. 
231 
 
discourse about law, but many have life as standalone complaints which are 
never sought to be traced to more fundamental solutions or endemic problems. 
Fuller points to numerous features of customary law which are informative.  
Custom teaches us that repetitive dealings tend to create standardised 
expectations;
123
 custom reveals a strong consensual element;
124
 custom organises 
and facilitates interaction; and society, through custom, silently directs people in 
the way it tells them is just and proper.
125
   
I would, however, go further than these examples.  Custom has much to 
explain about the basis for habits of obedience, about the discipline which 
inheres in rules being fashioned by those very same people who are to be bound 
by them and about its lack of ambition in calling society to act in accordance 
with some external standard. 
The contrasts between made law and custom will be obvious to the reader, 
even if there is not full agreement with my premise.  The ambition to which 
made law aspires is state-sanction.  Its authors are specialists in that field.  They 
prescribe laws for others.  There is none of the natural discipline that we see in 
custom, evident in made law, of keeping rules within the boundaries of what 
people will tolerate and in a way which will ensure continued meaningful 
interaction between citizens and yet which leaves room to move in the way in 
which that interaction might recommend. 
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Customary rules arise only between those who are to be bound by them.  
Several powerful results follow.  The first is economy.  There is no stronger 
impulse to keep rules clear and limited to those matters requiring treatment.  The 
force is, of course, not only not conscious, but it follows inevitably from the way 
in which custom works.  Only widespread, ubiquitous practices create the 
relevant expectations, so only interactions which actually work in a practical 
sense come to comprise rules. 
The mode of bringing made law into existence separates the function of 
making it from those it is to bind.  The only link is through elected 
representatives.  But that link is, as I suggested in Chapter 3, not necessarily a 
direct one. 
This comparison illustrates two somewhat extreme positions: one (custom) 
whose desire is that there be rules which govern existing practices all of which, 
by definition, have some pragmatic end; and the other (legislation) whose 
motivation is more ambitious.  Elected assemblies are intended to mediate that 
extreme.  This occurs both by the discipline of representatives being required to 
seek, at regular intervals, the endorsement of their constituents, and also by them 
controlling the legislation which passes into law.  In modern times, it assumes 
that the legislature will assert itself towards the bureaucracy.  There is no other 
real external discipline on the Executive: no other means of keeping the 
bureaucracy within the strictures of economy and discipline in its formulation of 





 then at the point there ceases to be a real and meaningful 
link between legislation and democracy, then the way we regard legislation 
ought be revised. 
More importantly, made law assumes that existing standardized 
interactions can be substituted for an endless set of alternatives, and indeed, set 
and re-set, with no real limitation on the ways in which people will adapt or the 
number of times they might be willing or able to do so.   
There is one other important feature of custom relevant to the present 
discussion which distinguishes it from legislation.  It too is a feature of law 
which has slipped into obscurity with the neglect of custom.  Reciprocity is one 
of the influences which produces the force of habit.  The reason is the way in 
which it appeals to that sense within us that if dealings are repetitive and 
reciprocal, then the rule upon which we engage with others is one we know will 
recur, this time perhaps with us filling the role held by our counterparty in the 
last such dealing. 
Reciprocity appeals to deep forces, and thus has a way of bringing home to 
people the practical rationale of conventions and their self-interest in maintaining 
them.  After all, that person can readily place themselves in the role of the other 
party and have what Adam Smith might have described as sympathy for their 
counterparty if they too can conceive of themselves as being likely to occupy that 
position in future dealings.  Reciprocity is likely to be stronger between members 
of a participant class, among whom repetition of similar dealings will be most 
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likely and who are more likely than otherwise unconnected parties to share 
common beliefs and worldviews and to feel more intensely the bonds to which 
reciprocity gives rise. 
The (incomplete) science of legislation  
In the late 18
th
 century, a critical juncture was reached.  Before this time, 
legislation had not enjoyed the attention of sustained systematic and impartial 
thought.  The 18
th
 century was characterised by Sir William Holdsworth (and 
endorsed more recently by Lieberman) as a period in which there were few 
‘legislative interferences’, giving the courts freedom to ‘…consolidate and settle 
the principles of the modern law’ and as a period which saw the legislative 
process as stagnant and lacking comprehensiveness.
127
  
Adam Smith considered the science of natural jurisprudence to be the most 
important, but also the least cultivated of all.   From his natural jurisprudence he 
devised, albeit incompletely, a science of legislation.  His science was more than 
an unthinking pre-commitment to the state not intruding into commercial and 
personal affairs.  Smith’s considered view was that legislation had a limited 
province, a product in part of rule-formulation in that context being removed, 
unlike the Common Law, from specific cases,
128
 coupled with a firm conviction 
that concrete cases as opposed to abstract thinking was a preferable way in which 
to formulate rules;
129
 the abuse which he had witnessed of legislative power in 
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the form of exclusive privileges, the success and competence with which the 
English common law was being administered (and reformed)
130
 in the 18
th
 
century, especially under the guidance of Lord Mansfield, and the structural 
resistance of the Common Law to pleading by a self-interested groups.  
Many of these themes involve testing legislation as a law-making method 
against the availability of the alternative common law, with its incrementalism, 
its divided power (among numerous judges), its application, precedent aside, to 
only the specific case, the availability of appeal and the greater commitment of 
Common Law to reason.  Legislation, in contrast, is capable of conferring at 
once, privileges unobtainable elsewhere and it has the capacity to act with blunt 
force. 
Bentham’s absolutism was one which fervently desired law reform, guided 
by his utilitarian principles, albeit as I pointed out in Chapter 1, that ‘practically 
the most vital part’ of his legislative doctrine was laissez-faire.
131
  His was an 
approach which did not seek to attempt to come to grips with what, if anything, 
custom added to an understanding of law and its definition:
132
 
... the laws in question may subsist either in the form of statute, or in that 
of customary law. 
As to the difference between these two branches ... it cannot properly be 
made appear till some progress has been made in the definition of a law. 
Bentham’s utilitarian absolutism subsequently came under pressure, first from 
evangelical philanthropy and collectivist currents in the 19
th
 century and later, on 
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the basis of its incompleteness as a guide to law-making for its lack, in particular, 
of any discourse of rights.
133
  The force which gave legislation a real boost was 
the sociological school, which demanded of law no more than it be a means to an 
end: an instrumental view of law against which Brian Tamanaha has recently 
spoken. 
The theoretical debate therefore has gone further than recording the 
differences about made law’s directed and ambitious character and case law’s 
reactiveness in ‘working itself pure’.  It cannot seriously be doubted that some 
form of ambition in made law is desirable and that legislation has about it a 
dignity which justifies its considerable intervention.  The science of legislation, if 
there be one, however, must include a set of principles which govern the 
circumstances in which it is desirable to employ made law, or, in reverse, the 
occasions when there ought to be legislative restraint.  At present, there is little 
by way of legisprudence in this important field. 
There are a number of features of made law (which I have, to varying 
degrees, touched upon above and in earlier Chapters) which evidence a lack of 
understanding of custom: 
1) legislation’s low regard for existing practices and usages; 
2) legislation’s loss of autonomous objects; 
3) the increasing domination of legislative drafting by the Executive 
and the Executive having its own legislative agenda. 
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Low regard for existing practices and usages 
No force compels made law to be sensitive to existing practices beyond the link 
which exists between it and the democratic process.  In its regulation of human 
activity, legislation adopts a top-down approach, strengthened by Executive 
arrangements and intervention, and expanded remedies and modes of 
enforcement. 
Unlike custom, made law has no necessary connection with existing 
practices and usages.  The manner in which legislation is created provides only 
the weakest of links between the daily affairs of people and the rules which it 
prescribes.  That link, in democracies, is elected representatives.  The notion of 
them as interested and active legislators ought not to be unthinkingly assumed, 
principally owing to the specialisation of that field, and, more importantly, the 
volume of legislation.  We have, as I suggested in Chapter 3, reached a stage 
where elected representatives themselves have ceased considering in any real 
detail, let alone reading, the bulk of legislation.  So, although Waldron asserts 
that legislation derives a dignity from its democratic quality,
134
 there are real 
questions as to the extent to which the processes of initiating, drafting and 
passing legislation remain in actual fact ones in which elected representatives 
involve themselves meaningfully. 
Loss of autonomous objects 
With the diminution of this, the main mechanism by which electors bring to bear 
their will on the content of legislation, the nature of made law in that form has 
become the preserve of those with a less direct connection to everyday practices: 
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the Executive.  As the understanding is lost, because of a disregard for custom, of 
the principles of social order, so too is any need to have regard to existing 
practices and usages.  And by this means, law is employed to achieve ends which 
are not ones directed by public will and which tend to stray beyond those fields 
which history might define as the proper province of made law. 
Executive domination 
There are several features of made law, and particularly its modern form, which 
render it susceptible to Executive domination.  I set out in Chapter 3 the ways in 
which this occurs and some of the forces at play.  Made law regards as all-
important, the state’s sanction of it.  That is the point at which, in modern times, 
we have come to accept that rules either succeed as law or pass into the abyss.  
That terminus, as the focus of made law’s ambitions, diverts its attention away 
from that to which custom aspires: utility and practicality.  But it is well-
intentioned: only those laws which have the sanction of the state have the 
sanction of democracy.  I have been careful here to use the word ‘state’ rather 
elected assembly because I have already suggested in Chapter 3 that sanction by 
elected assemblies has become, over time, less real, the result of which is that 
those who advise upon, draft and implement legislation have become the de facto 
sanctioners of it. 
Moreover, law of any kind which attempts too much by either ignoring 
existing practice or seeking to effect significant reforms runs into difficulty 
commanding compliance.  The problem emerges from the bare fact that 
behaviour or interaction which is not aligned with the way in which people 
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behave in the environment into which the law is to reach, lacks not only a habit 
of obedience, but, often, a readily apparent rationale. 
The problem of legislative failure, is not, as some have suggested,
135
 one 
caused by restraints placed upon legislatures.  The problem is lack of restraint.  
Legislation rarely asks itself what it might, in reality, achieve.  That there is a 
loss of restraint is shown by legislation now emanating not from those elected 
officials who complain about its volume and complexity, but from the Executive.  
The Executive, unlike Parliament, is far less directly mindful of the need for 
economy and of seeking to achieve only what it realistically can.  The absence, 
in particular, of the discipline of having to answer regularly and directly to 
electors is critical. 
The problem perpetuates itself.  The more legislation acts without regard to 
these principles, the more it needs to compel compliance in ways beyond merely 
issuing commands.  It is not enough to expand remedies and the means by which 
rules may be enforced.  As the ambition of legislation ascends, the interest of 
people in enforcing it to vindicate their rights diminishes, partly because the rules 
which have been legislated are beyond the self-interest of people to enforce.  
This is part of the trend towards public law expanding to subsume areas 
traditionally filled by private law.  And so there has emerged the regulatory 
bureaucracy, a branch of the Executive whose task it is to see implemented the 
legislation which the Executive itself has sponsored through over-burdened 
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elected assemblies.  Having sponsored the legislative regime, it becomes the 
desire of the bureaucracy not only to see the regime enforced, but to see it 
expanded. 
Large and expanding bureaucracies are therefore inevitable once legislators 
cease to insist upon maintenance of those principles, informed by a study of 
custom and of history, which characterise law.  
 
VI Concluding remarks 
 
Customary law, like legislation, is a way in which the will of the multitude finds 
expression.  It takes expression, however, far more directly than does legislation, 
which necessitates the overlay of a popular assembly and the processes and 
formalities which accompany its activities.  Two families of argument follow 
these different means.  Waldron’s argument favours the deliberating multitude, 
who, through their representative nature are more likely to reach the right result.  
The other family of argument can be found in the work of the communitarian 
scholars such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre who would favour the 
more organic and community-based means through which norms are created and 
given expression.  Hayek too would favour this approach.  It is not deliberately 
intellectualised and does not involve the participants trying to get it right.  Yet by 
each pursuing his or her own self-interest, in this enlightened way, there emerges 
a wisdom of sorts. 
There is in custom, however, weaknesses that affect its capacity to survive 
as a basis for law.  For one thing, it collapses when pushed.  It has nothing to 
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protect itself from the outside.  The Common Law, although having a respect for 
it, adjusts it (albeit sensitively).  But it has been powerless to resist the inroads 
that legislation has made.   In part this may be because deliberative actions, 
whether it be judging or legislating, have come to be regarded as righty 
displacing time-out-of-mind habit.  Another reason might be that custom has a 
tendency to be communitarian: alienating the community to which it applies 
from the rest of the world, by becoming fragmented and local.  On the other 
hand, communitarian scholars (Taylor and MacIntyre especially) see custom as 
offering the anchor without which we are lost.  On this approach, the religion, 
traditions and practices of rationality of some smaller community are the external 
reference point necessary to ground moral judgments.  Martin Krygier, in a 
similar vein, has suggested that the traditionality of law is inescapable, and 
argued that it is necessary to supplement the ‘time free’ conceptual staples of 
modern jurisprudence with an understanding of the nature and behaviour of 
traditions in social life.
136
 
The wisdom of the multitude is capable of being formed in different ways.  
The preference for one over the other involves, as well as other things, a 
philosophical choice about the extent to which the process of its formation 
requires or benefits from the injection of some deliberate thought.  There are 
good arguments why a case-by-case analysis is superior in the aggregate to non-
concrete ‘thought experiments’, and why it avoids many of the motivations 
which prompt legislation into existence, some of which, as I said in Chapter 3, 
are undesirable. 
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The Common Law approach is somewhat of an escape route between these 
two approaches.  It sits relatively comfortably between the deliberateness of a 
popular assembly and the customary rules and practices of the people.  It 
involves both the deliberate intellectualisation of the question what ought to be 
the rule (through argument in Court and the Judge’s reasoning), and yet it is 
rooted in the concrete case.  Whether, in the end, our minds, collective or 
individual, can reach as far as Waldron would believe (and Hayek would deny) is 
a question of underlying philosophy.  Underpinning it must also be a belief 
(perhaps implicit) in the end, about the immanency of the order within which we 
operate.  I return to this theme in the next Chapter.  For now, however, it is 
sufficient to note that the current disposition permitting legislative hyperactivity 
involves favouring pervasive and frequent intervention in the order.  Uncovering 




Causes of Proliferation and Reliance 
 
 
I  Introduction 
In this Chapter, I explore causes of legislation’s proliferation and our marked 
modern tendency to place such reliance upon it.  It is impossible to be exhaustive 
in doing so.  The forces that have brought us to the point and which have led us 
actively to favour, or at least to acquiesce in, a system in which legislation 
predominates, are numerous.  And not all are susceptible to revelation, either in 
terms of their existence or their true degree of influence in forging our attitude to 
legislation. 
The purpose of the exercise is to delve beneath the family of argument for 
which Waldron stands to see what intellectual and philosophical forces might 
bear upon the marked modern reliance upon legislation in preference to other 
sources of law and norms.  The deeper causes of our approach are, I suggest, 
ones which Waldron’s argument does not meet.  The failure of that strand of 
argument to address them leaves us with a loss, because when popular 
assemblies legislate as energetically as they do, their basis for acting has never 
confronted the major counterforces that call for a more disciplined approach.   
What I set out below are not the only causes of our present approach to 
legislatures and legislation.  I have already mentioned some of the more 
straightforward of them:  a bureaucracy that has the self-interest to engage in 
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mission-creep and empire-building and to keep the elected representatives busy 
and distracted by an overwhelming volume of potential legislation; the resulting 
burgeoning of the bureaucracy that more, and more intrusive, legislation 
necessitates; a greatly expanded electoral franchise, conferring on popular 
assemblies far greater legitimacy than previously; and a weakening of 
legislation’s foils, especially the Common Law and customary law.  The factors 
upon which I focus here are abstract in nature, and many of them are properly 
characterised as being an exercise in the nature of the history or descent of ideas. 
An important part of my argument is that whatever the causes may have 
been, they seem to have deprived us of the means to conceive of a system that is 
alternative to one in which a strong state near-monopolises rule-making power 
and does so frenetically.  Because of that, and because diagnosis is a necessary 
part of the cure,
1
 I wish to delve a little also into the historical and intellectual 
forces that seem in recent and current times to impel us to regard the state’s 
legislative capacity in the largely unquestioning way we do.  
The course I take below is first to identify the marked lack of legal 
philosophy directed specifically to legislation.  It is one means by which to 
understand that the regime of legislative dominance is one to which we have 
been habituated, rather than it being one at which we have arrived in any recent 
sense by conscious thought and reflection.  I then consider several aspects that 
come within what might broadly be described as the history of ideas.  I conclude 
by turning to other, related, analyses of the causes of the overreliance we place 
                                                             
1
    I do not, as Guido Calabresi does, think that ‘The reasons for statutorification are too 




upon legislation and its proliferation including the failure, in some respects, of 
judge-made law, and the loss, through many of the events and circumstances I 
have already described, and continue to do so here, of ‘higher laws’ as forces 
restraining legislation. 
In proceeding, three primary factors emerge, which I summarise now, so 
that they might be borne in mind as I traverse the various routes to their 
identification: 
1) legislation, being the product of a democratic (as distinct from 
monarchical) process, is regarded, automatically and unthinkingly, as 
satisfying all criteria of authority and legitimacy (something, I 
venture, is a product of the Waldron family of argument) when the 
fact of its having been brought into existence in accordance with 
accepted democratic processes gives no necessary assurance of the 
matters that have, by this means, been assumed away;  
 
2) the period of legislation’s rise has seen a loss of what Charles Taylor 
describes as meaning from society.  It has resulted in the almost 
complete extirpation of almost every vestige of every force and 
aspiration outside humankind.  It has meant both greater reliance 
upon legislation as the principal source of social ordering and 
control, and, indeed, given rise to a greater need for such ordering, as 
other kinds have receded or been dismantled.  It brings with it a 
belief that the order is not immanent and ought therefore yield to 




3) our current attitude is one of considerable confidence in sources of 
knowledge that are constructed, ie the product of humans’ own 
conscious and systematic effort, and therefore of legislation as a 
source of law in preference to other possible sources.  
 
II  Theorising legislation: the need for legisprudence 
Theories of legislation since the 18
th
 century are few.  In Chapter 1, we left the 
Enlightenment with different, but by no means unsophisticated, theories of what 
legislation might justifiably seek to achieve and some touchstones for its 
deployment. 
The next century saw legislation used, as we have seen, for what Dicey 
criticised as collectivist purposes, but which might also be understood as a 
transition from laissez-faire to a greater willingness to intervene to protect those 
less able to protect their own interests: a more protective state.  
The 20
th
 century saw the emergence of the regulatory state.  The two world 
wars saw the state accrue and exercise emergency powers, which seems to have 
shown the possibility of an even greater role for the legislator.   
There can be seen in these generalisations about legislation over the past 
three or so centuries very different approaches, whether consciously articulated 
or not.  We might theorise about legislation by having regard to how the 
legislator behaves in practice, the manner in which it legislates, and the subject 
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matter with which it is willing to interfere, and to what extent.  We can also turn 
to conscious theorising about the proper province of legislation, justifications for 
it and considerations of the source and nature of its legitimacy by reference to 
considerations external to the legislator. 
Exercises of these kinds inform what might be done to redress legislation 
having progressed beyond its limits, not just by helping to define what those 
limits are, but by exposing and understanding the intellectual forces – many sub-
lunar
2
 – that have contributed to legislation having been allowed, perhaps 
encouraged, to take the course it has and rise to the position of dominance it has 
assumed. 
An interesting feature of these developments is that, although we may have 
been heavily influenced by such forces, few theories of legislation have emerged.  
And so, in a period in which there has been the most profound growth in 
legislation, we find a real dearth of theories directed specifically to it, and only a 
very few which have articulated a case contrary to the prevailing trend of more – 
and more intrusive – legislation (Smith, Kames, Hayek, Fuller, Calabresi, and 
perhaps Dicey, being among the few to have done so). 
The point becomes even more stark if we contrast the number of theories 
of adjudication and judicial activity over the same period.  The 20
th
 century saw 
much attention given to this topic.  Very many theorists studied and explained 
the work of judges and defined, in their different ways, the merits and manner of 
proper exercise of those activities.   
                                                             
2
  A term used by D R Kelley, see The Descent of Ideas: The History of Intellectual History 
(2002) 1 and 314. 
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There is a marked contrast when it comes to legislation.  I explain below 
why and to what extent this is so.  Doing so may help understand one 
subconscious attitude to legislation: a desire not to dignify it by subjecting it to 
theoretical analysis, or considering it unworthy of such treatment, as the ultimate 
pragmatic act of commands which are, at best, the product of majority opinion.  
It emphasises also that the reliance that we place upon legislation is something 
that has not come about consciously, raising questions about the extent to which 
our attitude is, when subjected to considered reflection, justified. 
Luc Wintgens in particular has exposed to scrutiny dominant contemporary 
thinking about legislation.
3
  Current legal theory, he says, is premised upon the 
judge having a central role, something which has left the legislator largely 
ignored.
4
  The tendency has been to treat legislation, up to its enactment, as a 
political process, and one in which legal theory and law ought not interest 
themselves in any systematic way. 
We do seem reticent about the deliberate intellectualization of politics
5
 
and, it follows, to theorise to any great degree about legislation at that stage of its 
development. 
The relative theoretical inattention afforded to legislation is a sign of our 
having reduced the legislative process – in our imagination at least – to a matter 
                                                             
3
  L J Wintgens ‘The Rational Legislator Revisited: Bounded Rationality and 
Jurisprudence’, in L J Wintgens & A D Oliver-Lalana (eds), The Rationality and 
Justification of Legislation: Essays in Legisprudence (2013) 1; L J Wintgens, 
Legisprudence: Practical Reason in Legislation (2012); L J Wintgens, ‘Legitimacy and 
Legitimation from the Legisprudential Perspective’ in L J Wintgens (ed) Legislation in 
Context: Essays in Legisprudence (2007).  
4
  Wintgens (2012) (n 3) 1 (Introduction). 
5
  Jeremy Waldron, for example, suggests that we are ‘nervous’ about deliberate 
intellectualisation in politics: J Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (1999) 17. 
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of politics and mere satisfaction of Parliamentary processes.  On this view, there 
remains nothing to theorise about.  It matters not how legislation comes about.  
All that matters is whether the few procedural requirements for its validity have 
been met, and it is pointless to speak of how things might be done differently. 
This becomes even clearer when it is understood through the lens of what 
Wintgens has described as the ‘familiar view’ of legislation.  It shows just how 
restricted our outlook has become.  By ‘familiar view’, Wintgens seeks to evoke 
the prevailing modern attitude to legislation, but also to show it to be deeply – 
but unthinkingly – held.
6
  This is an important point to which I will return later, 
but I introduce it here as an illustration of just how profound is our incapacity or 
unwillingness critically to assess legislation and the legislative process.  
The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, as it came to be accepted in the 
late 19
th
 century and into the 20
th
 century, treats Courts as wholly subordinate to 
the legislature and cements the notion that legally valid norms are 
unquestionably legitimate.  That doctrine is associated with the Courts’ inability 
to declare certain laws beyond the power of Parliament to pass.  We have already 
seen how, once the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy was articulated in its 
relatively absolute terms, the doctrinal law would refuse to invalidate even 
statutes procured by fraud, so uncompromising is the doctrine. 
Owing to this separation of legislation’s political and legal lives, we treat 
as inseparable, questions of legality and legitimacy.  Laws are passed, and they 
are either valid or invalid, and those that are valid must be obeyed.  There is no 
                                                             
6
  Wintgens (2013) (n 3). 
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room in this approach for questions whether the statutory commands are 
efficacious, reasonably required, coherent with the body of existing norms, or 
otherwise undesirable.   
The result, both of the theoretical focus on adjudication (to the exclusion of 
legislation) and on upon the legality of legislation (to the exclusion of 
considerations of its legitimacy) has been to neglect legislation as a field of study 
and, consequently, for it to have been, ‘under-theorised’.
7
  
Perhaps lawyers have come to see legal science as describing, 
systematizing and explaining the law as it is,
8
 rather than as offering a basis to 
see what the law could or should be.  Perhaps it is part of an attempt by the 
lawyer to remain objective and therefore scientific and systematic.  Perhaps too, 
it follows from the imperative of the practitioner-lawyer having to remain 
focused upon realities and to give advice and argue cases in a manner that Judges 
are likely to accept based upon their understanding of doctrinal law.  It may also 
be part of the greater focus by universities in recent times on training lawyers for 
primarily vocational objects and neglecting, in doing so, historical and 
philosophical aspects of law and its development.
9
 
Wintgens’s familiar view exists against the background that legality is 
thought to derive from conformity with higher norms.
10
  If there be conformity, 
                                                             
7
  Wintgens (2012) (n 3) 1 (Introduction).  See also Waldron (n 5) 8 and his reference there 
to Unger’s assertion that legislation has been marginalized and also 21, 27-29. 
8
  Wintgens (2013) (n 3) 1. 
9
  The decline in the tertiary study of legal history in Australia has been shown by W Prest, 
‘New Frontiers of Legal History’ in J T Gleeson & R C Higgins (eds), Constituting Law: 
Legal Argument and Social Values (2011) 82-85.  Brian Tamanaha has identified 
problems with legal education in the US Law Schools:  B Z Tamanaha, Failing Law 
Schools (2012). 
10
  Wintgens (2013) (n 3) 2. 
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then it follows there must be legitimacy, in that the norms in question have been 
legitimated by compliance with the processes the system has imposed.  The 
trouble, as Wintgens identifies, is that there is a self-serving circularity to this, 
and it assumes away so many important matters.
11
  One of them is that legislation 
has no limit – or limitations – and that the inquiry about its merits ought begin 
and end with an assessment of its legality.  The premise is that legislation has 
been passed with the political process having taken care of all the considerations 
informing an assessment of legitimacy.  Another premise is the assumption 
(rather than even the mere presumption) that the legislator is rational.
12
  Yet 
another is whether and to what extent particular enactments give expression to 




If there is to be an inquiry beyond legality, what might a legisprudential 
approach look like, and how might an elucidation of it cause us to reconsider the 
familiar view of legislation and open up ways of identifying some of its limits, as 
currently practiced and enacted?  If Wintgens is correct, much happens ‘behind 
the veil of legality’ in which we ought to have interested ourselves. 
We need to theorise about legislation, and free of the stifling and 
unsatisfactory fusion of the legality and legitimacy of it, and when we do so, 
candidly to recognise how Parliament actually functions and the reality of how 
legislation is conceived of, drafted, promoted and, ultimately, passed.  I do this 
having, in Chapter 3, sought to expose many of the features of legislatures and 
                                                             
11
  Wintgens (2013) (n 3) 6. 
12
  Wintgens (2013) (n 3) 5-10. 
13
  Wintgens (2013) (n 3) 10-11. 
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legislation which call for a re-appraisal of, in particular, Waldron’s call for the 
dignity of legislation to be better and more widely accepted. 
One reason why, I venture here, we have tended not to permit ourselves to 
inquire into legislation’s legitimacy goes deep into the core of democratic belief 
and our hopes for legislation.  The legitimating effect of democracy in post-18
th
 
century England cannot be overlooked.  As the franchise widened in more recent 
times, one can understand why the processes by which legislation came to be 
enacted were thought – consciously or not – as doing away with the need to 
inquire into the legislator’s motives and rationales. 
As pragmatic and simplistic as it may be to fuse the questions of legality 
and legitimacy, it is unsatisfying to say the least to so believe in democracy and 
the impartiality and competence of legislators such that there are no grounds to 
bring legislation – post enactment – into question, or indeed to treat it differently 
depending upon factors which might reasonably be thought to inform its 
legitimacy.  Such an approach seems also to have enervated our desire to debate 
the merits of legislation or to seek to identify the points at which legislation 
reaches its limits. 
This Chapter is an attempt to explore some of the ways through the 
familiar view and to discover (or recover) ways of thinking about legislation 
which make pertinent questions about the merits and capacities of legislation 
rather than permitting them to be trumped by a mere assessment of legality.  Part 
of that exercise involves uncovering what might be modern modes or patterns of 
thought that have led us to hold the familiar view or cause us to maintain it.  If 
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‘emotions have a history’,
14
 then so too might our present attitudes and 
underlying disposition towards legislatures and legislation, despite emotional 
history being something that exists in common consciousness, rather than 
individual experience.  In some ways, we might see the history or descent of 
ideas as a common emotional history of sorts, an attempt to understand how 
ideas have had a life in the sub-lunar sphere. 
III  Descent of ideas 
In Chapter 1, I sketched historical developments since the 17
th
 century that led, 
in England in particular, to a legislature that, in the 20
th
 century, had become 
confident in its omnicompetence.  Woven between those developments, and no 
doubt influencing them and vice versa, are powerful ideological and 
philosophical forces that repay exploration as a means of understanding not only 
their strength, but also critically to assess the justification for that influence.  
These forces or influences are more than what language, interpretation, 
communication and cultural construction might reveal. 
I mean, following Donald Kelley’s treatment of this topic, to turn partly 
towards the spiritual world of ideas,
15
 bearing in mind the pitfalls he identifies in 
such an approach, but by which ‘ideas descend from the heights of philosophical 
                                                             
14
   M C Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (2001) 175.  
Nussbaum points out that the Stoics omitted the past as a temporal category and they 
made no place for emotions directed at past events: 177.  Her point is that they failed to 
give prominence to the way in which past events influence present emotions (albeit at the 
level of the individual).  
15
  Kelley (n 2) 7 
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I consider below several ideas and very briefly seek to explain a little of 
their descent and the way in which they appear to influence our approach to 
legislatures and legislation in current times.  
Democracy and the revolutionary shift 
The history with which I dealt in Chapter 1 was largely institutional in character: 
how Parliament evolved and become the successor to the Monarch as the 




 Centuries.  
Intertwined with that history is a meta-narrative of sorts, following much the 
same period of the gradual advance and development of ideas, but especially 
from and since the late 18
th
 century. 
 The basic principles which that line of thought and sentiment propelled 
are: democracy; equality; liberty of lifestyle; freedom of thought and expression; 
eradication of religious authority from the legislative process and education; and 
the separation of Church and state.
17
  All of these – some more than others – bear 
upon how legislators and legislation are to be regarded and the trust which might 
be placed in them in preference to a monarch, a religious leader, or traditional 
practices.  It repays consideration merely to reflect on the strength of those ideas, 
and to see them not merely as historically influential, but still embedded within, 
                                                             
16
  Kelley (n 2) 8. 
17
  J I Israel, A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of 
Modern Democracy (2010) vii-viii. 
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and informing, the way in which we regard popular assemblies, the work they 
do, and the trust which they ought command. 
 I have referred to the ‘Enlightenment’, but, as recent scholarship in 
particular has shown
18
 there existed different strains of this current of thought: 
radical in the revolutionary period in France and America in particular, but 
always more moderate in England and Scotland.  Moreover, although the 
Enlightenment took expression in different nations in different ways, looking to 
nationalist enlightenments may miss the shared attributes of different strains of 
the Enlightenment at a European level.
19
  The radical element is seen by many 
(Israel included)
20
 as having played the primary role in grounding the egalitarian 
and democratic core values and ideals of the modern world.   
It is well accepted in Scotland and England that the more moderate current 
of the Enlightenment prevailed.  We have not, in any recent period in the Anglo-
American world, witnessed the physical conflict and upheaval with which the 
radical Enlightenment was associated in the revolutionary period.  But in some 
ways, the influence of that strain may be concealed to some extent by just that 
fact.  There is much about the way in which Anglo-American legislative systems 
operate today that seems much more informed by the ideas and approach 
underpinning the radical strain of the Enlightenment than the moderate strain.  
                                                             
18
  J I Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(2001); J I Israel, Enlightenment Contested:  Philosophy, Modernity and the Emancipation 
of Man 1670-1752 (2006) and J I Israel, Democratic Enlightenment: Philosophy, 
Revolution and Human Rights 1750-1790 (2011). 
19
   Israel (2006) (n 18) 27.  
20
   Israel (2010) (n 17) i. 
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Israel himself claims that there is a close fit between current liberal values and 
the radical wing of the Enlightenment.
21
 




… the difference between reason alone and reason combined with faith and 
tradition was a ubiquitous and absolute difference.  Philosophically, 
‘modernity’ conceived as an abstract package of basic values – toleration, 
personal freedom, democracy, equality racial and sexual, freedom of 
expression, sexual emancipation, and the universal right to knowledge and 
‘enlightenment’ – derives, as we have seen, from just one of these two, 
namely the Radical Enlightenment; historically however, ‘modernity’ is the 
richly nuanced brew which arose as a result of the ongoing conflict not just 
between these two enlightenments but also (or still more) between both 
enlightenments …  
  
Glimpses of what might be attributed to the ongoing influence of the radical 
strain can be seen in the state’s having become almost entirely secular, its focus 
being upon on promoting the worldly happiness of the majority of its citizens and 
preventing the minority from gaining control of the legislative process.
23
  Few 
would cavil now with the radical Enlightenment’s insistence upon each 
individual having the same needs and being entitled to the fulfilment of them.  
Universality brings with it an entitlement for each individual to be free to pursue 
happiness in his or her own way, and to express himself or herself freely.
24
  The 
desire for an ‘authentic’ experience, and the state’s facilitation of that pursuit, we 
shall see shortly, is a feature of modern existence.  
                                                             
21
  Israel (2011) (n 18) 951; Israel (n 17) 241.  
22
  Israel (2006) (n 18) 11. 
23
   Israel (2010) (n 17) viii. 
24
   Israel (2010) (n 17) viii. 
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It is not possible to identify just how and to what extent these ideas 
associated with the radical strain continue to influence our thinking.  That does 
not mean, however, that we ought not seek to identify and critically to assess the 
factors which impel us to have, even by acquiescence, such a favourable view of 
popular assemblies and their capacity for rule-making.  
The history of the development of these concepts that were prominent in 
the Enlightenment remains ‘little studied or known’.
25
  This has tended to give 
rise to a misconception that the Enlightenment discourse was entirely new, and 
as if emerging spontaneously without any real intellectual provenance or 
precursors.
26
  That, in turn, contributed to the ideological endorsement being 
afforded to notions such as democracy and equality without any appreciation of 
their being historically-rooted ideas.
27
  Ignorance of this kind risks us lacking an 
appreciation of how those ideas might require revisiting and confronting as they 
take shape in lived experience, and failing to understand the extent to which 
those ideas continue to influence our approach and attitude to the work of 
popular assemblies.  These were, after all, intellectual changes rather than 
upheavals to social circumstances
28
 and, as such, are not necessarily tied to the 
circumstances of any particular time or place.  
One way in which these ideas confront challenges in lived experience is 
that overreliance on legislation leads to its proliferation, and proliferation 
threatens democratic ideals: that the ordinary (perhaps poorly resourced) citizen 
                                                             
25
   Israel (2010) (n 17) ix. 
26
   Israel (2010) (n 17) ix. 
27
   Israel (2010) (n 17) x; R Bourke, ‘Enlightenment, Revolution and Democracy’ (2008) 15 
Constellations 10 at 11. 
28
  Israel (2006) (n 18) 5. 
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ought reasonably to be able to know the law as it might apply to them and their 
activities.   Otfried Höffe has made stark this threat.
29
  The constant and rapid 
refinement and consolidation of rules, and the modification of them would tend 
to place beyond the resources of the ordinary citizen the means to comprehend 
how the law, at any one point in time, is likely to affect him or her.  The same 
problem is commonly expressed as one of accessibility.
30
   
The purpose of this brief excursion into the intellectual aspects associated 
with the institutional history with which I began this project in Chapter 1 is to 
recall the influence of these powerful ideas not only on the evolution of the 
system to its present state, and also to acknowledge the likelihood of their having 
a real influence today.  Exposing their likely influence is one way by which we 
might understand our marked preference in current times for those sources of law 
and social ordering that demote in importance, tradition and custom, and that 
give prominence to those which are constructed and have received the 
imprimatur of popular assemblies. 
A Modern Malaise?  
We might also approach more directly ideas whose history and descent it might 
repay time to consider from the viewpoint of their apparent influence on present 
dispositions and attitudes.  A leader on this topic is Charles Taylor.  Adopting the 
approach he takes exposes deeply-rooted undeclared and often subconscious 
preferences that bear upon our attitudes to legislation and popular assemblies.  
                                                             
29
  O Höffe, Democracy in an Age of Globalisation (2007) 75. 
30
  T H Bingham, ‘The Rule of Law’ (2007) 66 CLJ 67 70. 
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His is a viewpoint, although far from controversial,
31
 that offers a perspective on 
the modern disposition informed predominantly by intellectual history.    
Taylor’s overarching exercise is to explore how there came to be a 
possibility of not believing in God, and where such belief is just one possibility 
among others.  His point of contrast is five centuries ago, a time when, he says, it 
was virtually impossible not to believe in God.
32
  In doing so, he explores one 
sense of secular society, and, in particular, how alternatives to belief in God 
became thinkable.  Questions about the changes in belief and possibilities of 
belief are relevant to my exercise, at least in the way in which Taylor explores 
this topic.  He observes among many other things: 
1) a change in respect for, and treatment of, tradition (something which 
tends to favour legislation over the Common Law); 
 
2) the pride which has resulted from modern advances in technology, in 
human achievement and the contrast often made to historical 
practices and methods, ‘of having won through to … invulnerability 
out of an earlier state of captivity in an enchanted world’
33
 coupled 
with what Hayek says is a naïve and incomplete view of what science 
offers, and which he identifies as ‘scientism’.
34
  These show, Taylor 
                                                             
31
  His approach has been criticised, for example, for being ‘communitarian’ philosophy, by 
denying shared conventions beyond different communities and thereby denying a role for 
global justice: see, for example, A Pagden The Enlightenment: and Why it Still Matters 
(2014). 
32
   C Taylor, A Secular Age (2007) 3. 
33
   C Taylor (n 32) 301. 
34
  F A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (1982), vol 1 15 
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says, that we are restless and at the barriers of the human sphere.
35
  
(Again, this tendency, if it exists, would favour legislation over the 
Common Law);  
 
3) a modern desire for order (something of which legislation is often 
thought more capable, especially for its systematisation, than judicial 
decision and precedent); 
 
4) notions of their being some cosmic order (such as those which 
underlay traditional monarchies) which maintain themselves have 
been replaced by a providential social order which is meant to be 




Each of these factors we might see, I note in passing, as having contributed 
to the ‘constructivism’ of which Hayek is so critical,
37
 namely the fatal conceit of 
an excessive faith in reason, premised upon the misconception that we can 
construct what we must know. 
The fundamental change in outlook that Taylor says we have experienced 
is of interest here.  For one thing, the period over which that change took place is 
the same as that I identified in Chapter 1 as being of primary interest in 
understanding the rise of legislation and the kudos that came to attach to it and its 
author.  Moreover, it touches very directly some of those factors I have identified 
                                                             
35
   C Taylor (n 32) 726. 
36
  Taylor (n 32) 541; see also P Grossi, A History of European Law (2007), xii-4. 
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as being ones that contributed to our apparent change in disposition towards 
legislation: legislation relies less on tradition than does the Common Law and 
customary law; it has the appearance (at least) of being more ordered than other 
sources of law (and as being an instrument through which order can better be 
imposed or achieved); it is a direct product of human effort and, as such, appeals 
as constructivist activity that stands as tangible proof of our own 
accomplishments; and it substitutes for a cosmic order, a humanly-constructed 
one. 
I say something here of those factors and how the growth of legislation and 
the gradual weakening and disappearance of limits upon it can be seen as part of 
the trends – perhaps malaises – of modernity.  In doing so, I would seek to link 
the modern reliance upon legislation, as influenced by forces which are 
decidedly modern and far from being, in any objective sense, preferable to other 
approaches.  On the view I present, the modern disposition toward legislation is 
the symptom of malaises and temporary perspective, one which, although 
dominant, is philosophically fragile.  It forms part in this sense of Taylor’s 
‘unquiet frontiers of modernity’.
38
 
Individualism, a basic value of the Enlightenment, entails people having 
the right to choose for themselves their own pattern of life.  They decide the 
views they espouse and they determine the shape of their lives in so many ways 
that their ancestors could not.  The arrangements that permit this find expression 
in legal systems.  In doing so, law (primarily legislation) dispels the impediments 
which once prevented such unrestrained authentic expressions.  The malaise that 
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Taylor identifies is not so much that we have not relished our individual 
freedoms, but what we might have foregone or left behind in getting there. 
‘Modern freedom’ Taylor says, ‘was won by our breaking loose from older 
moral horizons’.  We once saw ourselves as part of a larger order: cosmic 
perhaps, but in which we took our place along with angels, heavenly bodies, and 
our fellow humans.  This order was reflected in the hierarchies of society through 
various orders, orders that modern freedom has discredited in securing its 
prominence. 
These orders gave meaning: things were more than just potential raw 
materials to be exploited for our projects.  They drew significance from their 
place in the wider ‘chain of being’. 
The change then, has been greater freedom, but disenchantment has come 
with it.  And with disenchantment, perhaps, has come as loss of an heroic 
dimension to life.  We seek only ‘petty and vulgar pleasures’, our aspiration 
tends to become getting and spending to fulfil our own immediate desires, all our 
true needs having been met.  By doing so, we narrow our outlook; we ‘flatten’ 
our lives and make them poorer in meaning.  We become less concerned with 
others and with society.    
Stripped of wider meaning, we give primacy to instrumental reasoning by 
focusing upon the most economical application of means to a given end.  This 
approach, so familiar to us in modern economics and accounting, of maximal 
efficiency and productivity (often ciphers for utility) seems so often to be the 
sole or dominant measure for success.  Suddenly it seems that everything is ‘up 
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for grabs’.  All that need be done is to re-design the purpose of the inputs as 
being individual happiness and well-being.  As Taylor says:
39
  
… once the creatures that surround us lose the significance that accrued to 
their place in the chain of being, they are open to being treated as raw 
materials or instruments for our projects. 
 
These changes have been liberating, but they have also been the opposite: 
economic considerations seem to trump other considerations, the need for 
economic growth is used to justify unequal distributions of wealth and income, 
and those demands engender in us an insensitive attitude to limited resources 
available to us.  And so too we are almost obsessed by technology, almost as if, 
because we have been so clever as to think of various technological means and 
devices, that technology ought be put to use: we ought because we can. 
These pursuits, however, despite appearing otherwise, are not mere 
choices, or at least, do not remain so for long.  Taylor shows how powerful 
mechanisms of social life press us in that direction, how, for example, a 
bureaucrat, in spite of his or her personal insight, may be forced by the rules 
under which he operates to make a decision he knows to be against humanity and 
good sense. 
Individualism and instrumental reason give rise to the institutions and 
structures of industrial-technological society.  Once they emerge, our choices are 
severely restricted.  They entrench instrumental reason by forcing weight to be 
given to it even in cases in which, in serious moral deliberation, we would never 
do.  And as the structures of individualism and instrumentalism are built up 
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around us, it becomes very difficult practically to do other than join.  Taylor 
gives the clear example that a person in a city designed so as to make it difficult 
to function without a car, will make a different lifestyle hard to maintain. 
And then there is the enervation of which Alexis de Tocqueville spoke (and 
to which Taylor refers) and about which more will be said presently.  
Participation in society and government will decline as individuals become 
enclosed in their own hearts, pursuing the satisfactions of private life (as long as 
the government of the day produces the means to these satisfactions and 
distributes them widely). 
The individual citizen is, in the end, left alone in the vast bureaucratic state 
and feels powerless.  He or she becomes enervated and so a kind of soft 
despotism arises. 
These malaises can be seen to foster, although Taylor himself does not 
make the link, both legislative reliance and a hyperactive legislature.  Working 
backwards, the vast bureaucratic state requires legislative machinery to function, 
to maintain itself, and to effect the revenue-gathering and spending for which 
vastness calls.  The comforts and satisfactions which it is to offer its citizens 
require more than just funds:  for example, town planning standards are a 
necessary part of amenity, working conditions must not be become overly 
burdensome and wages must be maintained.  Furthermore, an instrumental view 
of the world requires not just that citizens be restrained from open-slather 
exploitation of resources and raw materials, but that rules be put in place for the 
maximal efficiency of their deployment.  And as formerly powerful means of 
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restraint on individuals which found expression in modes of social order other 
than legislation disintegrate or weaken with the march of individualism, it 
becomes necessary to re-impose, this time by posited means, the kinds of values 
that the connectedness brought with it.  Hence we see more frequently the 
express code of conduct given statutory force, if not statutory form.  
These malaises, therefore, manifest themselves in several ways, but 
premised always upon our willingness for popular assemblies to have such 
unrestrained and versatile law making power and for that forum to be the one by 
which the characteristics of modernity that Taylor identifies are furthered.  
Such an outlook accords with our sense of power and capacity to order the 
world ourselves
40
 (ie to construct) through a wholly people-centred institution.  
Acting in this way re-enforces the advances we perceive ourselves to have made 
in reason and science, and in knowledge and understanding.  The invulnerability 
which comes from setting all the rules, structuring society and relations within it, 
and setting the ground rules for business, and for the prices they might charge, 
and requiring a whole range of ordinary human activities to be licenced by the 
state, as if it were a privilege to act in such a manner, all feed our desire to put 
some distance between age-old fears and current anthropocentric demands and to 
show it is no longer necessary to draw on the power of God.
41
 
All this in turn seems to feed our need for satisfaction with our 
accomplishments, our superiority over earlier, unenlightened people
42
 and 
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confirmation of having won through to invulnerability or an earlier state of 
captivity in an enchanted world.
43
  Taylor explains his thesis also by what he 
refers to as the ‘nova effect’: a spawning of ever-widening moral and spiritual 
options across the sphere of the thinkable and even beyond.
44
  I would add to 
that, not inconsistently with what Taylor has said, an active desire for the new 
and a concerted wish to depart from what has been the orthodoxy of the past.
45
 
The loss of meaning Taylor identifies is, in a sense, a loss of restraining or 
higher law, of the kind I have mentioned in passing in earlier Chapters, but to 
which I turn in more detail below.  As meanings or moral codes once offered by 
faith or religious teaching weaken or recede, greater reliance is placed upon 
constructed rules and boundaries.  Saying this cuts deeps into the debate whether 
moral precepts exist by reason of natural sentiment, or as a result of being 
ordained.
46
 The debate matters for present purposes, because on the former view, 
each will behave morally because we are hard-wired to do so. We wish, as Smith 
said, to be loved and to be lovely, and not to be blamed and be blameworthy.  On 
the other hand, if the source of morality is a deity, faith or religious teaching, 
then only those instructed, those who fear God, or those who believe would, it 
follows, adhere to those precepts (albeit imperfectly). 
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Now is not the time to attempt a resolution of that debate. I would, 
however, approach the problem it throws up from the opposite direction.  Much 
legislation and the administrative arrangements that attend it, assume that 
citizens, institutions and those in public roles are prone to act dishonestly and 
reprehensibly.  Elaborate regimes exist, for example, in the United Kingdom and 
Australia for the scrutiny of public bodies.
47
  More and more obligations, once 
private in nature, have attached to them criminal sanctions for non-adherence, 
something designed to encourage compliance with the associated rules.  
Obligations and responsibilities once considered necessarily to be imported by 
the nature of employment and other relationships find expression now in a 
seemingly endless proliferation of codes of conduct, codes of practice and 
regulations.  The overwhelming tendency is to regard it as necessary to record in 
statutory or like form, those responsibilities which have been regarded for some 
time as necessarily accompanying the relevant activity or role.  Unless this is a 
product of a general trend towards a posited expression of customary or equitable 
rules, it can only be a result of a perception, or a reality that people are becoming 
more likely to behave badly.  It cannot be an answer to say that the need for such 
codes is because standards are now higher than before. 
The collapse, then, of higher law, and Tamanaha’s treatment of that 
phenomenon can therefore be seen as a contribution to legislative reliance and 
one reason for its intensification. 
One aspect of the decline in religious adherence and institutions is, 
however, perhaps more quantifiable.  What might loosely be characterised as 
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church institutions have traditionally offered health, education, nursing, and 
other care services. It is easy to forget now, common in the age of the rich all-
embracing and a gargantuan Western state, how throughout much of history, 
these organisations offered services which, but for them, would have been 
entirely absent.  Another development has been the rise of the state in terms of its 
size, the range of activities it seeks to accomplish or control, and the near-
hegemony it has come to assert over rule-making. 
The State as Great Benefactor 
If we continue to be influenced – subconsciously or otherwise – by 18
th
 century 
Enlightenment thought, it might be questioned whether the desired ends have 
been achieved or are in sight.  The state has accrued to itself a hegemony of law-
making that it never had under a monarch.  The pervasiveness and detail of its 
rule-making is unprecedented.  The managerial legislature seems to accept 
responsibility to solve every problem.
48
 
The modern state faces fewer of the competitors for law making power 
than it has in the past few hundred years.  The Church is a much-diminished 
form of its medieval and later character.  There is no Holy Roman Emperor to 
contend with.  So too, universities, the Inns of Court and guilds have fallen 
within the general umbrella of state control. 
We are left, then, with a state whose virtual hegemony over rule making 
has few foils, and has grown – in theory and in practice – to recognise almost no 
boundaries.  I have mentioned practice, because modern experience is of a state 
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that has continuously and exponentially expanded its functions.  This ought to 
come as no surprise, for once we recognise the huge range and volume of 
legislation and the apparent lack of any filter for what ought properly to attract 
Parliament’s attention, we expose a hyperactive and unfocussed author (the 
state). 
There are many indicators of the state’s desire ever to expand its reach and 
be the ‘benefactor of society’.
49
  Justifications offered for its regulation of 
various activities seem self-perpetuating: the regulation of tobacco packaging is 
said to be justified because the state expends so much on health care.  Its 
regulation of workplace health and safety is justified for similar reasons. 
In extending its reach, the state has adapted to maximise the field over 
which it can exercise control.  These adaptations often have the appearance of 
de-regulation but are, in truth, no less an exercise of state power than traditional 
forms. Traditionally, state institutions ran postal services, water supply activities, 
the construction and maintenance and roads, hospitals and law enforcement.  
Recent decades have seen the state privatise many of these institutions and 
services including via corporatised entities, government owned corporations and 
the like.  But behind this institutional difference there is often no less regulation.  
A Minister may have the ability to direct some affairs of a government-owned 
corporation, and he or she might be bound to take into account or act in 
accordance with government policy.  And even though these bodies might have a 
corporate character, the state often takes the opportunity to regulate – often 
heavily – the prices these bodies can charge, the activities in which they can 
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engage (by, for example, licence conditions) and other requirements such as the 
place at which a head office must be located or areas within which assets must be 
retained. 
The state offers, and citizens demand, seemingly endless services.
50
  The 
state asserts control over, or responsibility for, employment levels, the economy 
and the health and well-being of citizens.  The range and nature of these is such 
that no state can ever fully achieve its task.
51
  It attempts everything, but in doing 
so must make sacrifices and compromises.  Inevitably too, there arise conflicts 
between the various ends it seeks to achieve.  This is just one of what has been 
described by Höffe as the ‘inevitable side-effects of the expansion of state 
responsibilities [activities]’.
52
  Some others are, with my own (not-so-minor) 
alterations: 
1)   the number of tasks requiring coordination can exceed the capacities 
of the state effectively to organise; 
   
2)   decision making slows; 
   
3)   it feeds, or does nothing to restrain or manage, the insatiable greed of 
citizens (and politicians), that their expectations of education, health, 
work and welfare will be met and their (selfish) claim on the public 
purse in doing so; 
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4)   the state assumes, or is taken to have assumed, responsibility for 
aspects of society which are, in truth, beyond its control; 
 
5)   citizens develop a tendency to take for granted that which is provided 
by the state.  We treat as an entitlement the goods that come 
automatically to us. 
 
One side effect that is often overlooked (but not by Höffe)
53
 is that the only 
way the state ever becomes the benefactor of society is by the prior appropriation 
of the resources it needs to do so, resources which, as Höffe points out, ‘up to 
that point are owned by the citizens’. 
Such an appropriation has been more colourfully styled ‘the grabbing 
hand’ by Andrei Shleifer.
54
  His intention is to conjure up the opposite of the 
invisible or helping hand.  His model focuses on politics and politicians as 
fundamentally self-interested and motivated by a desire, for example, to keep 
themselves in office rather than to promote the welfare of their electors and 
asserts that politicians pursue models very different from social welfare.
55
  This 
model Shleifer prefers to the invisible hand because it offers a theory of 
government which he says the invisible hand lacks.  It does so, he says, by 
formulating practical advice that recognises the limitations of government
56
 and 
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this helps design institutions that insulate economic aspects from political 
attempts to prey on them. 
That view is a very cynical one of politics and politicians in particular.  I 
would incline more to the view of the state’s ‘grabbing’ being for the purposes 
of fulfilling its role of largesse or as benefactor and more in the manner that 
Höffe contemplates. Shleifer, nevertheless, identifies the blunt instrument of 
state appropriation and control, and the need to feed its ‘pathology’
57
 of its own 
lack of recognised limitations.  The state, as benefactor, is necessarily one that 
must be ambitious in its legislative activities.  Appropriation, be it taxation, 
regulation or control, ordinarily requires legislative sanction, and the re-ordering 
or reform of social and business affairs.  The state can achieve, through statutory 
means, a form of control that, were it to involve itself directly in that activity, 
entails far greater risk, cost and effort.  Its decision to legislate is one way of 
spreading itself thin. 
We might pause here to consider one important cross-current to the strong 
and monopolistic (nation)-state.  The demise of the individual state is something 
that the increase in intensification of worldwide relations (globalisation) might 
provoke. Many of the activities considered necessary for human wellbeing 
stretch beyond state borders, yet are traditionally based upon statehood.  
Institutions and corporations are increasingly large and multi-national.
58
  The 
nation-state therefore, having taken on more and more responsibilities, and 
become so powerful a result, now faces the possibility of a reverse. 
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Whether what has occurred and is continuing to take place might be 
characterised as a forfeiture of sovereignty, as a compromising of its ability to 
govern as a product of its having become inefficient, or as it having lost its 
legitimacy,
59
 the nation-state faces, perhaps, the greatest threat to its majesty that 
it has for some hundreds of years. 
None of these developments, however, has curtailed the volume and reach 
of legislation.  Only the source from which it emanates has changed.  Greater 
worldwide relations have required more and more complex tax legislation, rules 
for the service of documents and for the regulation, for example, of banking and 
finance, stock exchanges and for the foreign ownership of media organisations 
and land.  There are, at the supra-national level, very many bodies, some of 
whom carry norm-making power, most notably, perhaps, the European 
Parliament.  And although much of what is done internationally is done by 
voluntary instrument (principally treaties and conventions) they too possess some 
qualities not dissimilar to legislation, dealing as they do with matters of wide 
application, being difficult to retreat from and adopting often proscriptive or 
prescriptive language.  And many require or result in domestic legislation to give 
effect to those supra-national norms in municipal law. 
My point, then, is that threats to the nation-state posed by globalisation do 
not seem to translate into the reduction of legislation or the topics to which it 
might extend, whether that be municipal or international in character. 
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Before leaving the sub-topic, I say something of the pressures to legislate 
that have originated from the regulator, being, principally ‘public agencies’
60
 that 
is, bureaucrats and legislators.   
Many modern works on regulation and regulatory theory give close 
attention to the ‘regulatory agenda’
61
 and to reasons to regulate.
62
  By 
comparison, the questions of why not, and when not, to regulate are neglected.  
‘Regulatory failure’ is often considered not as part of asking whether regulation 
was desirable or preferable to other forms of social-ordering, but a failure to 
achieve a pre-determined result, all of which assumes a need for greater 
regulation rather than more effective – or indeed less – regulation.  The problem 
is all too commonly cast as undesirable behaviour, going undetected and 
response and intervention tools failing to deal with errant behaviour and better 
enforcement.
63




The problem of regulatory failure is often traced to under-regulation.
65
  
Over-regulation is characterised as being a problem because it can lead to under-
regulation
66
 because if the prescription is too precise, it will be difficult to apply 
on the ground.  It is curious too, that regulators are often concerned to maintain 
their ‘reputation’
67
 as if they had some obligation to be thought of well by those 
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they seek to protect, and, presumably, to be perceived as menacing by those they 
seek to target and bring to compliance.  
And all too often, when regulation is approached in the context of 
democracy, problems of rule-making and regulation are identified as ‘challenges 
in effectively developing and enforcing rules in both parent laws and delegated 
regulations because of a number of policy and mandate conflicts, gaps and 
weaknesses’.
68
  Again, the language has a tendency to portray the problem as one 
of too little, not too much, regulation, or that regulation is poorly directed or 
beyond the capacities of the regulator. 
Doern et al’s recent study of the Canadian regulatory landscape and 
illustrations of the main types of ‘unruliness’, as they describe it, identify 
problems of colliding rules, rivalry between regulators and complexity.
69
  But the 
thrust of the solutions offered is not to investigate ways to prioritise rule-making, 
or to make decisions about fields of activity that ought not attract regulatory 
intervention.  Instead, for example, the problem is said to be ‘the inability to get 
policies established or agreed upon, policy mandate conflicts’ and conflicts 
between appointed regulators and elected Ministers.
70
  Such analyses, while not 
ignoring the problem of regulatory proliferation, rarely or less prominently urge 
regulatory restraint, and seem never to offer a principled basis to guide such 
restraint. 
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It is less common and prominently expressed to see, however, regulatory 
activity being declined or criticised by reason of it being beyond the knowledge, 
skill or competence of the regulator, or as a field of activity properly to be left to 
other forms of ordering.   
This completes the picture of a regulatory mind-set which has lost the 
vocabulary of limits and boundaries and the knowledge of when it is appropriate 
not to intervene.   
What are the forces that have led us to have such confidence in the state 
that we permit or tolerate its ever-increasing functions and responsibilities?  One 
powerful factor is our desire for comfort over most other things.  Successful 
liberal democracies face the prophetic warning issued by de Tocqueville:
71
  
I see an innumerable crowd of like and equal men who revolve on 
themselves without repose, procuring the small and vulgar pleasures with 
which they fill their souls.   
…  
Over these is elevated an immense, tutelary power, which takes sole charge 
of assuring their enjoyment and of watching over their fate.  It is absolute, 
attentive to detail, regular, provident, and gentle.  It would resemble the 
paternal power if, like that power, it had as its object to prepare men for 
manhood, but it seeks, to the contrary, to keep them irrevocably fixed in 
childhood … it provides for their security, forsees and supplies their needs, 
guides them in their principal affairs … 
 
The sovereign extends its arms about the society as a whole; it covers its 
surface with a network of petty regulations – complicated, minute and 
uniform – though which even the most original minds and the most 
vigorous souls know not how to make their way … it does not break wills; 
it softens them, bends them, directs them; rarely does it force one to act, 
but it constantly opposes itself to one’s acting on one’s own … it does not 
tryannize, it gets in the way: it curtails, it enervates, it extinguishes, it 
stupefies, and finally reduces each nation to being nothing more than a 
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herd of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the 
shepherd. 
 
The modern state seems keen to provide for all our comforts, but not with the 
end in mind that one day we might outgrow the need for the things it offers.  It is 
almost as if the state sees its importance and existence as fundamentally derived 
from providing the pleasurable things we all demand as part of our being 
comfortable.  If we as citizens were to become self-supporting, the great fear of 
the state seems to be that it would be left, like a scorned over-indulgent parent, 
without a purpose. 
A state that provides comforts is a popular one, and one that can justify the 
heavy appropriation of the resources necessary to make such provision from its 
citizens and from its firms.  But doing so risks enervating its citizens and 
engaging in a soft despotism.  By seeking to be the provider of all, it extirpates 
the intermediary institutions which Tocqueville considered necessary to liberty.
72
  
And that is precisely what we can see has happened historically.  We might 
observe the coincidence between the rise of the state as Tocqueville 
foreshadowed and the decline of intermediary institutions.  The Church is much 
reduced, Guilds and Unions struggle to maintain relevance, universities are very 
much state-sanctioned and regulated and we see fewer and fewer functioning 
private and community organisations and associations.
73
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The state, on the theory advanced above, would wish to be the sole 
provider of health care, utilities, welfare, education and even pastoral care.  
When it finds it impossible to do so, whether because others have got there 
before it and is precluded from excluding those providers, or because it simply 
lacks the capacity to do so, it engages its regulatory powers to decide how others 
ought provide those services, and, very often, the prices at which they might do 
so, as if the state were better placed to make judgments about these matters.  But 
there is the suggestion too of the state regulating for the sake of appearances, for 
an unregulated industry is not one in respect of which the state might claim any 
kudos from the provision of the beneficial things that industry provides, and it is 
not one from which the state might distance itself in the event of bad behaviour 
by industry participants, by pointing to the regulation it had put in place to guard 
against it. 
And so, it can be seen, whichever of these options the state employs (ie 
itself providing services or regulating the provision by others of them) the effect 
is to stifle institutions, whether they be the Church (historically a huge provider 
of such services and at times before the state did so), and universities and 
charitable institutions (as both come under closer state control).  For example, 
there are strong current suggestions of the state’s jealousy of the tax status of 
charities despite its 400 year old history being likely to see the revisiting of what 
it means to be a ‘not for profit’ organisation.
74
  A 2006 statute in the UK
75
 and 
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2012 legislation in Australia
76
 shows the trend to be towards the closer regulation 
of these bodies.  Had the state been less jealous of the activities of these bodies 
(offering, as they do, a model of benefaction without state involvement) one 
might have expected a very different approach.  
An example of the state’s vested interests in the maintenance of its near 
hegemony over rule-making is the surprise it exhibits when real challenges arise 
to it.  One very clear current example is Uber,
77
 the application for mobile 
phones that permit private cars to be shared to give ‘lifts’ (for payment) to those 
seeking a ride.   Uber has been characterised as part of the ‘sharing’ economy,
78
 
involving, as it does, increased person-to-person transactions,
79
 and without any 
necessary state involvement.   
Uber cuts across state regulation of the taxi industry and deeply-entrenched 
interests.  Characteristically, the state has licenced taxi drivers and regulated the 
prices that might be charged for taxi journeys and even the branding used on 
cabs.
80
  It derives considerable revenue from limiting the number of licences and 
forcing taxi operators to bid for them.  Innovations such as this might, on the one 
hand, be welcomed as an opportunity for the maximisation of resources, as a way 
in which to reduce vehicle emissions, and as expanding exponentially the 
                                                                                                                                                                    




  Charities Act 2006 (UK). 
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  Australian Charities and Not-For-Profits Commission Act 2012 (Cth).  
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  See, for example, S Ranchordás, ‘Does Sharing Mean Caring?: Regulating Innovation in 
the Sharing Economy’ (2015) 16 Minn J Law, Sc & Tech 1.  
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  D D Desai, ‘The New Steam: On Digitization, Decentralisation, and Disruption’, (2013-
2014) 65 Hastings L J 1469 at 1478. 
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  See, for example, Taxi Regulation Act 2003 (UK) and Taxi Regulation Act 2003 (Taxi 
Branding) Regulations 2012, SI 535/2012. 
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competition in that market and the likely reduction in prices.  The state, one 
might think, ought welcome the benefits this brings to its citizens.   
But Uber also deals the state out of its traditional regulatory activity.  
Private cars need not ordinarily be specially licensed.  The drivers of private cars 
need not subject themselves to the same licensing regime as commercial cab 
drivers and the prices they might charge are not dictated by legislation.              
The established taxi industry around the world has been vocal in its 
opposition to Uber and like innovations.  But the calls by that industry are not for 
it to be freed from the regulatory restrictions in order to be better placed to 
compete with Uber.  Taxi operators seem to like the existing regime.  They prefer 
the monopoly that the state system provides, the cosy relationship which that 
fosters and the price regulation from which they benefit.  No doubt they do so in 
part because they have borne costs in establishing and maintaining their 
operations that Uber participants have not.  Taxi companies have paid expensive 
licensing fees and subjected their drivers to the requirements that the regulatory 
regime requires.  For them there is no going back. 
The form of state regulation directed at taxis differs between cities and 
countries.  Some target the use of a meter (London) others, the regularity with 
which cars must return to their base.  The response of the state, generally 
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speaking, has been unfavourable to Uber.
81
  The few examples of favourable 
state responses are London and California and Colorado.
82
  
No doubt there are concerns that attend the sharing by citizens of private 
cars: the parties are unknown to each other, there is no guarantee that the car will 
be of a suitable standard, or that the driver possesses the relevant knowledge of 
the locality, or, indeed, has satisfactory driving skills.  Concerns of quality and 
safety therefore arise.  
The response by those states who would seek to prohibit Uber’s operation 
reveals much about the modern state.  First, it shows the extent to which vested 
private interests (taxi companies) can become entrenched and prelude the state 
from acting in the interests of citizens generally.  Secondly, it shows the state’s 
heavy reliance upon the funds it exacts from the monopolies it artificially creates 
in privileges such as taxi licences.  Thirdly, the overwhelming success of 
innovations such as Uber, necessarily in preference to the established state-
sanctioned and regulated regimes, shows that the state approach has entirely 
failed.  That is, a large portion of its citizens, when presented with an alternative 
to the state-sanctioned model, decide readily to abandon the mode which must 
have the benefit of familiarity.   It shows that the standard of service that the state 
regime has brought, considered along with the price it sets, is a choice that those 
citizens do not wish to take up.   
                                                             
81
   For example, in Belgium, Uber’s activities have been ruled illegal (by a Court): 
Ranchordás (n 78) 58.  In Pennsylvania, the state issued cease and desist orders in 
Pittsburgh: Ranchordás (n 78) 48.  
82
  Ranchordás (n 78) 7, 59.   
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  So, Uber exposes state regulation for what it is: self-interested; on 
occasion, contrary to the interests of efficiency; paternalistic and ultimately a 
failure because it brings about a service of a kind that many, when given the 
opportunity, readily forego. 
These points might be met with arguments that citizens might yet not have 
appreciated the increased risks they face when using the unregulated service, that 
Uber participants are free-riders in seeking to avoid a ride price which factors in 
the cost of a licence and associated regulatory and compliance imposts, and that 
those people ought, for these reasons, to be precluded by the state from doing 
other than using the incumbent arrangements.   
Such arguments have limited merit.  It is fanciful to think that the Uber 
ride-seeker would not be alive to the absence of state-sanction of participating 
drivers and cars.  For a citizen deliberately to turn away from the incumbent 
offering brings with it the necessary inference that they have made their choice in 
an informed way.  And although part of Uber’s attraction is the lower price at 
which services can be offered due in part to the lower regulatory and licensing 
imposts, it must be questioned whether such costs are truly justified.  If a citizen 
decides that the price of the incumbent service is too high, given the quality and 
nature of the service they are likely to receive, and being well experienced in 
those matters from years of prior use, then it can hardly be said that the citizen is 
merely seeking to free-ride.  
Innovations such as Uber will, no doubt, continue to challenge the manner 
in which the state approaches its regulatory functions and the assumption we 
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make about its entitlement to act paternalistically.  State responses to Uber tend 
to suggest that the state considers its role to be to preclude citizens from making 
their own judgments about risk, and jealously to guard its role as the sole 
determiner of what mix of risk, quality and price its citizens ought tolerate.  
We have been led to believe that the state is the only safe and reliable 
provider of a whole range of services.  This has occurred by a number of means.  
First, for decades now, history has been less well or comprehensively taught than 
was historically the case.  The effect has been to exclude from people’s 
knowledge the possibility – and historical reality – of institutions and persons 
other than the state offering care and comfort.  There are very many such 
examples: mutual funds, co-operatives, friendly-societies, and terminating 
building societies.  Each provided welfare and social services, often organised on 
the basis of some commonality of interest between those people, such as their 
religious or political disposition, or their or trade affiliations. 
Secondly, the state has been engaged in a concerted campaign of 
persuading citizens of its role as the natural provider of such services: it 
advertises its achievements on road signs, on radio and television and by other 
means; it is quick to point to the shortcomings of its competitor institutions in 
their provision of such services, despite its own demonstrable shortcomings.  The 
state suggests, by its constituent organisations, that it is vested with 
comprehensive responsibility for various fields of activity: for example 
legislation gives to the state greater and more aspirational goals, so aspirational 
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as to be unachievable.
83
  Thirdly, the state has, deliberately or otherwise, sought 
to fill the role of God, or at the least, to provide the meaning that, as Taylor has 
shown, has evaporated from society.  I take up an important aspect of this sub-
topic below in dealing with sovereignty.  But for present, the point I would make 
is that the state’s role as benefactor both fills the gap left in a disenchanted world 
and feeds our need for an ‘authentic’ expression. 
Sovereignty 
Part of the topic I have just been discussing – the state as benefactor – might be 
explained by the history of ideas associated with the notion of sovereignty.  What 
I wish to show is that the state has come to fill – or portray itself as filling – a 
role we once saw as the preserve first of God and later the Monarch; a kind of 
wise, timeless parent to whom we were, for a time at least, willing to forego our 
own judgment and independence and defer to their greater capacity to assess of 
our wellbeing.   
Such an understanding explains not only a reason why the state might find 
it necessary to be a benefactor without limits, but also how, in doing so, it fills 
for us the some deep-seated need for a protector.   
My starting point is the link made by Luc Wintgens between legalism (ie 
that all norms that have the form of rules are legitimate) as a metaphysical 
concept and late mediaeval theology.
84
  Legalism’s concern is principally with 
rules rather than where they come from.  Nominalism, he says, is one of the basic 
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  One critical aspect is the interpretation of God’s 




  The culmination of this argument 
is that nominalism would see the nature of ‘the good’ as claiming that something 
is good because God created something because it is good.
87
  The distinction 
between the two may come down to questions of God’s omnipotence: 
nominalists claim the realist position unduly limits God’s plenary power.  The 
conceptual move between realism and nominalism is, Wintgens says, the erasing 
of the lex aeterna; the plan according to which God created the world.
88
  God’s 
will is indifferent because it is no longer informed by his intellect.
89
  The good 




This outline, despite its brevity, does nevertheless show the basis for 
Wintgens’ ultimate assertion that the faithful need not know what really must be 
done as a matter of ‘good’ found ‘out there’: all he or she need do is obey the 
Commandments of God as they are revealed.
91
  Following norms imposed by 
God is all that man need do.  Legalism is, therefore, Wintgens says, related to the 
specific metaphysics of nominalism.  And, in turn, it holds that moral conduct is 
a matter of rule-following and moral relationships consisting of duties and rights 
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  So, just as human creatures must follow the norms 
commanded by God, so to must we follow the law as a commandment.   
Even when one turns to those theorists who would consider that the 
construction of the state necessitates a social contract (Hobbes, Pufendorf and 
Kant) that too is the product of rule-following behaviour because the laws of 
nature are from God and following them brings about the social contract.
93
   
Strong forms of legalism Wintgens shows to imbue our approach to 
legislation: law is sought to be separated from politics;
94
 a framework is offered 
for the application of rules and principles, but not for their construction,
95
 and 
this gives rise to a limited focus on their (legislative) creation.
96
  The judge’s 
function as the applier of rules calls for justification, whereas the enactment of 
legal rules by the legislator is exempted from justification because it does not 
(like the judge’s function) rely on a closed set of rules.
97
   
An understanding of nominalism, as Wintgens outlines it, is crucial to an 
understanding of the emergence of the concept of the state.
98
  It triggered 
Protestantism and an autonomous political philosophy based on will.  
Protestantism articulates a personal relationship with God, mediated to far less an 
extent by the Church than in the Catholic model.
99
  Conscience dictates the will, 
and, because the relationship is personal, the conscience of the faithful should be 
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free.  And so the churches too ought be voluntary associations and, it follows, so 
ought the state (following Locke). 
Ecclesiastical power was threatened because man was to be judged not by 
Church authorities but by his or his works and faith.  But the state was to be 
obeyed.
100
  So, Wintgens says, the conjugation of Calvinistic Protestantism and 
nominalism gave rise to the state as we know it. 
It is not a big step then, applying Hobbes, that God and the state focus on 
the same essential work (the laws of nature).  The state is the only means to 
activate the laws of nature and it ‘turns out to be’ the only source of binding 
laws.
101
  There is no law beyond the state and all law finds its origin there 
because the social contract, in its majoritarian desire and laws, find their 
expression in the state (Rousseau). 
This is merely a selection of (albeit influential) views.  But they serve to 
show some of many possible illustrations of how the state came to be regarded as 
the proper repository of rule-making power and to be sovereign (ie ultimate and 
unchallengeable) in doing so.   
The notion of sovereignty and its attachment to the state involves some 
other powerful factors.  I want to conclude this consideration of sovereignty and 
the role it plays in our attitude to legislation by exposing something of the 
absolutism and imaginative power which that notion holds.  Again, my primary 
reference point is Wintgens because of the clarity with which he establishes 
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sovereignty as the major operator between our understanding of legislation 
validly passed and legitimate also. 
Carl Schmitt saw concepts of political philosophy as secularised 
theological concepts.
102
  More sinister, however but perhaps no less true, is 
Blumenberg’s thesis that such secularisation is a legal process of dispossession 
or expropriation of the sacred.
103
  Wintgens regards this as a side-effect of 
nominalism.
104
   
It follows that the secularised view of sovereignty locates the political 
sovereign as the ultimate source of any law, as God was.  It follows, too, that the 
sovereign’s power is just as unlimited.
105
   
And just as God owes nothing to his subjects (despite of course his 
covenant of ultimate love and salvation) so too the political sovereign owes no 
justification to its citizens, Wintgens’ argument runs.
106
  The comparison is not 
entirely convincing, of course, because God owes us nothing but we might safely 
rely on him as the ultimate, to act in our best interests, whereas the political 
sovereign we know to be less omnicompetent in reality and vulnerable always to 
making wrong decisions, or ones that benefit others more than us in unfair ways.  
Nevertheless, I want to retain the underlying force of this comparison because it 
does serve to illustrate the equivalence that seems to have been afforded to 
sovereignty. 
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The consequences of the comparison might be taken further: the sovereign 
need not give any justification for his or her rulings;
107
 the ultimate source of 
power is unfathomable
108
 and citizens cannot complain because they created the 
sovereign and promised submission (Hobbes); they created it and are part of it 
(Rousseau); or they had (according to Kant) a moral duty to enter into a state, so 
cannot contest the duties that fall, as a result, on their shoulders.
109
    
This leaves, then, what Wintgens powerfully describes as the ‘black box’ in 
the chain of legitimation of legislation.  The concept is one that is so often 
overlooked in critiques of legislation and it explains much about how and why 
we have occluded from our consideration of legislation, and never permitted 
ourselves to inquire into, how we might conceive of legislation which is good or 
bad.  About his back box, Wintgens says:
110
 
Once sovereignty has been built into political space, it operates as a black 
box.  …  As a matter of logic, the magic of the black box prevents anyone 
questioning the outputs in any of its aspects.  …  
Sovereignty on this view can be called upon to justify both a monarch by 
divine right and a totalitarian state.  The monarch by divine right is the 
representative of God on earth, and Hobbes’s sovereign is after all not far 
from that.  Although the subjects have created him, he is called upon to 
implement the laws of nature that are the laws of God.  Under a monarchy 
of divine right, the monarch is exercising the divine prerogatives that are 
included in, and which constitute, sovereignty.  On this view, the sovereign 
does not have the power to violate the laws of God.  As a matter of logic, 
he has no permission to do so, although he has the power to define their 
content according to Hobbes. 
…  
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Taking sovereignty as a black box, we enter into the realm of absolute 
power that, by its very nature, cannot be legally limited, as Austin has 
argued.  … Absolute power is disconnected from anything [ab-solutus].  If 
it is a source, it must at the same time be the origin, that is, a self-
referential beginning. 
The problem, of course, as Wintgens himself identifies, is that sovereignty and 
the view of legitimation it underpins, can be called upon to justify both rule by 
divine right and a totalitarian state.  It calls upon us to accept the perfect 
rationality of the ruler’s commands.  It explains why we have fused, with 
legislation only, concerns of validity and legitimacy.  We treat all valid 
legislation as legitimate and we do so for reasons that include an unstated 
conception of the legislature (ie the state) as sovereign.   
And we see, because of the way in which we regard sovereignty, that no 
matter how its centre might shift, from the Monarch, to the Parliament, or the 
state, or indeed the people,
111
 it still justifies the deployment of an untrammelled 
power to legislate.  
How well this fits with Nils Jansen’s analysis of legal authority as having 
typically focused on officially-sanctioned rules issued by legally recognised 
bodies.
112
  These state-centred concepts of law and legal authority follow almost 
inexorably from an approach of the kind I have just set out.   
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IV When Judges Fail 
 
I have offered, by reference to the historical development of Parliament since the 
17
th
 century, a reason – or perhaps more a change in psyche – for the increasing 
trust we place in popular assemblies and, because of it, our greater willingness to 
permit those bodies to fulfil an omnicompetent role.  
The rise of regulation has attracted the attention of law and public 
administration scholars. Andrei Shleifer has attempted a general theory to 
explain how rise fits with both empirical evidence and history.
113
  He identifies 
shortcomings in the Common Law as leading to the rise in regulation and in the 
proliferation of legislation.  In doing so, he asks why legislation and not the 
Courts became the primary means by which to control business behaviour. 
His argument is that dispute resolution in Courts is costly, unpredictable 
and fails to deal with modern problems.  The consequence, he says, is that 
legislative regulation (imperfect though it is) emerges as the alternative strategy 
for promoting desirable business behaviour and controlling such behaviour as 
ought to be discouraged.  Regulators rise where judges fail, he says.  
Shleifer’s principal criticism is directed to judicial discretion, which, he 
claims, judges tend to exercise, particularly with respect to facts, so that the facts 
fit their own biased (by this he means pre-judged) view of how the matter ought 
to be disposed of.  A judge might do this also to avoid an appellate court 
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overturning the first instance decision, something which is more difficult if the 
trial judge has made certain findings of fact.   
The shortcomings in the exercise by judges of their common law functions 
is something that Shleifer regrets.  He sees legislative regulation as imperfect, 
principally, it seems, because businesses take (costly) precautions against it, even 
when there is no benefit to them in doing so.    
I need not dwell too long on Shleifer’s thesis.  As an economist, he focuses 
on business behaviour.  And he may not have the same understanding as do 
lawyers of the nuances of factual analysis, the proper role of judicial discretion 
and the structural limitations on common law decision-making possesses when 
rapid developments are called for.  On this latter point, the Courts, deciding as 
they do, disputes between parties, are less well placed than legislatures to 
ascertain the likely effects of various possible rules and to know to the extent that 
legislatures might, all the possible ramifications of instituting a particular rule, 
especially where new circumstances are concerned.  
Shleifer’s views, nevertheless, coming as they do from outside the field of 
law, do offer some insight into the competing merits of legislation and the 
Common Law.  And they confirm, to some extent, a broader theme of my 




V Bounded Rationality: a doctrinal solution 
 
Luc Wintgens’s ‘bounded rationality’ offers a doctrinal solution to the problem 
of legislative hyperactivity, via an expanded function for judicial review.  His 
starting point is the assumption made by courts when construing legislation that 
the legislator was acting rationally.  He would urge a change: that such an 
assumption ought be displaced where there is cause to believe to the contrary.  
He would prefer an approach in which the legislator was not judged to be 
rational where there exists an empirically justified account of the legislator 
having violated normative standards.
114
  It is an ordinary rule of construction that 
we exercise ‘charity’ towards the speaker, that is, that we assume his or her 
words ought not be construed as contradictory or absurd.
115
  So, while we might 
be charitable towards legislators, and accept that they might strive for rationality, 
we know that they may well fail to do so, or fail in a limited way.
116
  There are 
all manner of bases, many of which I have catalogued in one way or another in 
earlier Chapters, why, given the motivates that cause legislators to act, that the 
resulting product (the statute) lacks rationality in the way Wintgens suggests 
ought enliven his doctrine of bounded rationality.   
This is the first limb of Wintgens’ argument.  The second is that legal 
validity need not focus – to the exclusion of all other considerations – upon 
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compliance with legal processes.
117
  Legal validity is a multifaceted concept, he 
points out, that does not itself warrant such a limitation.
118
   
Wintgens’s notion of ‘bounded rationality’ as ‘legisprudence’ presents a 
viable alternative to the fusion of legality and legitimacy.
119
  His is a notion 
which challenges the presumption of rationality of the legislator and replaces it 
with a ‘level theory of coherence’.  It entails: 
1) the principle of coherence - that norms make sense as a whole, 
including through legislators giving reasons for why norms are 
changed or not changed (thus instilling coherence over time); 
2) the principle of alternativity –intrusions upon freedom are legitimate 
only in cases in which social interaction is failing; 
3) the principle of temporality – the requirement that norms be justified 
over time, and not just at the time they are imposed and then assumed 
to have a continuing, constant, justification; 
4) the principle of the necessity of normative density – rules ought not be 
accompanied by strong sanctions.  Preference ought be given to less 
severe possibilities. 
Wintgens’s approach would see these approaches brought within judicial 
review (‘rationality review’, he styles it)
120
 of legislation by the Courts.  It 
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permits the ‘marginal control’ of the rationality of legislation
121
 and leaves in 
place the legislator’s discretionary power to make choices.   
Wintgens draws upon a sample of cases of the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BGV) decided under art 20, 3 of the Constitution, 
which states that ‘[t]he legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the 
executive order and judiciary by law and justice’.  That provision has been 
interpreted as requiring the legislator to pay attention to cleaning up or 
modernising obsolete norms.
122
  Norms can become unconstitutional over time, 
or move in that direction.  The legislature is given time to adapt a norm before its 
being declared unconstitutional.
123
  What Wintgens’s approach would offer to 
Anglo-American system is new and expanded grounds for the judicial review of 
legislation, based upon the expectation we all might reasonable hold of 
legislators acting within the bounds of rationality.  
The whole notion of insisting upon legislators to demonstrate their having 
strived for rationality is founded upon a view that we are entitled to expect of 
them that they have sought to make sense of the world, and to show how they 
have done so.
124
  It recognises and takes account of the pressures of limited time, 
imperfect skills and scarce resources that affect legislators.
125
  The demand is not 
that legislators act perfectly, or make the choice that a particular judge might 
prefer, but that they act rationally by keeping track of their norms.  It is up to the 
legislator, the argument runs, to show how it has proceeded in fact finding, how 
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its choices have been made and how it has effectuated the prognosis of changing 
circumstances as well as the effect of its norms.
126
     
Wintgens’s approach has much to commend it.  It recognises the reality of 
modern legislatures and is unwilling naïvely to assume away the very real 
shortcomings in their motivations and operations.  It is an approach which would 
compel legislators to account for their rule-making beyond doing so merely in a 
political sense.  Moreover, it offers a much more persuasive account than does 
the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy for the kinds of boundaries to which 
legislation is, of its nature and the characteristics of its author, specially exposed.  
 
VI The collapse of Higher Laws 
 
A further perspective on the events and developments I have been describing in 
this Chapter and the historical evolution I set out in Chapter 1, is that of Brian 
Tamanaha who has argued that there has been a collapse in ‘higher laws’ that 
were essential to law’s autonomy.  He explains his point in these terms:
127
 
A few centuries ago … [l]aw was thought to consist of rules or principles 
immanent within the custom or culture of the society, or of God-given 
principles disclosed by revelation or discoverable through the application 
of reason, or of principles dictated by human nature, or of the logically 
necessary requirements of objective legal concepts. 
 
Since then, Tamanaha says, those rules or principles have collapsed with the 
consequence that law has lost some of its autonomy, an autonomy so 
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fundamental as to be considered to be part of the rule of law.
128
  Tamanaha’s 
principal theme is that, through higher laws, an ideal existed by which there were 
fundamental principles that even the sovereign law-maker was bound to obey.
129
  
Those restraints have, he says, collapsed over the last several centuries.   
For Tamanaha, an instrumental view of law has come to prevail, in which 
law is consciously viewed as a tool or means with which to achieve ends.
130
  He 
contrasts this to law having more autonomous objectives and being more 
immune to seizure and co-option by particular interests in society.
131
  
How does Tamanaha characterise these higher laws: how does he see them 
having operated as restraints?   
First and foremost is their immanence: their subsisting nature, and the 
process of their ‘making’ being discovery rather than construction.
132
  The 
concept of divine law brought with it both the notion of law’s creation being the 
province of a superior non-earthly being and the sense of it being necessary to 
search for those pre-determined rules rather than embark on some man-centred 
exercise of ascertaining from the start what would, in our interests, be the best 
rule to adopt.  The process of law making was more a task of discovery, an 
external exercise, and one in which faith played a major role.
133
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Custom was also a major component.  It took expression in many ways.  It 
was afforded deep respect as part of the pre-modern commitment (mostly 
unconscious) to things continuing as they always have; the lack of any real 
distinction between things as they are and things as they should be.  These views 
are characteristic of custom, and are reminiscent (albeit more nostalgically so) of 
Sir Henry Summer Maine’s historical approach and recall the considerations I set 
out in the preceding Chapter. 
    The next ingredient of these higher laws was the Common Law.  It was 
peculiarly adapted to drawing on custom and giving it life.  The historian J G A 
Pocock explained common law thinking in this respect as follows:
134
 
In the first place, it is asserted that ‘the ancient constitution’ was an 
‘immemorial’ constitution, and that belief in it was built up in the following 
way.  The relations of government and governed in England were assumed 
to be regulated by law; the law in force in England was assumed to be the 
common law; all common law was assumed to be custom, elaborated, 
summarized and enforced by statute; and all custom was assumed to be 
immemorial, in the sense that any declaration or even change of custom – 
uttered by a judge from his bench, recorded by a court in a precedent, or 
registered by king-in-parliament as a statute  -presupposed a custom 
already ancient and not necessarily recorded at the time of the writing. 
  
Although the extent to which all judges might have been governed in their 
decisions by custom differed, and theorists have perceived different tendencies 
and preferences with common law, there is no doubt of the Common Law’s 
greater direct reliance on custom than legislation.
135
 
                                                             
134
  The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in 
the Seventeenth Century – A Reissue with a Retrospect (1987) 261. 
135
  J W Tubbs, The Common Law Mind: Medieval and Early Conceptions (2000).  Tubbs 
explains the difficulties with interpreting the works of the English commentators, owing to 
a lack of organisation in some cases, inconsistent use of terminology and imprecise 
299 
 
Tamanaha shows another element of the higher laws to have been the 
science of legislation.  The 18
th
 century (through Kames and Smith in particular) 




Like other sciences, [law] is supposed to have first or fundamental 
principles, never modified, and the immovable basis on which the whole 
structure reposes; and also a series of dependent principles and rules, 
modified and subordinated by reason and circumstances, extending 
outward in unbroken connection to the remotest applications of law. 
 
These higher limits operated also on legislation.  Tamanaha gives examples in 
American law of charters which acknowledge expressly the limits of legislative 
authority
137
 and of Courts recognising and giving effect to ‘non-constitutional 
limits to legislative power which put fundamental common-law dogmas beyond 
the reach of statutes’.
138
  
There can be little doubt that many of these notions are now gone, or are 
now less potent, with the legislature having been freed from many of them.  As I 
have pointed out in earlier Chapters, Constitutional restraints remain, in many 
Anglo-American systems, in the form of written charters, and far less potently, in 
presumptions (presumptions only) of statutory construction.   
The reason why positivist restraints are less influential or fundamental 
according to Tamanaha is that these limits are products of the law-maker’s will, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
language in distinguishing between the Common Law, local usages and general custom:  
esp 189-195. 
136
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Method of Legal Studies’ 3 US Monthly Law Magazine 381-382. 
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  Tamanaha (n 127) 216. 
138
  Tamanaha (n 127) 217, quoting Pound. 
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so cannot be characterised as immanent principles of right and absolute 
prohibition.
139
  What legislatures can make they can unmake. 
I have already shown how, in the 18
th
 century, scientific studies were 
undertaken with the purpose, whether through natural jurisprudence or otherwise, 
to identify and articulate the principles which ought to govern both common law 
and legislation.  The scientific approach, combined with the Enlightenment 
concern with man as the centre of all things, necessarily involved a study being 
made of man and society.  By doing so, and in other than the most unrestrained 
of the theories (Bentham’s) there was a recognition nevertheless of something 
external to law: something natural – as being a ‘given’ and as dictating in some 
way the content of law. 
While Enlightenment science initially provided additional foundations for 
restraint in the making of law in the longer term, it undermined the more 
traditional restraints, in the form of both divine law and custom.
140
  The critical 
scrutiny of received tradition which was so characteristic of the Enlightenment 
had the consequence that restraints or features of law that could not then be 
explained or justified by reason were seen as blind fetters.
141
 
These factors, combined with the science of the legislator ultimately 
deferring to the most unrestrained version of it (Benthamism), which expressly at 
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least recognised no principle which ought restrain the legislator, served to free 
the law of its longstanding restraints.  This occurred much more potently for 
legislation than it did for the Common Law.  Judge-made law retained its system 
of precedent, its appeal structure and its reticence for innovation by other than 
the most incremental of means.  Parliament, on the other hand, embarked upon a 
trajectory in which it threw off all restraints other than those of a political and 
Constitutional kind, and some weak rules about how legislation is to be 
construed. 
One of the reasons for the 18
th
 century science of legislation not leaving 
any strong restraining influences on the legislature (besides Constitutional ones) 
may be that its quest to formulate objective principles of law and society were 
not as successful as first hoped.
142
  What was lost was any belief in there being 
one or a dominant moral system.  Human sentiments proved less capable of 
guiding us to the proper ends which ought to be pursued than previously 
thought.
143
  And utility, while it has proven successful in every practical sense is, 
beyond what Tamanaha identifies as its ‘hedonistic’
144
 objectives, unable to 
distinguish between pleasures.  There is no objective happiness and therefore no 
basis to deprive the populace of whatever, in aggregate, it desires.  It places a 
burden on the minority to permit the majority their happiness, without any means 
of assessing the appropriateness and fairness of that sacrifice.  Utility, on its own, 
never offered any basis for restraint beyond its simplistic formula of happiness 
for the majority.  
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We take comfort in these difficult questions being weighed, debated and 
decided by the democratic body which is Parliament.  Whether that trust is well-
placed is something which I would urge must be considered against the 
background of how well Parliament, in reality, meets the hopes we have for it. 
The upshot of Tamanaha’s theory is that law is now used for instrumental 
purposes (ie self-interested objectives of those who can control its exercise) and 
that Parliament is inherently unsuited to, and incapable of, making good choices 
without higher principles to guide it.  Tamanaha suggests, ultimately, that with 
the loss of these principles, law has lost also its in-built restraints and become an 
‘empty vessel’.
145
   
Custom deserves particular treatment in the context of Tamanaha’s wider 
thesis. 
Custom has many characteristics of Tamanaha’s higher laws.  It is a source 
of rules which no sovereign or legislature has played any part in devising and 
one which, for that reason, stands beyond the immediate control of made law.  Its 
antiquity or immemoriality confers reverence, something that Bentham lamented: 
‘[w]e inherited [customary law] from our fathers, and, maugre all its 
inconveniences, are likely, I doubt, to transmit it to our children’.
146
 
Brian Tamanaha links the demise of custom with the erosion of the rule of 
law.  This is a characterisation of custom as offering principles which even the 
sovereign law-maker is bound to obey
147
 and hearkens to a time when custom 
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was, itself, an authoritative source of law.
148
  The collapse Tamanaha identifies 
stems from law ceasing to be seen as representing the common good or public 
welfare, from it ceasing to have the quality of being ‘of and for’ the community 
and for that reason alone deserving of obedience by citizens.
149
  Tamanaha 
makes the point that ‘the central role and function formerly played by these 
classical ideas and the critical vacuum left by their demise’ results in integral 
parts being lost from what once was an organic whole of interconnected ideas 
about law.
150
  Custom, not as the source of any individual’s own will, but as a 




… the process of explicitly articulating and applying the law was a matter 
of discovering and declaring the unwritten law that was already 
manifested or immanent in human life. 
Custom, if it were to be seen in this light, would have consequences for judicial 
method.  A judge or other arbiter who sets out to find the law as manifest in 
human life is undertaking a much more objective task than one following the 
traditional role of finding the law in the contemporary sense.  For one thing, in 
the case of customary law, what is manifested in human life must be known to 
all, not just those vested with authority to arbitrate disputes.  The modern judicial 
role of finding the law is of course a more technical and specialist one, and one 
which leaves no room for the layman to contribute (as did the special jury).  
Customary law involved less elitism.  Moreover, unmade law gives to no 
individual authority to create law or affect legal relations on a large scale.  This 
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might be contrasted with made law, which, taken to its unrestrained but logical 
end point, runs the real risk of becoming that of an authoritarian elite.  Made law, 
in the form of legislation, is uniquely subject to pressure and influence, as we 
saw in Chapter 3.  Knud Haakonssen has observed this distinction, in the context 
of the abuses evident in the statutes to which Adam Smith directed his famous 
criticism in the Wealth of Nations:
152
 
Law which is made by some authority other than a judge of concrete cases 
is liable to be guided by political and religious objectives, whereas judge-
made law based on precedent has a better chance of approaching the 
principles of natural justice. 
Tamanaha’s view of custom, then, is as an abiding source of ‘natural’ legal 
principles, loss of which erodes the rule of law by freeing the legislator from 
restraints imposed by time and experience.  The position is reminiscent of 




The characteristic of the constructivist rationalists … is that they tend to 
base their argument on what has been called the synoptic delusion, that is, 
on the fiction that all the relevant facts are known to some one mind, and 
that it is possible to construct from this knowledge of the particulars a 
desirable social order. 
It is possible to detect in the constructivist rationalist approach a view with 
Marxist overtones, one which reveals a particular belief about what benefit the 
past might offer in making decisions today about social affairs. 
We can see in Tamanaha’s work a way of looking at the last 300 or so 
years as involving a move from a law restrained by higher or unalterable forces 
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to law which is free of all but the most positivist of limits and some of the 
consequences which follow. 
Tamanaha’s approach is a largely historical way of seeing how limits 
which once operated on legislation came to be removed.  There are, as well, 
numerous other approaches to divining limits which are more philosophical than 
historical.   
VII Closing of the imagination 
 
So strong are the forces I have identified that we seem to have lost the capacity 
to conceive of the state in any alternative form to the one it presently assumes.  It 
has led to a kind of Freudian (flawed) motivation to kill the father
154
 – for whom 
the lawgiver might be substituted here – a desire overcome the things that 
occurred before and establish a new order: to ourselves be the father and 
lawgiver.
155
  Freud would hold that identifying with the father, gives rise to a 
super-ego, and inner moral authority and one that overcomes the irrational fear of 
castration.  
There are other ways to see the phenomenon of humankind striving to 
eliminate or overcome the limitations placed upon us.  We might see it by 
analogy to the force that compelled the construction of the Tower of Babel: 
man’s revolt against God.  We might draw on Michael Oakeshott’s essays of that 
same title
156
 to understand the single-mindedness with which we might be 
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capable of pursuing that goal.  We might see it as a weakness, again via 
Oakeshott’s view, that we human beings are prone perennially to 
misunderstanding ourselves, and our limits when we succumb to the temptation 
to erect structures we hope will bring us to a final perfection in a suppositious 
promised land.
157
  Or we might see Nietzsche’s pronouncement ‘God is dead!’ as 
evidencing the pitiful state of trying all the time to escape from our own 
inevitable weaknesses by defying those who might be the source of such 
boundaries.      
Thus I raise for consideration whether we have become locked in a secular 
and self-confirming pattern: legislation that is valid is legitimate; what the state 
can validly do it ought do because democracy leads to good results; and 
secularity is good too because it is the opposite of the religious or spiritual.  So 
too the opposite holds good: we distrust things that we have not consciously 
created, because what is traditional and the product of evolution is to be regarded 
as unenlightened, because we are not enlightened.  But ultimately we must face 
the distortions which our own approach brings, of a less than adequate 
understanding of our own motivations and emotions.  
And if de Tocqueville is right about the soft despotism that the state 
administers, then that too has contributed to our lack of resistance to its 
intrusions, simply because they appear so benign.   
These themes resonate somewhat with a view expressed by Jürgen 
Habermas in his An Awareness of What is Missing.  He has powerfully defended 
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Enlightenment rationality, something that has come under attack by both 
postmodernism (which denies formal reason’s claims of internal coherence and 
neutrality) and by fundamentalist approaches, which would place reason beneath 
religious imperatives.  At the same time, he recognizes the need, in a post-secular 
society, for a discourse of sorts between religious and secular viewpoints.  The 
post-secular society is one that has an acceptance that it cannot stand alone and 
must interact to some extent with religion:
158
    
Among the modern societies, only those that are able to introduce into the 
secular domain the essential contents of their religious traditions which 
point beyond the merely human realm will also be able to rescue the 
substance of the human. 
  
His thesis is that secular reason lacks self-awareness, a problem which will cause 
it to ‘spin out of control’:
159
  it has within itself no mechanism for questioning 
the products and conclusions of its formal, procedural entailments and 
experiments.  It is a conclusion that finds support in the circularity in our 
approach to legislation.  He then goes on to reveal something which says much 
about our energetic and apparently directionless approach to legislation, albeit 
that he view is expressed about science.  Science, he says, continues inventing 
and proliferating technological marvels endlessly without having the slightest 
idea why.
160
  Habermas criticizes us for having ‘naïve faith’
161
 in science’s 
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ability to provide reasons, aside from the reason of its own keeping on going, for 
doing what it does.  
So too perhaps with legislation: we have developed a naïve faith in the 
state and in popular assemblies.  So great is that faith, that despite the fact that 
they might do anything, they can make good choices for why they act as they do 
and not in other ways, and why taking a particular course is good.  Granted that 
the position with respect to science may be more stark than for legislation.  
Legislation, after all, is accompanied by the possibility at least of open debate 
and for investigations to be made into the desirability of the various courses 
which might be adopted.   
Hayek offers a link between Habermas’s thesis and the trust that we place 
in legislation for its constructivist character.  Habermas himself also draws the 
connection for us between science and state action.  The modern liberal state is, 
he shows, the counterpart of science.  That state is one that maintains ‘neutrality 
... towards world views’, including religious visions of what life means, where it 
is going and what we ought do to achieve to help it get there.
162
  But the state, 
holding itself as it does above this and other viewpoints, has no means for 
judging the outcomes.  The whole problem, however, is that such viewpoints 
import real long-term goals that act as a check and reference point for 
momentary desires.  They give those who adhere to them reasons that are more 
than merely prudential or strategic for acting in one way rather than another.  
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A state that lacks such means to check its goals will inevitably act without 
judicious selection: it has ‘lost its grip on the images, preserved by religion, of 
the moral whole’ and cannot come up with ‘collectively binding ideas’.
163
  The 
citizen possesses rights – rights that the state protects – including the right to 
choose.  The direction that the citizen might choose is a matter of indifference to 
the state, because it seeks only to guarantee the right to go there, as it does for 
each other citizen.  There is no morally guided, or collective, action because 
Enlightenment rational morality offers no impulse towards it. 
As a consequence, decoupled as we have become from worldviews, it 
becomes impossible to awaken in the minds of secular subjects, ‘an awareness of 
the violations of solidarity throughout the world, an awareness of what is 
missing, of what cries out to heaven’.
164
  Religion therefore might provide some 
rectification.  Habermas proposes that:
165
  
… the religious side … accept the authority of ‘natural’ reason as the 
fallible results of the institutionalized sciences and the basic principles of 
universalistic egalitarianism in law and morality.  Conversely, secular 
reason may not set itself up as the judge concerning truths of faith, even 
though in the end it can accept as reasonable only what it can translate 
into its own, in principle universally accessible, discourses. 
Habermas’ approach, Norbert Briekskorn says, places demands on religion (ie 
giving up the spheres of law, government, morality and knowledge) but it makes 
no demands in the opposite direction, other than requiring of reason that it 
respect religion.
166
  Michael Reder has observed that Habermas’s approach 
would be to instrumentalise religion, to capture it for secular purposes, ie to ‘to 
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help to prevent or to overcome social disruptions …’.
167
  But having been so 
deployed, his argument runs, religion becomes sidelined again and the 
uncomfortable demands it makes can be once again ignored.   
I offer Habermas’s view as both tending to confirm the circularity of 
reasoning in which we engage when speaking of the state and legislation, and to 
illustrate a cause of that to be the loss to us of any external touchstone by which 
to check our goals and the means by which they are sought to be achieved. 
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I set out on this project identifying a proliferation of legislation and showing modern 
legislation to be confident to legislate on virtually any topic, and regularly so.  That 
‘hyperactivity’ (as Lord Sumption described it) lacks any real notion of limits, its 
proper province or a discernible prioritisation of focus.  The result is a huge volume 
of legislation, governing almost every aspect of human affairs, and rapid and often 
radical change to the norms it contains.  
The practical problems of such proliferation are not difficult to identify, and 
nor is their existence the subject of particular controversy.  They place beyond the 
resources of the ordinary citizen the means to comprehend how the law is likely to 
affect him or her; it puts ‘cognoscibility’ at risk; it renders it more difficult for 
citizens to arrange their affairs and have certainty and predictability in doing so; it 
tends to cause the content of those norms to depart from established sociable 
behaviour and, more generally, risks the law degenerating into massive and possibly 
meaningless, contradictory (or even trivial) blocks of rules and norms; and ones 
susceptible to having been devised and sponsored not by the public or those who 
represent them in popular assemblies, but by instrumental forces desirous of 
achieving their own particular self-serving ends, and ends that might serve some 
useful purpose, but not ones which public will would itself have brought about.  
Waldron’s argument (the principal modern defence of the approach which leads to 
this state of affairs) does not see or meet problems that confront it. 
With so many problems attending the work of the prolific and unfocused 
legislature, we look to some justification for a more or less unbounded deployment 
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of legislation.  We find in Jeremy Waldron that proponent.  He, albeit one 
commentator, stands for the family of like arguments.  The proposition that popular 
assemblies are wise, dignified and more likely to get it right argues for there being a 
wisdom in the multitude, one that is operative through the representative assembly 
and the debate, disagreement and deliberation said to take place in it.  These are 
viewpoints which, when we reflect upon our actual experience of legislation in 
current times, can be seen to have triumphed.  
It is, however, a seriously incomplete and unsatisfactory justification.  One 
purpose of the preceding Chapters has been to explore these factors and to show that, 
because of them, when popular assemblies legislate with the verve they do, there is a 
loss, and a loss of a normative kind because the foundations for the deployment of 
legislation in that manner have not been laid in any complete manner.  It is as well 
however, to collect here a summary of the ways in which that incompleteness arises.  
There are three primary problems:  
1)   a misplaced attribution to legislation of a prestige properly attaching to 
popular assemblies; 
 
2)   a conceptual weakness in seeking to justify the prolific and intrusive 
deployment of legislation because its author (popular assemblies) might 
enjoy kudos as the safer repositories of power than a despotic monarch: that 
is, despotism in either hands remains undesirable; 
 
3)   Waldron’s approach does not seek to answer (or indeed recognise) some 
practical and institutional weaknesses that attend popular assemblies and 
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legislation or some likely underlying causes of the contemporary approach 
to legislation, and nor does it declare the preference on which it must be 
founded of the underlying order being one which there are no limits to our 
capacity or entitlement to change, and revolutionise.  
 
Parliament was instrumental in the transition from a monarch exercising 
despotic, relatively unconstrained power, to a heavily curtailed monarchical power 
and the exercise by Parliament itself of formerly royal powers.  So monumental was 
that achievement, in an era of abuse of monarchical power, that Parliament was 
recognised as having obtained the liberty of the people and brought under control an 
often self-interested tyrant.  In this transition, however, legislation played no 
prominent role.  Yet legislation, as one of the most noticeable products of 
Parliamentary activity, has been afforded the benefit too of that prestige.  
The entanglement of prestige properly attaching to Parliament, but 
unjustifiably extended to legislation can thus be resolved by an historical analysis of 
the circumstances in which that kudos first came to accrue.  It is resolved also by a 
further factor, which is as much historical as it is a sociological observation.  The 
concerns which led to Parliament assuming the role it did, were the curtailment of 
relatively unrestrained power (albeit in the hands of a Monarch) and the 
centralisation of that power and its susceptibility in that form to abuse and undue 
intrusiveness.  The societal concern which led to the establishment of the modern 
Parliament, therefore, would tell against that body acting, through relatively 
unrestrained legislative activity, in much the same way as a despotic monarch.   
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Once the kudos that attaches to Parliament is detached from legislation (an 
entanglement that history rectifies) a conceptual problem is revealed in the Waldron 
approach.  The fact that popular assemblies are afforded prestige is no basis for them 
to make legislation in the prolific manner and with the intrusive effects that our 
actual experience of legislation confirms to be the case.  The institution might 
command respect as being wise, dignified and more likely than alternatives to get it 
right, but no part of doing so would justify a particularly prolific deployment of 
legislation.  The attributes of its author are conceptually separate from the merits of 
the heavy use of one of that body’s powers.  And that is only strengthened if the 
kudos of Parliament is firmly located in the freedom it brought from the despotic and 
intrusive powers, which, for those reasons, it should not lightly be taken to authorise 
in the discharge of its own functions.     
From this there emerges an incompleteness.  The Waldron approach overlooks 
many of the practical and institutional limitations of popular assemblies and 
legislation that I discussed in Chapter 3.  They are not, in reality, forums for free and 
open debate.  Instead, elected representatives might be so bound by party cohesion 
that the differing viewpoints might be far less diverse then the number of 
representatives would suggest.  Public will (itself a problematic concept) is 
susceptible to manipulation and misrepresentation, and bureaucrats seem to keep the 
assembly in a state of such activity (assisted by an acquiescence of the 
representatives themselves) that proper consideration and debate of most legislation 
becomes impossible.  
These factors suggest popular assemblies do not possess attributes to the extent 
that the Waldron approach assumes.  The incompleteness, however, runs deeper.  
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Those who would contend for there being merit in the prolific deployment of 
legislation bear the onus of having offered a more-or-less complete justification for 
that.  If that justification is complete or partial, then where popular assemblies 
legislate in such a manner, there is a loss, and the loss is one which is of a normative 
kind because the stance those assemblies adopt is one for which there is no, or no 
adequate, theoretical basis.   
The incompleteness here is not just a failure to meet practical and institutional 
limitations.  It is also a failure to articulate why other means for the expression of 
public will are not to be preferred.  An example of this is customary law, to which I 
gave consideration in Chapter 4.  It is another means by which public will finds 
expression, but through widespread practices.  It enjoys the mediating influence of 
common law adjudication in Courts by which more habit is subjected to the scrutiny 
of practical reason.  If, as Waldron would have it, there is a wisdom in the multitude, 
then that approach does not make entirely clear why its expression via popular 
assemblies rather than through custom is to enjoy such a strong preference.  There 
would seem to be embedded within that choice a preference – undeclared – for a 
view that underlying order is one that is not immanent and which we should feel 
unrestrained to change, adjust and fashion as we see fit, that it is only through a 
deliberate process, or conscious intellectual effort that the correct or preferable order 
may be arrived at.  The alternative is to accept the order as more or less immanent, 
and open to adjustment but less intrusively and radically, with such adjustments as 
are warranted to be discerned by human behaviour, albeit subject to oversight by the 
rational judge.  The selection of the former over the latter goes undeclared by the 
Waldron approach.  
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There are other deep-seated influences which the Waldron approach overlooks 
or bypasses.  These are powerful forces that are likely to have contributed to the 
proliferation of legislation and the great and frequent reliance we place upon it.  
Legislation is, unlike other sources of law, under-theorised, and is therefore less well 
understood in its jurisprudential strengths and weaknesses. There seems to be a 
modern approach to democracy more akin to the approach inherent in the radical 
Enlightenment than the moderate strain which for some time had prominence in 
Britain, such that there is a prospect of a greater trust reposed in democratic concepts 
that has until recently been the case.  There are questions too of motivations for our 
greater reliance upon legislation or perception of our place in the larger order, our 
relationship with the divine, and those forces larger outside ourselves.  Have we, for 
example, been motivated more by an egotistical desire to decide for ourselves the 
order to which we ought be subject?  The larger possible influences are also ones 
which the Waldron’s approach does not meet.  An onus lies on those who would 
advance it because they are factors which, even if we might not expect to see them 
dismissed are possible influences, ought to have been regarded in the balance as 
possibly causing a favouring of popular assemblies and legislation, or as carrying 
some underlying bias in their favour.  
  Underlying the arguments I have advanced in Chapter 5 in particular lies a 
theme: that there is good reason to suspect that legislatures and legislation have 
considerable limitations, and that there exists a gap – a gulf in fact – between those 
limitations and what doctrinal law recognises.  We leave it largely to politics to be 
the force that restrains legislatures and legislation and guides them to avoid activities 
and modes that would cause these boundaries to be crossed.   
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There are a number of problems with entrusting such important matters to the 
political process.  First, we are entitled to be sceptical at the very least whether the 
political system is equipped in theory or in practice to recognise such limitations and 
to ensure that they are either avoided or the effect of them mitigated.  Secondly, one 
of my central arguments has been that we have lost the capacity to imagine a system 
different from one in which the state monopolises rule-making so absolutely and in 
which legislation has come to dominate.  Such lack of awareness means that the 
political system (indeed any system) will not act to remedy it.  Thirdly, the political 
process is, in some ways at least, a contributor to the problem just described, because 
it has come about in part from the way we regard democracy and popular assemblies, 
a regard which, I have argued, is somewhat naïve, and hearkens more to what such 
assemblies achieved historically than the way in which they operate in contemporary 
times.  Fourthly, the system we have in which we entrust to politics the necessary 
controls, is the very same one that has led to legislation proliferating in the way that 
it has, lacking any real or sufficient prioritisation of focus, and being considered 
(unthinkingly perhaps) to be a solution to every problem, however small and 
technical.  Finally one aspiration we might reasonably have for legislation is that it 
be removed from day-to-day politics, or at least to enjoy a separation to some degree 
from those tumultuous, unscientific and changeable forces.  
This is not the occasion to venture ways to counter the prevailing tendency.  I 
have not sought to do more than to identify and diagnose a problem and a serious 
incompleteness in the major arguments that would appear to underpin the present 
approach to legislation.  I have not here, most importantly, sought to be exhaustive in 
my treatment of the normative considerations that necessarily underpin a choice of 
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that kind.  I offered, in doing so, alternatives to the pervasive modern disposition to 
legislatures and legislation.  I do not, however, offer my project as showing the 
present approach to be one that is definitely wrong or not to be preferred.  I do hope, 
however, that it has contributed to seeing that there are alternatives to the existing 
approach. 
For now, however, I would identify the loss I have diagnosed as a serious one, 
and as exposing legislative hyperactivity to be a reality rather than an approach 
which can claim superiority over other possible alternatives.  If there is a 
contribution which I would wish this project to have made to the discourse on this 
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